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

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POLEMICS & EXCHANGES

On Helping Taiwan

In his article "Out on a Limb: America's Pledge to Defend Taiwan" (*Vital Signs*, December), Ted Galen Carpenter does not discuss whether it is in America's national interest for Taiwan to fall under the control of the Beijing regime. Instead, he argues that our Asian allies may not support our defense of the island. To Carpenter, this makes the situation so "perilous" that the United States should cut and run before anything happens.

The successful military conquest of Taiwan by China would send shock waves through Asia. Taiwan is a prosperous democratic country that has been governing herself for over half a century. She sits across strategic sea-lanes, and her offshore economic zone encompasses potentially rich oil and mineral deposits. She is the center of global computer-chip manufacturing.

Carpenter works for the libertarian Cato Institute, a group that purports to cherish freedom. How can he accept the idea of a free people being brought under the heel of an aggressive dictatorship by armed force? He admits that "younger Taiwanese . . . regard the mainland as an alien place and have little enthusiasm for reunification" but cites this as a justification for Beijing to move quickly to subjugate Taiwan before the spirit of liberty grows any stronger.

The rise of China will force other states either to form a coalition to contain Beijing or to board the Chinese "bandwagon" in hopes of gaining some spoils as an accomplice.

Singapore has attempted to draw American attention toward Southeast Asia by offering the use of her new Changi Naval Station, which includes a pier built to accommodate aircraft carriers. Tokyo has worked to reenergize the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter China. While North Korea provides the cover for cooperation on missile defense, Beijing is clearly the real concern. Japan, South Korea, and Australia have sent troops to Iraq, not because they have any direct interests there, but because they value their alliance with the United States and responded to American leadership. If there were a crisis much closer to home, they would again respond to Washington's call.

Of course, our allies hope that no crisis will occur. The *status quo* of a *de facto* independent Taiwan serves everyone's immediate interests. China is threatening violence but does not have the means to invade. Carpenter cites a recent "D-Day-style" exercise by Chinese forces, but the units involved were very small compared with what it would take to invade Taiwan. On the actual D Day of 1944, it took a massive logistic effort to move Allied forces to Normandy across only 25 miles of water with complete control of the air and sea. Chinese forces would have to cross 100 miles of open water in the face of the U.S. Navy and against the most experienced air force in the world. It would be the Marianas Turkey Shoot, not D Day.

If American allies show lukewarm concern for Taiwan, it is because Washington has not staked out is own position with clarity. Deterrence is the best way to maintain peace, but it is weakened by ambiguous statements like those that too often emanate from the State Department. Pyongyang's attack on Seoul in 1950 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were both examples of dictators mistakenly believing no response would meet their aggression.

Washington should proclaim its support for Taiwan while the military balance is in its favor. Otherwise, allies may well be tempted to board the Chinese bandwagon. No coalition is possible without American leadership. An American retreat from long-standing commitments would send a signal that the balance of power has already shifted in Beijing's favor, and not just in the Taiwan Strait.

—*William R. Hawkins*
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Carpenter Replies:

Many of the criticisms expressed by Bill Hawkins have little to do with the thrust of my article. The point that I emphasized was that, if the United States decided to defend Taiwan from an attack by the People's Republic of China, she would probably have to do so alone. I did not focus on the question of whether the United States should defend Taiwan (although I have done so elsewhere). Nor did I dis-

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cuss what a defense of Taiwan might cost America in blood and treasure—which would likely be far greater than Hawkins' rosy scenario of a U.S.-executed "turkey shoot" in the Taiwan Strait.

His principal response to the central thesis of my article is the curious argument that Washington's East Asian allies would eagerly support a more confrontational U.S. policy toward China: "If American allies show lukewarm concern for Taiwan, it is because Washington has not staked out its own position with clarity." That view is dangerously misguided. The lack of support from East Asian nations for U.S. policy regarding Taiwan is the result of their growing economic and political ties to China, not because of an absence of U.S. resolve. Those countries understand that China is fast emerging as the leading power in the region, and they see no gain for themselves in antagonizing Beijing.

Hawkins' argument also is reminiscent of the illusion that advocates of a hawkish policy toward Iraq embraced during the Clinton administration. They were confident that, if the United States adopted a clear, hard-line policy toward Saddam Hussein, such countries as France, Germany, Russia, and India would fall into line and support Washington. Yet, when George W. Bush pursued such a policy, those countries stood on the sidelines and denounced U.S. actions. Bill Hawkins and others who argue that East Asian nations would support a strong, explicitly pro-Taiwan policy by the United States are indulging in another comforting delusion.

Hawkins cites evidence that many of the East Asian allies want to strengthen their alliances with Washington. That is true, but it simply highlights their self-serving and free-riding behavior. They want the best of both worlds—a fruitful and ever-expanding relationship with the PRC combined with a U.S.-provided military insurance policy in the event that China turns aggressively expansionist and pursues goals beyond retaking Taiwan. That is a terrific deal for them, since the United States incurs the bulk of the costs and risks of those security arrangements. Whether it is a good deal for the United States is another question.

It is, of course, a sad prospect that a free and democratic Taiwan might someday be conquered by an authoritarian PRC. But while Taiwan has some economic and moral importance, her continued *de facto* independence is not essential to America's survival. When less-than-vital American interests are at stake, wise policymakers must do a cost-benefit calculation. The prospect of defending Taiwan—without allied support—against a China that will certainly become stronger militarily in the years ahead is a sobering one. It certainly does not suggest a situation in which the benefits clearly outweigh the costs.

On Beslan

Srdja Trifkovic's conclusion to his piece on the Beslan tragedy ("After Beslan," *The American Interest*, November) hits the mark precisely. Orthodox Christians have had it proved to them over and over again that the West will prefer the friendship of the Mohammedan to ours, unless we volunteer to forsake our convictions and identity to become second-class Westerners. At one time, this meant subjection to the pope. Today, it consists in subjection to the New World Order. It is ironic that the honest traveler cannot help but notice that what is left of Christian Europe—a living Christian Europe, not inanimate cultural monuments—remains in the Orthodox Eastern Europe so long despised by the once-triumphant West, at one time declared dead by communism but now haltingly yet demonstrably coming to life again despite malicious opposition from secularists and Muslims and uncomprehending interference from non-Orthodox Christians. If you wish to know where the hope of the world lies, look East.

—Fr. Steven Allen
Rectory of St. Spyridon Church
St. Clair Shores, MI

Nothing, including the 1182 massacre of thousands of Roman Catholics in Constantinople under the Byzantine emperor Andronicus, justifies the sack of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204. However, contrary to Srdja Trifkovic's "After Beslan," this was not what led to Muslim incursion into Europe. The Muslims never made it into Eastern Europe until they were permitted to cross the Dardanelles in 1348 by John Cantacuzemus in exchange for their aid in his successful civil war to become Byzantine emperor. This was almost a century and a half after the Fourth Crusade. The Byzantines had two-and-a-half centuries to recover from the Fourth Crusade before the Ottomans finally took Constantinople in 1453, but, by that time, the Muslims were already very well established in Eastern Europe, thanks, in part, to John Cantacuzemus.

—Joe Porreca
West Seneca, NY

Dr. Trifkovic Replies:

I am not sure just how much hope there is when we look East. "The West" has just triumphed in the Ukraine, following a massive joint European-American disinformation and manipulation campaign. Its goal is to turn the country into a mirror image of its westernmost third, a Russophobic condominium of Washington's global hegemonists and the European Union's postnational Christophobes.

Huntington's civilizational blocks continue to determine Western attitudes. The identity of the Eastern European Christians is deemed irrelevant, at best, or a removable obstacle, at worst. After so many decades of suffering, their survival—let alone revival—is scarcely imagined except on Western terms, as a faithful imitation of, and absorption in, the postnational, post-Christian nightmare that surrounds us.

In 1204, the English, French, and Germans were all "*Frankoi*" who demanded compliance. They fatally wounded Byzantium, which was the main cause of its weakened condition when the Muslim onslaught came. Even on the eve of its final collapse, the precondition for any Western help was submission in Florence. Eight hundred years later, when it comes to liquidating the last European remnant of living Christianity, any gap between the Sorosite left and the Wolfowitzian imperial "right," between the United States and Europe, and between Europe "old" and "new," disappears almost completely.

This is the only crusade that the Muslims can support with glee. It is worse than a crime; it is a mistake.

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by David A. Hartman

The Bush Economic Agenda

Energized by his election as if it were a landslide, President George W. Bush proposes to spend his "political capital" on an ambitious economic agenda headed by reform of Social Security and the U.S. Tax Code. The President's candor in acknowledging that the deficits and tax cuts of his first term—the "Wall Street Relief and Bush Reelection Acts"—will make it harder to achieve his new agenda raises questions about the qualifications Team Bush brings to the task of cutting through these two Gordian knots. President Bush did not secure a mandate for these goals from the electorate; opinion polls show that the public prefers a reduction of deficits over a reform of Social Security and taxation.

The reduction of the federal budget deficit should be the first priority of the economic agenda. Bush has proposed to halve the federal deficit by pushing social-welfare spending off onto the already beleaguered budgets of the states and delaying the modernization of defense rather than rescinding any of his tax cuts or addressing the generous agricultural and corporate-welfare payoffs and other political pork that rewarded donors of his first-term victory. *Déjà vu* of another Texan, Lyndon Johnson, he is still vacillating between "guns and butter" by opting for both.

The Bush plan for Social Security would offer younger workers the option of establishing "privatized" individual accounts funded from employee Social Security contributions. This proposal has the commendable effect of beginning the conversion to a real retirement and disability savings scheme, directly addressing the chronic U.S. savings deficit and reducing the unfunded $3.7 billion actuarial liability that characterizes Social Security as a New Deal "Ponzi scheme" that gratuitously redistributes income from current workers to current retirees. Bush has limited the scope of reform, however, by insisting that there will be no reductions in benefits nor increases in payroll taxes. By comparison, Plan Two of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security included cost-of-living adjustment of benefits rather than the current wage indexing, which, along with partial privatization, would resolve the pending crisis.

The tax-reform goals Bush has outlined include deferring taxes on all saving for investment until consumed and fundamentally simplifying the tax code—*possibly* by means of a consumption-based tax—while making permanent his first-term tax cuts. The "complications" to which he has referred arise from the fact that *both* Social Security reform and fundamental tax reform will cause transitional losses in tax revenues that have already been spent on the tax cuts he proposes to make permanent. Also, his tax cuts for dividends and capital gains were steps toward the flat income tax, not a consumption tax; *only* a consumption tax—such as a National Sales Tax or a Business Transaction (value-added) Tax—would provide the urgently needed border-adjusted taxation that could rescue the drowning manufacturing sector by leveling the playing field with other industrialized countries that impose value-added taxation. The Commission on Tax Reform that the President intends to appoint must be allowed to address the border-adjusted taxation issue honestly. The Commerce Department's "Manufacturing in America" game plan declined to recognize the problem, much less to address it.

Unaddressed in the President's plans for economic reform are runaway Medicare and Medicaid entitlements, which similarly redistribute income from current workers to current retirees' and indigents' healthcare and have an unfunded liability several times that of the Social Security obligations. Bush proposes curbs on class-action and malpractice suits, as well as his tax-exempt healthcare savings accounts, to help rein in healthcare inflation. These structural improvements, however, will be at the very least offset by his addition of prescription benefits to runaway "first dollar" to "the-sky-is-the-limit" Medicare entitlements.

Also conspicuously missing from the Bush agenda is anything that could arrest the decline of the devalued dollar, much less strengthen it. (See "Diagnosing the Diminishing Dollar," p. 42.) The excess of cheap money being supplied by the Federal Reserve, acting as the lackey of Wall Street, undermines saving for investment, funds excessive borrowing for consumption, and invites speculation that threatens an eventual collapse of market values. The closing of the saving deficit, the federal deficit, and the trade deficit all require financial discipline, not the quick fix of easy money, which will only exacerbate economic problems in the future.

An appropriate economic agenda for the next four years must take into account the reality that the United States has been on a consumption binge increasingly funded by foreign savings, an imbalance that threatens not only the United States but the entire world economy. Solutions such as Social Security privatization and consumption-based taxation can contribute to increased saving and to restoring sound U.S. economic growth. However, border-adjusted taxation is probably the most important reform needed to balance the unsustainable trade deficit in goods that transfers ownership and mortgages of U.S. productive assets to foreign investors to fund the excesses of U.S. consumers. A respected currency is a far greater force for U.S. influence than spending on unwarranted military adventures—which, when added to bloated domestic spending, demands excessive federal revenues.

The President should be supported by his Republican Congress in legislating his priorities for economic reform, provided such legislation is accompanied by the curtailing of federal spending and the levying of the taxation required to close the federal deficit. Republicans can expect bitter Democratic opposition to Social Security privatization but could get cooperation on border-adjusted tax reform. The President can best serve his agenda by encouraging his Republican Congress to provide the legislation they are better staffed to create and by using his "bully pulpit" to sell these reforms to the electorate, while exercising critical and frugal oversight of which bills to sign and which to veto. c

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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION and its supporters are investing tremendous hope in Iraq's January national elections. According to the conventional wisdom in Washington, violence may increase as the balloting approaches, but, once the election is held, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis will be convinced that the resulting government is legitimate. Except for the foreign terrorists and the Saddam dead-enders, the insurgents will gradually give up and participate in the democratic process. Violence will subside, and a stable, united, democratic, pro-Western Iraq will emerge, allowing the United States to draw down her forces stationed in that country.

It is a charming vision, but those who cling to the Iraq mission previously invested their hopes in other purported milestones that would dampen the insurgency. For most of the warhawks, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime was supposed to be the defining moment. American troops were to be welcomed as liberators, and Iraqi exiles, led by the Pentagon's favorite politician, Ahmed Chalabi, would become the successor government in Baghdad virtually by acclamation. Much to the surprise and dismay of the pro-war faction, it didn't turn out that way.

Then, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 was the great milestone. Since virtually all insurgents were supposedly Ba'athist followers of Saddam, his capture would dishearten the rebels and cause the insurgency to fade. Instead, the insurgency flared with unprecedented ferocity in the spring of 2004.

Next, proponents of the Iraq mission attached great importance to the handover of nominal sovereignty in late June 2004. With American officials no longer directly running the show, Iraqis would certainly rally behind the interim government of Iyad Allawi. That proved to be another faulty prediction; the insurgency intensified.

The national elections will likely prove as disappointing as the previous milestones. Indeed, the elections may make matters even more difficult for the U.S. occupation force.

Contrary to the Bush administration's hopes and expectations, the elections are likely to produce a government not only controlled by the Shia majority but dominated by religious parties and candidates. In other words, the "new Iraq" is probably going to be Islamic, not secular and pro-Western. It was the fear that the elections would lead to a highly religious government that caused the Kurds (the most secular of Iraq's factions) to side with Sunni leaders in proposing that the balloting be postponed.

To make matters even worse for the United States, the new government may be quite friendly to Iran. Tehran is skillfully exploiting linkages with its Shia coreligionists in Iraq. The two most influential politicians in Iraq are the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Both men have long-standing ties to Iran.

There is a chance that the elections will prove to be the panacea for which the pro-war faction is hoping. That chance, however, is remote. Iraq was always inhospitable soil for planting a secular, pro-Western democracy. Democracy involves far more than just setting up institutions and holding elections. To be viable, it needs a strong culture of tolerance. Democracy requires that majorities accept and protect individual rights, observe due process of law, protect freedom of expression, and protect property rights.

All of those values are weak or entirely absent in Iraq's political culture. Thus, we should not be surprised if the new Shia-dominated government uses its power to oppress the Sunni minority that was the oppressor for so many decades. Nor should we be surprised if the new national assembly draws up a constitution that enshrines the most coercive aspects of Islamic law and bears almost no resemblance to the American Constitution. The real surprise would be if the political process in Iraq turns out otherwise.

Those who hope that the January elections will be a panacea for Washington's foundering mission in Iraq are almost certainly doomed to be disappointed yet again. One wonders what panacea they will cling to next, since they seem to be running out of options.

—Ted Galen Carpenter

STEM CELLS have taken center stage in California. In November 2004, California's voters approved, with 59 percent of the vote, a measure that would spend three billion dollars in borrowed state funds to pay for research that requires the destruction of human embryos.

You might expect a heated debate over whether such research is morally acceptable—and whether the state government should be in the business of paying for it, especially with a bond measure, and especially given the state's precarious financial footing.

A few pro-life groups opposed the initiative, as did many fiscal conservatives, but they spent little money, and it's hard to overcome the star power of Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who lent his massive credibility to the plan. With the death of Christopher Reeve, and with the widely publicized claims about the potential for this research to solve every medical problem under the sun, it was unreasonable, perhaps, to expect California's voters to reject Prop. 71.

Now that the election is over, some obvious problems are coming to the surface. Californians are getting the broader debate that should have taken place before November. Democratic Sen. Debra Ortiz, who strongly backed Prop. 71, introduced a bill that would give state legislators some oversight of the stem-cell spending process.

That proposal was attacked instantly by Bob Klein, the Palo Alto real-estate developer who was named head of the institute created by the initiative. "There are very clear prohibitions against legislative intervention and rule-making and funding," Klein said, in a December 7 *Los Angeles Times* article.

Critics were correct, then. The $300 million that will be spent each year on research from the initiative will be spent in an unaccountable fashion. Ten of 27 board members have been named, but the public and its legislators will be kept out of the loop.

State Sen. Tom McClintock, the Simi Valley Republican who ran in the 2003 gubernatorial recall election, was one of the few voices speaking out before the initiative passed. He focused on the ridiculousness of a state already in deep financial doo-doo maxing its credit card to pay for something of this nature.

McClintock and others also noted the obvious potential for corruption when government officials get to reward private

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firms with billions of dollars in funding. Money will go to the politically well-connected rather than to the most promising cures. Some board members themselves are involved in the biotech industry, according to published reports.

Prop. 71 backers are debating the merits of Klein's leadership. "We're setting up an echo chamber here where we're only going to hear from people who agree with each other," said Marcy Darnovsky, associate executive director of the Center for Genetics and Society, in a December 14 *Los Angeles Times* article.

Of course, this initiative has always been about politics rather than science. The goal of Klein and his backers was to get around President George W. Bush's awkward compromise on stem-cell research. As one of Klein's top supporters told the *Times*: "[T]hroughout his career, and most recently as chairman of the Proposition 71 campaign, Mr. Klein has demonstrated an understanding of the politics of science."

To cynics, there is a bright side in the politicization of this money. As my colleague, *Orange County Register* editorial writer John Seiler, put it in a recent *Register* blog entry: "The more money wasted, the fewer babies will be killed and dissected. Ideally, the mad scientists involved will blow all the money on Ferraris, long vacations in Tahiti, beachfront mansions, and stocking their wine cellars, with no money spent on the actual 'research.'"

That might be the best we can hope for at this point.

—*Steven Greenhut*

THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY (BNP), founded in 1982 by John Tyndall, a former chairman of the National Front, has consistently campaigned to reverse postwar immigration, to withdraw Britain from the European Union, to reintroduce the death penalty for serious crimes, to back Ulster's Loyalists, to support the family, and to place greater restraints on big business. Such policies were never exactly going to help the party secure the Nobel Peace Prize, and the BNP has never been treated kindly by the powers-that-be. Yet under its new leader, Nick Griffin, a law graduate from Cambridge and, like his predecessor, a former senior figure in the National Front, official and semi-official harassment of the party has reached new heights (or plumbed new depths)—despite some softening of policies and improvements in presentation.

The reason is that the BNP, once widely viewed as morally outrageous but irrelevant, is now viewed as morally outrageous but increasingly relevant. Victories in local elections since 2001 and creditable votes in the June 2004 European elections have given it important local council representation (mostly in northern England) and raised the outside possibility that it may even secure representation at Westminster for the first time in next year's general election. Had it not been for the sudden surge of the United Kingdom Independence Party in June—they went from 3 MEP's to 12—the BNP would almost certainly have obtained a few European Parliament seats, a happenstance that has led to predictable BNP mutterings about "conspiracies."

Since 2001, when the BNP won its first council seats in Burnley, the political temperature has been rising. Stung by the constant allegations of Stokely Carmichael-ish "institutional racism," senior figures in Britain's armed forces, police, and prison services have overcompensated by fanatically opposing "racism." In 2002, the head of the Prison Service decreed that BNP members could not be prison officers. In November 2003, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) stated that BNP members should not be allowed to join the police because they were likely to display what one ACPO representative called "attitudes incompatible with professional policing"—a point of view shared by then-Home Secretary David Blunkett, who took time out from expediting his mistress's nanny's visa applications to bleat, "I don't believe it is possible for a member of the British National Party to be a police officer in this country." (Presumably as a ploy to ingratiate themselves with London's overwhelmingly anti-Tory ethnic minorities, London's Conservatives contemptibly suggested that this ban should be extended to the Fire Brigade.)

Despite protestations of objectivity and pretensions to liberalism, Britain's media have been unremittingly hostile to the BNP, never giving them any credit and never treating BNP members as fellow human beings. Even such self-styled "conservative" newspapers as the *Daily Telegraph* have blindly accepted the ultraleft view of the BNP as being unreservedly true; many of the articles that appear across the spectrum of newspapers are almost identical, as if they were cut-and-pasted from one another. The result is that BNP members are often treated like outcasts and are omitted from discussions, denied civil liberties, sacked from jobs, and refused support by trade unions—although a newly proficient legal team has ensured that many such outrages are later quietly reversed, and erstwhile employers compelled to pay compensation. Within Britain's chattering classes, it is thought cleverly postmodern to say, as one agitpropping musician expressed it, that BNP members should be beaten up or even, as comedian Jeremy Hardy said on his BBC radio show, that BNP members and supporters should be shot in the back of the head. When hackers closed down the BNP website for several weeks earlier this year, there were no expressions of concern from those who are the most assiduous in promoting freedom of expression for everybody else.

The BBC—despite being governed by a Royal Charter that commits it to strict objectivity—is one of the BNP's most persistent enemies, perhaps with an eye to ingratiating itself with the government that will be reviewing its Royal Charter in 2006. In July 2004, the BBC broadcast a documentary called *Secret Agent*, a "shock-horror" type of program that secretly filmed BNP members saying and admitting to doing discreditable things, from squirting dog excrement through the letterboxes of Asian families to fighting in the streets to saying (this from John Tyndall, who was recently expelled by Griffin) that "all that has come out of Africa is voodoo, cannibalism, and AIDS."

This documentary had several important results for the party. First, the BNP's bankers—the HSBC and Barclays Bank (the latter, incidentally, a strong supporter of apartheid-era South Africa), followed by the Alliance & Leicester—withdrew their facilities from the party. The BNP has had to move its banking operations overseas—a move that has further hindered the party's already shambolic accounting procedures and earned it a £5,000 fine from the Electoral Commission for late filing of accounts. In September 2004, confidential Home Office documents leaked to the press revealed that the government was drawing up plans to prevent BNP members from joining the Civil Service. (One of the chief architects of the plan is Martin Narey, who was head of the Prison Service at

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the time of that ban.) In December, nine BNP members were arrested as a result of the program, including Nick Griffin—although six, including Griffin, have been released without charge. This is probably because the "crime" Griffin is alleged to have committed—that of calling Islam "a wicked, vicious faith"—is not yet a crime, pending the government's proposed banning of "Islamophobia" in 2005.

It has to be said that the BNP is sometimes its own worst enemy, by being insufficiently selective about whom it admits as members, by cutting administrative corners, and by being strident, paranoid, and aggrieved. There are also presentational wrinkles, with—to take just two of many possible examples—its website referring to Michael Howard as "Michael Hecht" (his Jewish-Romanian family's original name) and calling political opponents "vermin." If BNP members want to be treated with respect, they must show a little respect in turn for their political opponents, many of whom are more mistaken than malicious. Yet, these undeniable BNP faults aside, one uncomfortable fact remains: A worryingly large number of Britain's politicians and opinion-formers are guilty of unchivalrous conduct, intellectual laziness, and political turpitude unworthy of a genuinely free and liberal society.

—*Derek Turner*

ALBERTO GONZALES, President Bush's nominee to replace John Ashcroft as attorney general, is, by all accounts, a skilled lawyer who has achieved a great deal since his humble beginnings as the son of Mexican migrant farmworkers. He also has compiled a track record that should trouble all those who wish to limit abortion, immigration, affirmative action, or the powers of the executive branch.

As a member of the Texas Supreme Court, Gonzales joined the majority of the court in construing a Texas statute intended to restrict a minor's ability to have an abortion without first informing her parents to allow most minors in Texas to bypass their parents when deciding to have an abortion. In *In re Jane Doe*, 19 S.W. 3d 346 (2000), the Texas Supreme Court ruled that "Jane Doe," a 17-year-old, was entitled to have an abortion without first informing her parents, overturning both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, each of which had found that "Jane Doe" had not met the statute's requirements for bypassing her parents. In allowing "Jane Doe" to abort her child, the Texas Supreme Court ignored an amicus brief filed by the statute's sponsors indicating that the Texas legislature wanted the statute's bypass provisions to be narrowly construed. In a stinging dissent, Justice Nathan Hecht convincingly argued that the rationale for the majority's decision was that it did "not regard the decision to have an abortion as being a very important one." Bush's nomination of Gonzales as attorney general does not augur well for his keeping faith with the social conservatives who gave him the margin of victory over John Kerry.

Gonzales' appointment also signals that the second Bush administration will be no more friendly than was the first to those seeking to limit immigration or affirmative action. Liberal columnist Joe Rodriguez, writing in the November 16, 2004, *San Jose Mercury News*, praised Gonzales, claiming that "Gonzales advised his friend in the big, flat state of Texas when then Governor Bush headed off a ballot initiative modeled after California's Proposition 187. That unconstitutional doozy would have ended public services and education for illegal immigrants." The National Council of La Raza, an active opponent of measures to stem illegal immigration, reacted to Gonzales' appointment by issuing an adulatory press release, noting that "Alberto Gonzales served with distinction on the board of one of NCLR's oldest and most respected affiliates, the Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans (AAMA) in Houston, Texas."

With respect to affirmative action, Gonzales has already had a major impact. As White House counsel, he intervened to change the briefs the Justice Department intended to file in the University of Michigan affirmative-action cases from arguing against any government consideration of race to arguing that the government had an interest in promoting "diversity." Many observers believe that the position taken by the Bush administration under Gonzales's prodding was instrumental in causing the Court to uphold most forms of affirmative action in higher education.

More recently, Gonzales has gained notoriety as the author of a January 2002 memorandum arguing that the "War on Terror" has made the Geneva Convention's limitations on treatment of enemy prisoners "obsolete" and "renders quaint some of its provisions." Critics charge that this was the message received by the jailers at Abu Ghraib. Gonzales also asked the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel to write an August 2002 memorandum that concluded that torturing suspected Al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad "may be justified" and that American criminal law's prohibition against torture "does not apply to the President's detention and interrogation of enemy combatants pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority."

Some conservatives, looking for comfort in the Gonzales nomination, have argued that at least he will not now be nominated for the Supreme Court. At the very least, though, Gonzales will be in an excellent position to help select any Supreme Court nominee Bush gets a chance to appoint. And some administration officials have suggested that the attorney general appointment is designed to help Gonzales reach the Supreme Court, by allowing him to distance himself from the controversy over Abu Ghraib.

—*Tom Piatak*

OBITER DICTA: Our first poet this month is **Charles Edward Eaton**, who lives in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Mr. Eaton is the author of four volumes of short stories; a novel, *A Lady of Pleasure*; and many collections of poetry, including *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, which includes a number of poems published in *Chronicles*. He is the recipient of the North Carolina Award for Literature, among other prizes, and was awarded an honorary Doctor of Literature degree by St. Andrews College.

Our second poet is **Peter Hunt**, a widely published essayist and critic who sits on the editorial board of the *Chesterton Review*. His poetry has appeared in various journals and magazines.

Our cover art is provided by our interior artist, **George McCartney, Jr.** Mr. McCartney has studied at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and received a bachelor's of art from the State University of New York at Geneseo. Since 1997, he has work in various mediums in the fields of illustration, graphic design, and textiles. George currently resides in New York City with his wife, Kristin, and his son, William. He can be contacted at *georgemccartney@mac.com*.

Our interior art is provided by our designer, **Melanie Anderson**. Mrs. Anderson received her B.F.A. from Northern Illinois University.

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by Thomas Fleming

Selling Muhammad the Rope

The "War on Terror," as the years roll by, looks more like a Maginot Line than like a *Blitzkrieg*.

Instead of hunting down terrorists or expelling Islamic cells from the United States, President Bush has chosen to attack the rogue states of Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of targeting Islam itself as the source of anti-American terrorism, administration officials have spoken blandly of "the religion of peace" and joined hands in prayer with some of the very mullahs who have egged their followers on to destroy us. Instead of instituting rigorous ethnic profiling of all people whose origin and appearance would give grounds for suspicion, the administration has preferred to pass the PATRIOT Act, an impossibly unwieldy set of measures that intrude into the private lives of library patrons, e-mail correspondents, and elderly DAR members boarding airplanes. And, finally, instead of protecting the borders, Mr. Bush insists that it is better to fight terrorism in Iraq than here in the United States, and this mantra has been repeated so often to American soldiers that it is virtually the only answer they give when reporters ask them what we are doing in Iraq.

Whether we view the war in Iraq as justifiable or not, this much is clear: We cannot defend Americans at home by killing Iraqis in the Middle East. Although a large percentage of Republican voters apparently believed that the Al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center were Iraqi agents, the greatest number of Islamic terrorists come from such "friendly" Islamic countries as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

After three years of false starts and failed initiatives, it is very difficult to sum up the U.S. response to terrorism. There is, perhaps, no point in looking back at Secretary Rumsfeld's on-and-off-and-on attempts to control the world's media, Colin Powell's disinformational speech to the United Nations, Condoleezza Rice's disastrous congressional testimony, or the apparent treason that is tolerated in the Department of Defense under the number-three man, Douglas Feith. I prefer to let bygones be bygones and to concentrate only on what has happened in the past week.

The first week of December 2004 was a busy time for the War on Terror. When Tony Blair met with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan on the sixth, Musharraf was pleased to report that he had smashed the Al Qaeda operation in his country. This must have been reassuring both to Britain and to the United States: George W. Bush, only the day before, had saluted Pakistan as a strategic "frontline" ally in the War on Terror.

General Musharraf has not always been so tough on Al Qaeda. He has been long suspected of having close ties to narcotrafficking—a major business in Pakistan—and his close connection to Islamic extremists does not have to be suspected: They are the basis of his rise to power. He trained Islamic extremists for service in Afghanistan against the Soviets, worked with Osama bin Laden to suppress a Shia uprising in his own country, and has, for years, maintained close links with the terrorists who have been working to establish an Islamic state in Kashmir. In this ongoing terrorist operation, he was, once again, Bin Laden's ally.

Back in September, Musharraf—sounding like no one so much as Jesse Jackson—declared that the United States must confront the root causes of terrorism—poverty and illiteracy—and he repeated his not-so-subtle plea for Western financial assistance in his meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. While this might sound as if the general has learned to pander to the American liberal establishment, we should listen to him: He certainly has more hands-on experience with terrorists than anyone in the CIA does. He probably arrived at this conclusion from studying the poverty and deprivation in which Osama bin Laden was brought up.

Both Tony Blair and George W. Bush say that they agree with Musharraf that the problem of Kashmir must be addressed. What neither seemed willing to say, however, was that the problem of Kashmir is seriously aggravated by Pakistan's unwillingness to curtail cross-border incursions of Islamic terrorists into the province. Kashmir is a complex situation, and no hands are exactly clean, but Musharraf and his cronies have an unbroken record of supporting and collaborating with Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

For decades, both Britain and the United States have turned a blind eye to Pakistani aggression, and this one-sided policy has strained relations with the emerging economic superpower of the region: India. Such a policy might have made some sense during the Cold War, but, in the current context, it seems suicidal. Any War on Terror in which Musharraf's Pakistan is an ally cannot be won.

Pakistan is hardly the only American ally to profit from the heroin trade with Western countries. A few days before the Blair-Musharraf meeting, Donald Rumsfeld arrived in Afghanistan to attend the inauguration of the American puppet, Hamid Karzai, under whose leadership and U.S. protection the Afghan drug lords have stepped up poppy production. The director of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime recently revealed that Afghanistan's opium cultivation has increased by 64 percent to a record 131,000 hectares, the highest drug cultivation in the country's history, and warned: "The fear that Afghanistan might degenerate into a narco-state is slowly becoming a reality."

Karzai has made reassuring noises about burning poppy fields, but the fact remains that, under U.S. control, the production of this chemical WMD was vastly increased. The administration's split personality on this issue (or is it only doublespeak?) is very clear if you visit the CIA website to see what they claim to be doing in the War on Terror. At the top of the page is this statement of former director George Tenet: "What are the threats that keep me awake at night? International terrorism, both on its own and in conjunction with narcotics traffickers, international criminals and those seeking weapons of mass destruction. You need go no further than Usama Bin Ladin."

Perhaps Karzai will reform himself and his country. Already, he has signaled that it is time for a change: amnesty for Taliban leaders who promise to behave. This is more than a little puzzling. Professional officers in Iraq, who might make a real difference in policing and governing the

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country, are deliberately kept out of the armed forces, while the Taliban—the extremist savages who sheltered Osama and provoked war with the United States—are to be forgiven. Perhaps it is because among the Taliban are certainly many of those heroic freedom-fighters trained by the CIA, who armed and paid them and, to beef up their heroism in the struggle with Russia, sent in fundamentalist mullahs to inspire them with religious fanaticism against the entire non-Islamic world. When, about a year before September 11, I had the occasion to challenge several CIA agents on this policy, their response was simple: It was the best idea at the time, and still, in retrospect, it seems the best decision. Are they still saying that?

On the same day that Blair and Musharraf were comforting each other, five men in San Diego County were indicted on charges of smuggling illegal immigrants from Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland into the United States. The smuggling ring was active between 2001 and 2004—in other words, during the years of heightened security following September 11. The names alone indicate the international dimensions of the problem: Yervand Asriyants; Charles Altamos; Suren Chamian; George Leyfer; and Justin Peltier.

Asriyants, allegedly the leader of the group, and Chamian both appear to be Armenians. Russia is filled with Islamic extremists from the former Soviet Union, and such people have no trouble making their way into Ukraine and Poland. Of course, these Armenians may not have been smuggling in Islamic terrorists but only Jewish fiddle-players from Russia and electrical engineers from Poland. The point is that a European/Central Asian smuggling ring had made contact with U.S. smugglers of aliens and, for three years, carried out their invasion of the United States. There can be no doubt that Al Qaeda terrorists are investigating the possibilities and may have already set up a network for importing terrorists into the United States by way of Mexico. In 2002, the Coast Guard learned that some 25 Al Qaeda operatives had entered the United States as stowaways on commercial vessels, and a year ago, the Italian government warned Tom Ridge that Al Qaeda was increasingly involved in illegal immigration—a multi-billion-dollar business.

As Samuel Francis observed at the November 2004 John Randolph Club meeting in San Antonio, if a pregnant Mexican woman can make it to San Diego, what is there to prevent an Al Qaeda terrorist from doing the same? The answer is: nothing. Certainly not the new "strict" provisions for homeland security going through Congress. When conservatives called for measures of tougher immigration control to be inserted into the House bill reorganizing "homeland security," the Republican talking point was "Let's not confuse an anti-terrorism bill with immigration reform."

The House and Senate ultimately agreed on a bill that did offer a sop to the conservatives who wanted stricter measures to prevent illegal aliens from entering the country and, once entered, from obtaining drivers' licenses. But the few thousand agents being added to the border patrol constitute a strictly symbolic gesture. What the legislation does accomplish is the creation of an even greater and more complex bureaucracy whose employees will spend the next decade seeking to increase their staffs and intriguing against one another. Bureaucratic reform almost always means bureaucratic expansion, which leads to greater inefficiency—and ineffectiveness.

The most obvious fact staring Americans in the face on September 11, 2001, was that Middle Eastern Muslims had entered the country, manipulating the system to gain everything they needed to murder thousands of American citizens. Since that time, it is true, the government has cracked down on student visas, prosecuted Islamic organizations who had ties to known terrorist groups, and subjected visitors to more careful scrutiny.

The system, however, is entirely haphazard—so random, in fact, that, in the dozens of times I have flown domestic and international flights in the past three years, I have never seen any obvious Middle Easterner or Muslim pulled out of line. On the other hand, my wife has been searched, and a homeschooled Christian girl traveling with a Rockford Institute group was given the third degree. Both of our borders are entirely porous, and neither Mexico nor Canada is making the slightest effort to prevent Islamic terrorists from entering their countries, much less from crossing their borders to enter the United States.

Our failure to shore up our crumbling frontiers is symptomatic of a deeper failure. We refuse to define who we are as a nation. Since we cannot be a Christian nation, we cannot, apparently, designate Islam as an ideology hostile to our country—though a large majority of Americans would like to stop all Muslims from entering the country. On the national level, our government and its leaders enjoy cordial and warm relations with heads of Islamic states (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) and with Islamic oil magnates.

U.S. support for Islam, however, goes far beyond business and diplomatic relations, far beyond the refusal to define Islam *per se* as the enemy of our country. Since the Carter years, at least, the U.S. government has backed radical Islamic insurgencies. Afghanistan was not the only place where we collaborated with Osama bin Laden. He was our ally in the war against the Bosnian Serb Christians, and the Islamic fundamentalist government that we installed in Bosnia gave him citizenship. He was also our ally in Kosovo, where Islamic Albanian terrorists were waging genocidal war against Orthodox and Catholic Christians. We even bombed several European cities in order to give the terrorists *carte blanche* to finish the job.

But, say the Republicans, all of *that* happened on Bill Clinton's watch. That is true, but the NATO-sponsored regime in Kosovo has continued its policy of massacres and terrorism without any change in policy. To round out the good news of the first week of December 2004, the Albanian-controlled parliament in Pristina named a known terrorist, Ramush Haradinaj, as prime minister of Kosovo. (For the disgusting details, read Srdja Trifkovic's "U.N.-Approved Terrorist To Run Kosovo" at *News & Views* on *ChroniclesMagazine.org*.) This former KLA commander, known for his mass murders in Kosovo and Macedonia, was once arrested by U.N. forces, but the Albanians rioted until UNMIK caved in and released the criminal whose appointment is being hailed by the neoconservative *Wall Street Journal*, which appears to be working with the terrorist's London p.r. firm.

I shall believe that our government is going to do something to protect the American people from terrorism on the day that the President of the United States publicly admits that we have ignored, encouraged, and sponsored Islamic terrorism for over 25 years—and that, in Kosovo, at least, we are still doing it. If Dr. Trifkovic is correct in equating Islam with communism as an ideology that threatens our survival, then collaboration with the terrorists in Kosovo is the equivalent of selling the rope. c

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Star Wars
by Charles Edward Eaton

Does the heart have a deep fossil in it,
A fragment of a star shot long ago,
Sharp as an arrow, covered with mother
Of pearl all our sorrows have secreted?
We do feel weighted in many places, stones,
Jewels clocked to keep the movement going,
But it is the heart that works its way up,
Wanting to shoot pearled arrows in the air.

No coincidence that Cupid's quiver
Is lush, full, fighting arrow with arrow,
A brilliant play in the air when they clash.
But the old stone sharpens, resharpens,
Wanting to pick its victim on its own.
So our eyes meet like planets looking out—
They know the long shower of meteors,
How the hot body is strewn with scars.

Like the dark of the moon, the eyes conceal
How such a blazing rain could miss its mark.
Therefore concealment of that old fragment
That means to mount in the kiss, the orgasm,
Saying there must be iron in ecstasy
To keep philosophy from blowing away.
The eyes of lovers, flicker, roll around,
As the hidden point of it all breaks through.

Eyeball to eyeball as the shaft speeds on—
How can we ever know how far, how deep,
If the freighted fragment joins its brothers:
Dawn comes, the room is full of fallen shafts
That just missed our close, planetary eyes.
Never say no to a lover's weighted stasis.
There is a target there in outer space:
I shoot, you shoot, to heave the clinkered heart.

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by Philip Jenkins

Lebanese Rules

Between 1975 and 1991, Lebanon suffered a bloody civil war that had massive repercussions regionally and globally. Among other things, the hostage crisis in the 1980's detonated the Iran-Contra crisis that almost destroyed the Reagan presidency. Today, Lebanon is relatively peaceful, though under a repressive Syrian hegemony, and the whole story may seem of little importance to anyone except a regional specialist. But the Lebanese experience might well provide a foretaste of conditions in the West, and specifically Europe. Above all, the Lebanese meltdown should raise alarms about contemporary Western concepts of nations and nationalism and the seemingly inevitable triumph of global capitalism.

A brief history is in order. Lebanon was an artificial entity created by the French in 1920, out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. To oversimplify, the society was heavily stratified, with an extraordinarily wealthy elite drawn from Maronite Christians, whose main rivals were Sunni Muslims. The lowest classes were Shiite Muslims. In 1943, Lebanese elites agreed on a National Covenant, which held good for 30 years. Political power and offices were shared out on the basis of a recent census, itself an outrageous piece of creative accounting that gravely underestimated the numbers of the poor and disinherited. Under the gerrymandered system, Christian elites agreed to respect the nation's Arab identity, while rich Muslims promised not to seek union with other Muslim or Arab states. The new Lebanon would operate purely as a business concern oriented to the creation and defense of wealth and privilege, as politics were taken out of the equation. The state existed as a means of doling out the spoils to the elites, and any sense of national identity or loyalty was scorned.

This idyllic arrangement ultimately collapsed, partly because of the glaring imbalance between rich and poor. New factors intervened, however, especially the forces of demography. The elites—the Maronites, in particular—suffered from the common Western and European fashion of strict family limitation, and their numbers declined relatively. The ranks of the poor swelled, though the official prohibition on further censuses meant that these rising numbers would never achieve official recognition. Increasingly, the young and poor confronted the old and rich, with no hope of either joining or replacing them. This situation would be troubling enough, but then new external forces came into play, as the Shiite poor explored older forms of Islam, with their radical vision of social justice and emphases on apocalyptic, charismatic, and mystical traditions. And finally, in the 1960's, the arrival of exiled Palestinian militants meant that the disaffected in Lebanon came to see their cause as part of a global revolutionary movement. Moreover, the well-armed Palestinians were able and willing to challenge the local ruling classes.

In 1975, the Lebanese dream collapsed, as radicals of various shades confronted the Christian-dominated state. Soon, the war became more explicitly religious, as the anti-regime cause was increasingly led by the radicalized forces of Shiite Islam, by militias such as Amal and Hezbollah. The carnage seemed all the more bizarre since the fighting occurred among the proud monuments of global capitalism: One decisive conflict in the 1975-76 struggle for Beirut was the Battle of the Holiday Inn. Once unleashed, the violence raged until the nation was all but consumed, with 200,000 dead.

Today, the Lebanese war would seem long ago and far away, except that, in crucial respects, its underlying causes find striking echoes in the modern West, and, above all, in contemporary Europe. Here, too, a grand political settlement has tried to extinguish national loyalties, to replace the old politics with the exclusive pursuit of wealth. Like Lebanon, though, the new Europe cannot ignore the facts of demography, especially when the clash of generations is simultaneously a conflict of religions and worldviews. Old-stock white populations of Christian inheritance are aging rapidly, as birthrates fall well below replacement—to 1.1 or 1.2 per woman in many areas. Much of the population growth is found among immigrant populations, who—unlike in the United States—are chiefly Muslim in background. Within 30 years, Muslims could make up a quarter of the populations of France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The link between wealth, religion, and generational conflict is obvious today in the cities—in the housing estates surrounding French cities, for example. Young Muslims are all too likely to encounter the mechanisms of the state in the baneful form of police, prisons, and the criminal-justice system.

The presence of a large Muslim underclass need not of itself portend disaster, were it not that we can see some of the same factors that operated in Lebanon *circa* 1970 or 1975, especially in the spread of internationalist and apocalyptic forms of Islam. Across Europe, we see fervent evangelism by the Salafists, by Takfir wal Hijra, by the Tablighi Jama'at, by various *jihad*-oriented groups. And the example of Al Qaeda—and now, perhaps, the Iraqi resistance—encourages dissidents to think in terms of explicitly military challenges to the state, to see the European regimes as oppressive crusaders.

For some years, European elites have presented their new society as a world living after the end of history, with the turbulence of the 20th century concluded, with all passion spent. The Lebanese example, however, showed that money-making alone cannot substitute for cultural and national loyalties; that ideology and religious activism can never be wholly suppressed; and that, ultimately, demographic pressures have the capacity to overturn even the most stable-looking society. As in Lebanon, Europe's elites seem to believe that, if they no longer think in terms of religion, of national loyalty, of cultural identity, then nor will anyone else. I do not know if Western European cities will ever witness an apocalyptic struggle on the lines of Beirut's 1976 Battle for the Hotels; but the parallels are ominous. c

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War on the Home Front

Real Homeland Security

by Wayne Allensworth

U.S. officialdom calls them "Special Interest Aliens," as much because they might have a special interest in us as we in them. They are aliens from countries that are considered potential sources of terrorist attacks on the American homeland, and their numbers are reportedly growing. "People are coming here with bad intentions," an anonymous Border Patrol agent stated in an interview with NBC 4 TV in Los Angeles last November. "We know for a fact that people coming from the Middle East are now coming into Mexico and spending a year, even two years in Mexico to learn how to speak Spanish." These "Special Interest Aliens" (SIA's) intended to pass themselves off as Mexicans, presumably to increase their chances of following the paths of millions of illegal Mexican immigrants who have entered the United States.

Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) told NBC 4 that he and other members of Congress had sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security demanding answers to important questions, including "How many people have been stopped at our southern border who would be hostile and [are] coming from hostile countries?" According to Rohrabacher, "It could be in the hundreds, it could be in the thousands." Douglas, Arizona, resident Larry Vance showed NBC 4 a Middle Eastern prayer rug left behind by one of a host of illegal aliens who have used his property as a transit point to heartland America and said: "I think it would be incredibly naive, to the point of stupidity, to not [*sic*] believe there are terrorists coming through here."

A Tucson, Arizona, NBC affiliate subsequently carried a similar report: A former Border Patrol supervisor claimed that aliens from states that are considered potential sources of terrorism are crossing the border at will; a diary written in Arabic was left behind by one illegal alien; and a Border Patrol agent told reporters of an incident involving an alien from Pakistan, apprehended along the Arizona-Mexico border, who was identified as an associate of an Islamic terrorist group, and another incident involving seven Middle Eastern men who were caught by the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol veteran told reporters, "We were told specifically that these people had terrorist pasts and they were coming here specifically to carry out a terrorist attack."

The Los Angeles and Tucson television investigations followed on the heels of numerous reports about terrorists possibly entering the United States over the summer of 2004. In July, Farida Goolam Mohamed Ahmed was detained at a McAllen, Texas, airport, on her way to New York. She carried a South African passport and travel itineraries showing a July 8 flight from Johannesburg to London. From there, she flew to Mexico City before illegally crossing the Rio Grande near McAllen. Ahmed was on a terrorism-watch list and has allegedly entered the United States as many as 250 times.

Border Patrol agents reportedly ran across dozens of Middle Eastern men trying to enter the United States illegally last summer. In June, 77 Middle Eastern men were reported to have been apprehended in Arizona alone. In September, U.S. agents were investigating a story about a suspected Al Qaeda cell leader, Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, trying to enter the United States along alien-smuggling routes on the U.S.-Mexican border.

Such stories did not let up last fall: In November, *Time* reported that a "key al-Qaeda operative" captured in Pakistan told an alarming story of the network's plans to target the United States with "weapons of mass destruction." Sharif al-Masri told interrogators that Al Qaeda was interested in smuggling "nuclear materials to Mexico, then operatives would carry the material into the US." At about the time of Masri's capture, Homeland Security officials were meeting with Mexican counterparts to discuss U.S. concerns about the terrorist threat along the Mexican border—including the possibility that illegal-alien-smuggling rings could aid terrorists in crossing into the United States. The American side was apparently worried about the use of aircraft in delivering biological or chemical attacks on U.S. soil; the Mexicans said they would focus on flight schools and aviation facilities on their side of the border. The reported theft of a crop duster south of San Diego, apparently by three men from Mexico who assaulted a security guard and flew off the plane in a southerly direction, had alarmed the Americans.

The rash of reports of terrorists crossing the border in Arizona and Texas caused some Texas congressmen to demand tightened security along the border. Rep. John Culberson (R-TX) has, among other things, led the fight against the acceptance of Mexican Matricula Consular cards as a valid for of identification and was prominent among those Texas congressmen demanding tightened border security. Last fall, Culberson said he had been told by U.S. prosecutors that Al Qaeda terrorists were slipping into the United States disguised as Mexicans, paying off alien-smuggling rings to get them over the border in the flood tide of Mexicans. The terrorists, according to Culberson, had obtained Matricula cards. Once in the United States, they became "sleeper agents," awaiting the signal to carry out pre-planned terrorist acts.

At first glance, comments by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and announced border-security measures gave the appearance that the Bush administration was beginning to take the border problem seriously. In November, Rumsfeld commented that smuggling routes for moving illegal aliens into the United States could be used "just as easily for terrorists." At the same time, Homeland Security officials, partly in re-

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sponse to the demands of the Texas congressmen, announced that illegal aliens who are not Mexicans would be deported without a hearing within days of apprehension. Before the policy change, some 22,000 non-Mexican illegals had reportedly been released to move freely throughout the United States (pending a hearing that most failed to attend) *last year alone*. The policy has a limited range of enforcement, however: The new rules are to be enforced on a trial basis in Tucson, Arizona, and Laredo, Texas. What's more, the policy is limited in scope: The rules only apply to non-Mexican illegals found within 100 miles of the border within 14 days of their arrival. (How does anyone know when they arrived?)

The hearing loophole was recognized in testimony before Congress in 2003 by Steve McCraw, assistant director of the FBI's Office of Intelligence. Apart from the large number of no-shows at immigration hearings, some immigrants can use the process itself to their advantage. McCraw testified that

> the ability of foreign nationals to use [the hearings procedure] to create a well-documented but fictitious identity in the United States, provides an opportunity for terrorists to move freely within the US without triggering name-based watch lists. It also enables them to board planes without revealing their true identity.

Sheriff Dwayne Jernigan of Laredo, Texas, was not impressed by the announcement of the trial policy change regarding non-Mexican illegals. He told Britain's *Daily Telegraph*, "[A]re we serious about terrorism? Or about homeland security? . . . [E]ntering this country illegally is a crime, and we're turning our heads and ignoring it." There is plenty of reason to agree with Sheriff Jernigan. The single pitiful measure taken by the misnamed Department of Homeland Security is nowhere close to adequate to deal with the border-security problems now made more urgent by the "War on Terror."

Millions of aliens attempt to cross the U.S. border illegally each year. The vast majority are not apprehended by our understaffed, overworked Border Patrol. *Time*'s Donald Bartlett and James Steele told the shocking story in an investigation of the illegal immigration problem last year: An estimated three million illegal aliens entered the United States in 2004 alone. Packs of illegal aliens, sometimes numbering in the hundreds, cross into U.S. territory along thinly guarded—or unguarded—stretches of the southern border. Cars, trucks, and planes deliver tons of illegal narcotics—and, if smugglers can deliver such contraband, they could also deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical materials to "sleeper" terrorists already in the United States. "Interior enforcement"—rounding up and deporting illegal aliens within the United States—was virtually halted in the 1990's, which spurred on the human tidal wave. Aliens knew that if they could get beyond the border zone, they were home free.

The U.S. Border Patrol was increased from a few thousand agents to more than 9,000 by the late 90's, with promises of more staffing to come; the staffing increases, however, are obviously too little, too late, to guard borders thousands of miles long. (By contrast, as of this writing, the United States is set to increase the occupation force in Iraq to as many as 150,000 troops.)

The Border Patrol is ill equipped to do its job. An anonymous Border Patrol agent told a Tucson reporter last fall that "Over fifty per cent" of the vehicles at his station were out of service, cameras and infrared lenses for night patrol were not functioning, and agents lacked proper training:

> At the Academy, we do three hours of training to determine if somebody is carrying fraudulent documents. And I can tell you from working the checkpoint, there are times people have given me documentation that I have absolutely no clue, as sad as it is to say that, [as to] what I'm looking at.

According to the agent, the Border Patrol is under enormous pressure to rush people through checkpoints and keep the border traffic moving; agents cannot take the necessary time to check out suspicious border-crossers. There are simply too many of them and far too few Border Patrol agents.



Melanie Anderson

With would-be terrorists reportedly attempting to blend into the flow of Mexicans crossing the border, how many have already slipped past the Border Patrol or have been returned to Mexico (as are Mexican illegals apprehended at the border) where they are free to cross again—as the Mexicans do—without being identified as "Special Interest Aliens"?

With millions of illegal aliens residing in the United States, channels for obtaining fraudulent documents are of great use to terrorist networks. Estimates of the number of illegal aliens—whose whereabouts and activities are unknown to the U.S. government—range from 7 million to as high as 15 million. This is easily the highest number of aliens within U.S. territory in history. The U.S. government does not attempt to ascertain the identities or backgrounds of millions of foreigners to whom it grants visas—many of whom overstay those visas and remain in the United States. According to the *Time* story, as many as 190,000 aliens from countries other than Mexico, including Middle Eastern states, had melted into the U.S. population by the fall of 2004.

At the same time, record levels of legal immigration are part of the U.S. security problem. An immigration policy that has encouraged millions of Third Worlders to migrate to the United States has created—apart from a social, cultural, criminal, and economic disaster in progress—an Islamic network made up of mosques, schools, and social organizations across the United States that allows potential terrorists to go undetected by the authorities. The Bush White House seems oblivious to current realities: While the administration makes war on Islamic states, it simultaneously throws out the welcome mat

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for Muslims. That is to say nothing of Islam's history of anti-Christian violence or of the long-standing U.S. policy in the Middle East, which has antagonized the Muslim world for decades. Estimates of how many Muslims reside in the United States vary (from 1.5 to 7 million), but the numbers are striking, no matter which estimate is accurate.

The virtually undefended 4,000-mile border with Canada may be just as much a potential entryway for terrorists as the 2,000-mile border with Mexico. Canadian security officials have admitted that as many as 50 terrorist groups are operating in their territory. Since Canada's immigration and asylum polices are more lax even than our own, can we simply ignore the threat?

Despite all of this evidence suggesting otherwise, Homeland Security Under Secretary Asa Hutchison, reacting to questions about border security, has assured Americans that "the strategy we have is appropriate for the threat." Really? Is this another example of the apparently delusional Bush administration rejecting "reality-based" analysis?

The administration is currently attempting to cut off one important source of real-world information: Border Patrol whistle-blowers, who are being threatened with retribution. Agent Ron Zermeno, of the Temecula, California, office, told local officials last August that illegal-immigrant roundups had been stopped by officials in Washington, setting off a public outcry, according to the *North County Times*. Zermeno says he was subsequently threatened with being fired by Border Patrol management. It seems the Border Patrol is implementing new, looser rules regarding agents' performance reviews—rules that Border Patrol agents say can be used to kill dissent within the ranks.

In another move signaling the Bush administration's real intentions (as opposed to public reassurances) regarding border security and immigration control, the White House successfully lobbied to have many immigration and border-security provisions stripped from the intelligence reform bill passed by Congress and signed by the President last December.

It is evident that the Bush administration does not take homeland security seriously. What's more, the White House's wrong-headed "War on Terror" is a distraction from the real threat to the United States, which is at our very borders and in our hometowns, not in Baghdad or Tehran. It should be clear to all who have paid attention and have put loyalty to country ahead of loyalty to party that the Bush administration's misadventure in Iraq is unjustified, has turned into a quagmire for the U.S. Armed Forces, and is likely doing wonders for terrorists' recruiting efforts. Patriots who opposed this war did so precisely because we regarded the invasion of a country that had not attacked us and did not represent a threat to the United States as morally indefensible and contrary to American interests. Many of us were appalled that the administration was chock-full of officials whose primary allegiance was apparently to a foreign power, Israel, and that these officials had helped push America into an unnecessary war to defend someone else's country. We were angered that the administration did next to nothing to defend our homeland from attack, as the readily available information on the border-security crisis made plain.

The Bush administration's "War on Terror" has drained resources that could have been used not only to pursue and to punish those responsible for the September 11 attacks but to defend our country where it really mattered—on our own soil. To do so requires a comprehensive approach, involving revising our immigration and border-security policies; reevaluating our relations with our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, which would entail demanding that they do their share to help the United States counter the terrorist threat and police our common borders; and reviewing a foreign policy that unquestioningly supports Israel without any regard for the cost, antagonizes the Islamic world, and undermines U.S. standing around the globe.

Finally, as long as Washington is wedded to globalization and multiculturalism (President Bush himself has assured us, despite all contrary evidence, that Islam is "a religion of peace"), America will not be secure. There is no reason for the United States to make war on the entire Islamic world—but neither is there a reason to allow a substantial portion of that world into the American homeland, gaining a foothold that is a serious threat now and will be a greater one in the future. Patriots should not be distracted by the administration's sly-dragons-across-the-sea policies, the same policies that have allowed the Islamic threat into our homeland. Real homeland security demands an uncompromising love for that homeland, a devotion to her people, and a willingness to act. If the United States can send 150,000 troops to Iraq, then America can defend her borders. If Americans are willing to fight and die in distant lands, then surely we must be willing to move decisively to defend our own homes and neighborhoods. C

The Lake
by Peter Hunt

Bell-cries of swan and grebe ring out
The sunlit spell of day's delight
As trembling wavelets gleam like foil
Across the lake in morning light.

Nestlings come from rippled shade
In yellow reeds, by sun made bold,
Fussing and playing in broccoli-green
Where willows pour their streams of gold.

But beneath the red and gold
Of that old Autumn oak which dies,
Where silver light and mellow warmth
Can't come, the sunken dinghy lies.

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Is There a *Khilafah* in Your Future?

The Coming Islamic Revolution

by James George Jatras



Melanie Anderson

Discussions of *jihad* terrorism and the best defense against it rarely avoid entanglement in the contentious question of the relationship of terrorist actions to Islam as a religion. Is the terrorism an aberration of Islam, or is it, judged in light of history, the prevailing orthodoxy? Indeed, the question is an important one, and, in a society that avoids uncomfortable realities, answering it honestly is less a matter of analysis than of moral courage.

Perhaps less important in theory, but more central in terms of policy, is a question less commonly asked: *What is it, exactly, that the terrorists mean to achieve?* Nonstate violence as a political/military methodology is not new, nor does it exist in a vacuum. It proceeds from a worldview and, in almost all cases, has stated, ideologically defined, conscious goals. The question then becomes one of whether the terrorists' motivations are essentially *reactive* (*i.e.*, they are offended by the presence of infidels on the sacred soil of Arabia, they are opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle East, they are trying to preserve a traditional way of life from the depredations of modern moral corruption, *etc.*), in which case we would need to stop doing something (pull U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia, stop supporting Israel, stop exporting trashy movies, *etc.*). Or is what they want something *affirmative*, something that has an independent, positive imperative?

In suggesting an answer to the question, I ask the reader to do a quick Google search for the word *khilafah*. When I first tried this about a year ago, the result was in the range of 26,000 to 29,000 links (some of them redundant). Now, the results are above 50,000, and, by the time you read this, maybe more. Almost all of these sites link to material available in English; I can only guess what is out there in Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Turkish, Malay, and other languages. The location of the site operators is not always clear, but many of them seem to be based in the United Kingdom. (Since many of the quotations in this article were downloaded a few months ago, some of the sites have been removed, to some extent because of action of the British government. Since the sentiments expressed on the sites are unlikely to have disappeared as conveniently as the sites themselves, this appears to be, at best, treating the symptom.)

Khilafah—perhaps more familiar in the common form in English, *caliphate*—historically refers to the state ruled by a successor (called *khalifah* or, in English, *caliph*) of Muhammad, beginning in the seventh century. The *khilafah*, in one form or another, lasted until it was abolished in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the founding of the Turkish Republic.

Even a cursory review of these websites shows that in only a very few of them does the *khilafah* reference pertain to this purely historical entity. On the contrary, as far as I can see, most of them are found on advocacy sites. These are people who date the current decrepitude of the Islamic world in comparison with the West to abolition of the *khilafah* and insist that all Muslims are obligated to work for its revival. For example, the following is from the website (*hizb-ut-tahrir.org*) of the Turkish branch of an international political party whose stated goal is reviving the *khilafah*:

> It was a day like this 79 years ago, and more specifically on the 3rd of March 1924 that . . . the criminal English agent, Mustafa Kemal (so-called Ataturk, the "Father of the Turks"!) announced that the Grand National Assembly had agreed to destroy the Khilafah; and . . . he establish . . . a secular, irreligious, Turkish republic. . . .
>
> Since that day the Islamic ummah [nation, community] has lived a life full of calamities; she was broken up into small mini states controlled by the enemies of

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Islam in every aspect. The Muslims were oppressed and became the object of the kuffar's [unbelievers'] derision in Kashmir, Philippines, Thailand, Chechnya, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Palestine and other lands belonging to the Muslims . . .

So the crime took place and the kuffar tightened their grip over the Islamic lands and tore it up into pieces. . . . In place of a single Khilafah state they established cartoon states and installed rulers as agents to carry out the orders of their kuffar masters. They abolished the Islamic Sharee'ah [*sic*; religious law] from the sphere of ruling, economy, international relations, domestic transactions and judiciary.

Without the Khilafah, the Islamic lands will remain torn up and the Islamic peoples will remain divided. Without the Khilafah the kafir, crusader and colonial states will continue to control us, plunder our resources and create divisions amongst us. Without the Khilafah, the Jews will continue to occupy our sacred places and kill and humiliate our brothers in Palestine. Without the Khilafah, the Islamic peoples in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Uzbekistan and so on will continue to be killed. . . . Without the Khilafah, those Muslims who do not work seriously for its implementation will be sinful and incur the anger of Allâh, even if they fast, pray, make Hajj [pilgrimage] and pay Zakah [alms]. This is because the work to establish the Khilafah Rashidah is a fard [duty] on every Muslim, and it should be conducted with the most extreme effort and utmost speed. . . .

The Khilafah Rashidah on the way of the Prophethood is coming soon by the help of Allâh. Its prerequisites in terms of system and statesmen are present. The voices of the Muslims in all parts of the world from Turkey to Nigeria, and from Uzbekistan to Indonesia are resoundingly demanding its return. It will come back despite the efforts and money spent by the kuffar and the agents to prevent its return. So strengthen your resolve and work seriously with the sincere da'wah ["invitation" to Islam; *i.e.*, proselytizing] carriers who are working to re-establish the Khilafah, so that you may attain the victory that Allâh has promised.

What we have here is an ideology, one with clearly defined goals, in search of a host—a land and a people in which to bring it to life.

Two things in particular should be noted in this exposition: First, all existing governments—including those in power in the Islamic world, here called "cartoon states"—are illegitimate (or based on *kufr*, "unbelief") and must be overthrown; and, second, Islamic law, *sharia*, must be established as the ruling legal system.

Some of these sites detail what the *khilafah* will look like when it is reestablished, and what powers would be exercised by the man, the *khalifah*, who will rule it. In summary (from *al-islami.com/islam/establish_khilafah.php?p=4*):

- The Khilafah [state] must include all Muslim nations in the world.
- There must be only one Khaleefah or Ameer [ruler], with all Muslims giving him their bay'ah or allegiance. . . .
- Shariah law must be implemented in the Islamic state regarding all issues.
- There must be only one military, with a single leadership appointed by the Khaleefah.

If the end sought by people of this persuasion is reestablishment of the *khilafah*, to what extent do they recognize the legitimacy of using violent struggle—*jihad* and, by extension, what we call terrorism—as a means to achieve it? There is actually sharp debate in this community about that issue. Some take the view that what leads to the reestablishment of legitimate authority is itself legitimate. This side generally takes a very expansive view as to what constitutes self-defense in such places as Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine, Kosovo, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang, Sudan, Aceh, Afghanistan, and other places. Some drop hints, rather than state outright, about how they would answer this question. One British-Islamic website, *muslimstudent.org.uk* (now removed), stated:

> Sharia'ah verdict obliges the Muslims to abolish the present puppet regimes in the Muslim World, and to establish the Islamic system and unite all the Muslim countries, bringing them back under the banner of one single state, and one single Khalif who would rule by the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Messenger (SAW). The duty of all Muslims is not only limited to working towards overthrowing the regimes ruling the Muslim countries nowadays, and in liberating occupied Muslim land from the unbelievers [*sic*] dominance, even if an Islamic rule is put in force, but it includes the work for unification of Muslim countries. This is a duty and it must not be stalled for any reason even the absence of an Islamic state, for the texts of the Sharia'ah concerning the unity of Muslim land are general and not limited to the presence of a Khalif. . . . Fighting and exterminating Israel is an obligation even if the Muslims fighting are Arab armies loyal to regimes of unbelief, like the Egyptian soldiers when they fought Israel during the Sinai war. . . . The uniting of Muslim [lands] includes the land that Muslims lost control of, including, Turkistan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and the land that Muslims had lost like Andalous (Spain) . . . Our duty as Muslims . . . [is] to kick the American, British, and Israeli forces from Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) and Palestine, and to overthrow all these non-Islamic regimes in order to establish the Islamic state on their ruins.

Others take the view that, strictly speaking, *jihad* can only be unconditionally legal once the *khilafah* is reestablished. If that were to occur, there is little disagreement that the foreign policy of the caliphate would be one of *jihad*. For example,

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khilafah.com says:

> Thus Islam has come for the whole of mankind and Allah has obliged the Muslims to convey it in a manner which draws attention. . . . [W]hoever stands as an obstacle and prevents Islam from reaching the people, it is an obligation to fight him in order to remove this obstacle, and thus to open the way for the people to Islam: so either they embrace Islam or they submit to the laws of Islam. . . . The true and effective jihad which uproots kufr [unbelief] and liberates the land of the Muslims from the Yahud [the Jew] and Kuffar cannot take place without the existence of the Khilafah State which will unite the Muslims in a single state and under the leadership of one Khalifah who will rule them with the Book of Allah and the Sunna [traditions] of His Messenger, and lead them into the battlefields of jihad to spread Islam and protect the Muslims.

And, according to another site, *almuhajiroun.com* (currently offline, but this site has a remarkable tendency to reappear following periodic interruptions):

> Once the Islamic State is established anyone in Dar Al Harb [realm of war] will have no sanctity for his life or wealth hence a Muslim in such circumstances can then go into Dar Al Harb and take the wealth from the people unless there is a treaty [of temporary truce] with that state. If there is no treaty individual Muslims can even go to Dar Al Harb and take women to keep as slaves.

Where will *khilafah* be instituted? The short answer is, *wherever it can be*. Commonly, two general areas have been discussed. One is in the zone stretching from the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia (overlapping the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to Pakistan, which includes Afghanistan. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would have been the embryo for the Khilafah's reestablishment in that region, with the eventual subversion of an already semi-Talibanized, nuclear-armed Pakistan, fostering the creation of a *sharia* superstate with over 200 million people and armed with nuclear weapons. The other candidate is in Southeast Asia, with the creation of a *sharia* state in the Aceh region of the northwestern part of the Indonesian island of Sumatra as the initial beachhead, to include eventually all of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and parts of the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma, and possibly Bangladesh.

What does all this have to do with anything? Just this: What we have here is an ideology, one with clearly defined goals, in search of a host—a land and a people in which to bring it to life. Some might dismiss this kind of talk as the ravings of just a few lunatics, albeit violent lunatics. Perhaps some might have taken the same view of an Austrian former corporal sitting in the Landsberg am Lech fortress prison in 1924, writing a book about his "struggle," or of a couple of obscure German scribblers issuing some kind of "manifesto" in 1848.

These disparate elements promoting *khilafah* share a common, clearly defined vision—one with a lot more moral, historical, and demographic depth than a Hitler or a Marx could have claimed—that should not be discounted. To call the violence associated with this movement merely "terrorism," without an awareness of what the violence is meant to achieve, is to miss the whole point. The khilafists have their collective manifesto, and perhaps, with September 11 and its aftermath, they have had their Paris Commune. Maybe the next big attack will be their guns of the cruiser *Aurora*, leading, they hope, to their own October Revolution and the long-awaited rebirth of *khilafah*.

U.S. policy is focused on a list of "rogue states" instead of targeting the *khilafah* movement and its subsets: *jihad* ideology and the demand to install *sharia*.

If this specter is haunting not just Europe but the whole world, why has hardly anyone noticed? To my knowledge, the only political leader of a major power who has publicly acknowledged the existence of this movement is President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation, who has observed that Chechen terrorism is an initial step in the reconstitution of a "global caliphate," which amounts, he said, to "world supremacy." Mr. Putin also took note of the radicals' willingness to kill Christians, atheists, and nonradical Muslims who oppose the effort. There seems to have been absolutely no resonance among other world leaders to this identification. In fact, in the media, there has been some criticism, as if Putin had made it up.

American policymakers seem unable or unwilling to take *khilafah* seriously, though they can hardly be unaware of it. U.S. policy is focused on "state-supported terrorism" and a list of "rogue states" instead of targeting the global *khilafah* movement and its subsets: *jihad* ideology and the demand to install *sharia*. Indeed, the major bases for that movement are not in the rogue states (with the partial exception of Iran) but in countries regarded by Washington as allies in the "coalition against terrorism": Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan—all close, longtime friends of the United States. This does not even take into account khilafist strongholds in Europe, especially in Great Britain.

Dealing with this seeming incomprehension of the problem is a far more urgent task than the endless tinkering with the structure of law enforcement and intelligence agencies that disproportionately occupies the attention of official Washington. Perhaps America—having seen her survival of the Cold War primarily as a vindication of an end-of-history global order based on her materialistic ideology of democratic capitalism—is incapable of recognizing an opposing force based on completely different assumptions about God and man and the purpose of human life. Even more troubling, we appear to be guided by a worldview that proceeds from philosophical assumptions derived from the Enlightenment that are almost designed to lead to incomprehension. Our military prowess, though impressive, is only tangentially related to the real threat.

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The Saudi Presence in the United States

The Most Lethal Terror Front of All?

by Robert Spencer

For all the investment the United States has made in prosecuting the "War on Terror" in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Saudi presence in the United States has gone largely unnoticed—although it may be the most lethal terror front of all.

U.S. politicians have been intoxicated by Saudi petrodollars for decades. Saudi greenbacks led Spiro Agnew to fulminate against "Zionist influences in the United States" and Jimmy Carter's advisor Bert Lance to complain about "the great Jewish ownership of the press." Carter himself enthused about the wonders of the House of Saud after a wealthy Saudi contributed $50,000 toward his presidential library. Successive American diplomats have signed on to the Saudi payroll in exchange for their advancement of the Saudi line in Washington.

All of these favors over the years have never put the Saudis in much of a mood to reciprocate. Witness the December 2004 report in the Saudi government organ *Al-Watan*, asserting that

> secret European military intelligence reports indicate the transformation of the American humanitarian mission in Iraq into a profitable trade in the American markets through the practice of American physicians extracting human organs from the dead and wounded, before they are put to death, for sale to medical centers in America.

This outrageous libel from a close U.S. "friend and ally" was immediately picked up by papers in Iran and Syria.

Even more ominously, Saudi money has built numerous mosques in America. What is preached in them was hinted at by Sgt. Hasan Akbar, an American engineer from the 101st Airborne Division. After killing Capt. Christopher Scott Seifert and Maj. Gregory Stone and wounding 15 others in northern Kuwait on March 22, 2003, he explained why he did it: "You guys are coming into our countries, and you're going to rape our women and kill our children."

Akbar probably learned that his primary allegiance was to Islam, not to the United States, in his mosque. The Bilal Islamic Center in Los Angeles was built with a pledge of up to eight million dollars from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia; an additional $295,000 for the mosque's school came from the Saudi Islamic Development Bank. The Islamic Development Bank states that it works "to foster the economic development and social progress in member countries and Muslim communities worldwide based on the principles of *shari'ah* (i.e., Islamic jurisprudence.)" Presumably, this would include the teaching about the impermissibility of a Muslim fighting another Muslim (as stipulated by the Koran's Sura 4:92), and the necessity of *jihad* against non-Muslims.

According to journalist Paul Sperry, "Bilal is just one of many black mosques funded by Saudi [Arabia]. Most of them, including Bilal, are associated with Imam W. Deen Mohammed, head of the Chicago-based Muslim American Society, or MAS, which has been credited with helping convert more than a million U.S. blacks to Islam." W. Deen Mohammed has acknowledged that Saudi money comes with strings. He told the *Los Angeles Times* that "in Saudi Arabia it's the Wahabi school of thought . . . and they say, 'We're gonna give you our money, then we want you to . . . prefer our school of thought.' That's in there whether they say it or not. So there is a problem receiving gifts that seem to have no attachment, no strings attached." When asked if he himself had taken Saudi money, he replied like a nervous schoolboy caught red-handed in a bit of mischief: "Well, I don't receive any money now, but I have received some and I lost it." Mohammed added: "I suspected some strings were attached. I said I can't accept this kind of relationship. They were choosing my friends for me, too. The enemy of the friends who were giving me money was supposed to be my enemy, too."

Two years before September 11, the Naqshbandi Sufi Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani testified before a State Department open forum that 80 percent of American mosques were under control of extremists: "Because [radical Muslims] are very active they took over the mosques; and we can say that they took over more than 80 percent of the mosques that have been established in the US. And there are more than 3000 mosques in the US." After visiting 114 mosques around the country, Kabbani estimated that "ninety of them were mostly exposed, and I say exposed, to extreme or radical ideology."

Kabbani's Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) maintains that "the majority of mosques in the United States have been taken over by radicals who preach the dour, restrictive version of Wahhabi Islam financed and championed by Saudi Arabia." ISCA Vice President Mateen Siddiqui affirmed this recently in the course of a discussion with a journalist about an American Muslim convert, Charles Vincent. Vincent is quoted in the same article as saying: "I do wish the American troops would be defeated. I'm a Muslim first, and I just live in this country." Asked if he would fight against American soldiers if he were in Iraq, Vincent replied: "If there was a jihad, I don't see how I could not join in."

Even the Saudi embassy's website in Washington spread the message of *jihad* as recently as November 2003. Until public notice compelled the Saudis to modify the site, readers were told that

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> the Muslims are required to raise the banner of Jihad in order to make the Word of Allah supreme in this world, to remove all forms of injustice and oppression, and to defend the Muslims. If Muslims do not take up the sword, the evil tyrants of this earth will be able to continue oppressing the weak and [the] helpless.

Back home in Riyadh or Jeddah, such talk would hardly raise eyebrows. In a 2002 interview with Al-Jazeera, Saudi Sheikh Mohsin Al-'Awaji, former imam of the Great Mosque at King Saud University in Riyadh, criticized Osama bin Laden for targeting "innocent people, and I refer to the innocents on the face of the entire earth, of every religion and color, and in every region." Nevertheless, he still found himself able to praise the mastermind of September 11 as "a man of honor, a man who abstains [from the pleasures] of this world, a brave man, and a man who believes in his principles and makes sacrifices [for them]." Indeed, "the Saudi people love every Jihad warrior, every fighter, and every man of honor, whether in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, or southern Sudan." Opined another Wahhabi Sheikh, Dr. Muhammad Al-Khasif: "There are dozens, even millions, who lift up their eyes to Osama bin Laden as a savior." A recent CNN poll found that "Almost half of all Saudis . . . have a favorable view of Osama bin Laden's sermons and rhetoric."

Sounding uncannily like that "savior," the Saudi Embassy website called for a restoration of the caliphate, discussed by James Jatras in this issue of *Chronicles*. The Saudi embassy website said: "Today's false idols, which dominate over the entire world, are Democracy, Capitalism, Socialism and Communism. Islam instead calls for a Khilafa (Caliphate) based on consultation, and a just economic system based on Zakat and a prohibition of usury." Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual godfather of Islamic terrorists around the world today, could not have said it better. In his *Milestones*, a manifesto for modern-day *jihad*, Qutb declares:

> Democracy in the West has become infertile to such an extent that it is borrowing from the systems of the Eastern bloc, especially in the economic system, under the name of socialism. It is the same with the Eastern bloc. Its social theories, foremost among which is Marxism, in the beginning attracted not only a large number of people from the East but also from the West, as it was a way of life based on a creed.

Qutb concludes: "It is essential for mankind to have new leadership!" That new leadership would come from Islam.

The Saudis have spread this kind of thinking in the United States through the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). According to the *St. Petersburg Times*, "ISNA is subsidized by the Saudi government. An ISNA subsidiary called the North American Islamic Trust owns about 27 percent of the estimated 1200 mosques in the United States, says a report by the Council on American-Islamic Relations." It is intriguing that CAIR itself acknowledges that there are more than 300 mosques in the United States funded by Saudi Wahhabis, since they have taken a vocal stance against any attempt to determine if jihadist violence is being preached in those mosques.

CAIR and the Saudis are engaged in quite similar efforts to obscure American awareness of the Islamic roots of *jihad* terrorism. This was exemplified recently by CAIR's "We have more in common than we think" campaign directed at American Christians. In it, CAIR's Ibrahim Hooper lays a fine trap for the ignorant and unwary, quoting verses from the Koran that appear to be positive toward Christians, while neglecting to offer any positive ways to ameliorate the effects of many negative ones (which, of course, he does not mention) or to deplore the increasing persecution of Christians in Islamic lands. It was a sleight-of-hand worthy of the most sophisticated of advertising firms—which, in fact, the Saudis engaged.

Not long after September 11, the Saudis secretly hired a prominent public-relations firm, Qorvis Communications, to combat American perceptions that the House of Saud was behind the global rise of *jihad* terror. Qorvis initiated a slick series of radio ads—under the name of the Alliance for Peace and Justice—attacking the Israeli military and lauding Saudi Prince Abdullah's peace proposals. Now, after pursuing an outrageously supine policy toward the Saudis for years, American officials seem to be awakening to what the Saudis have been up to. According to *Newsweek*'s Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Federal prosecutors are seeking to determine whether the Saudi Embassy's PR firm, Qorvis Communications, made false statements to the Justice Department and violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)—a 1938 law requiring full disclosure of foreign-sponsored propaganda in the United States."

Last summer, the FBI, INS, and the Joint Immigration Task Force raided the Northern Virginia offices of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which was founded by Osama bin Laden's nephew, Abdullah bin Laden. It was not the first raid on a Saudi-funded organization in Northern Virginia (where there is an unusual proliferation of Wahhabi-linked groups). While these raids are much more encouraging than White House and State Department embraces of Prince Abdullah, the oily Adel Al-Jubeir, and their gang, they threw into particular relief the extent of Saudi penetration into the United States and revealed just where Saudi loyalties really lie.

Those loyalties should be abundantly clear to any objective observer. On March 17, 2004, on the Saudi government-controlled *Iqraa TV*, a Saudi sheikh named Said Al-Qahtani spoke of September 11 as a tactical error that postponed the Saudis' ultimate goal for the United States by arousing American ire:

> We did not occupy the U.S., with 8 million Muslims, using bombings. Had we been patient, and let time take its course, instead of the 8 million, there could have been 80 million [Muslims] and 50 years later perhaps all the US would have become Muslim . . . What should a Muslim do if he is attacked in his country, on his land? In this case, there is no choice besides defense, self-sacrifice, and what religious scholars call—Defensive *Jihad* . . . We attacked their country, and this caused them to wake the dormant enmity in their hearts . . . Especially since there is global Zionism, the enemy of Islam, and Judaism, and fundamentalist Crusaders . . . They interpret this whole incident as only the beginning and thus there is no choice but a preemptive strike.

Yet the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense have declared that the stability of the House of Saud will be a top American priority in 2005. If only the Saudis would return the favor. ·c·

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Islam: Africa's Religion of War

Cries From the Dark Continent

by Doug Bandow

If there is one characteristic that seems to define Christian societies today, it is tolerance. In Western Europe, home of the papacy and the Reformation, Europeans hesitate even to refer to their Christian heritage. In America, organs of liberal power, especially the courts, attempt to empty the public square of any mention of religion.

The Muslim world is dramatically different. There are, or at least long were, a few outposts of relative religious liberty: Until recently, Turkey ruthlessly suppressed the slightest hint of political Islam. Middle Eastern states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman allow Christian worship, though evangelism is not encouraged.

Far more Muslim countries persecute non-Muslims. Saudi Arabia is essentially a totalitarian state. Iran is little different, though younger Iranians are straining against rigid religious law. (Ironically, there was far greater religious freedom in Iraq than in either of these two countries.) Pakistan imprisons those who blaspheme the "prophet"; private violence, unconstrained by the state, is also common.

More surprising, perhaps, is the situation in Africa. Muslims make up at least half of the population of 25 of Africa's 56 states. North Africa is no surprise, but large and sometimes overwhelming majorities in Chad, Comoros, Dijbouti, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal are Muslim. "Africa has been a confluence of" three civilizations—the West, Islam, and indigenous Africa—writes Ali Mazrui of the State University of New York at Binghamton.

In the parts of Africa dominated by animists and Christians, religion usually plays only a small role in the violence that so tragically afflicts that continent. In Muslim states, however, religious violence is common and persistent.

Some of the worst violence occurs largely within the Muslim community. In Algeria, for instance, the military's 1992 suspension of elections for the National Assembly because of the victory of a militant Islamic party ignited a civil conflict that resulted in an estimated 100,000 casualties over the following eight years. Islamic radicals assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and employed terrorism against tourists to undermine the nation's economy. Extremist forces are active, though of less influence, in countries such as Morocco.

The problem of Islamic political activism extends to terrorism. Although a minor front in the "War on Terror," two U.S. embassies were attacked by Al Qaeda. In a detailed report for the Congressional Research Service, Ted Dagne notes: "For over a decade, Sudan has been a safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, Islamic Group, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. . . . Terror groups from the Middle East have established a presence in Somalia, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda."

Routine violence by African Muslims against African Christians has been even deadlier. Mobs kill more people than bombs. These problems are the most devastating where religions "reinforce pre-existing divisions of other kinds," writes Mazrui, such as tribal identity in Nigeria. The link often is complex, but its malicious effect is clear.

The home of a Christian Church that goes back to the fourth century, Ethiopia is not an hospitable home for Christians. At least part of the cause of the three-decade-long conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was religion; there is a strong Islamic influence in the former.

Problems have been more sporadic than systemic. International Christian Concern reports:

> While there are no established extremist groups perpetrating acts of violence, there are incidents of harassment. These incidents are often as racially motivated as religiously. Tensions have erupted into harassment, intimidation, and violence between Muslims and Christians in the Oromiya and Somali regions.

The September 11 attacks and Washington's response have exacerbated tensions between the two faiths. For instance, mobs have destroyed churches and beaten Muslims who have converted to Christianity. In 2002, Fikru Zeleke, evangelism and missions secretary of the Meserete Kristos Church, worried about escalating violence: "Muslims in this country have targeted the evangelicals as number one enemy." Complaints of government discrimination against groups seeking land for cemeteries and churches, bans on religious-oriented parties, and restrictions against the entry of religious workers are common. (Alas, there have also been intra-Christian incidents between Copts and Pentecostals.)

Of particular concern is the presence of some Muslim fundamentalists. The State Department reports that "Leaders of the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council struggled with Wahhabist fundamentalism within their ranks." The council is worried about "the growing influence of radical elements within Islamic communities in the country, aided by funding from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for mosque construction and social services."

In Somalia, problems are limited in scope but real. Happily, the lack of an effective national government prevents serious official discrimination. Popular antagonism toward the U.S. government remains a serious problem, however. For instance, shortly after the United States attacked Afghanistan, mobs in the town of Argessa destroyed church buildings, and

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the government arrested three church leaders.

The populous state of Nigeria has become one of Africa's most bitter battlegrounds. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom notes that there are

> persistent reports of official discrimination against Christians or Muslims in areas of Nigeria where either group is in the minority. Furthermore, there are increasing reports of foreign sources of funding and support for Islamic extremist activities in northern Nigeria, activities that threaten to fracture already fragile relations between the two main religious groups.

Nigeria has long been beset by radical Islamic movements. Extremist sentiments were fueled by the illegal immigration of many Nigerians to Saudi Arabia and their subsequent expulsion in the 1970's and 80's. A new round of anti-American sentiment growing out of the aftermath of September 11 has fueled some local groups, though, as Peter M. Lewis of CSIS observes, they are "not mobilized on the scale of the Muslim Brotherhoods of Egypt or Uzbekistan, or the popular Islamist parties of Algeria or Pakistan."

In 1986, the Muslim military regime upgraded Nigeria's status within the Organization of Islamic Countries to that of a permanent member. That raised substantial controversy and heightened religious tensions. Large-scale riots occurred in northern Nigeria in 1987. A Christian general attempted a coup in 1990, in part to contain Islamic influences. Violence among Muslims and between Muslims and Christians flared in succeeding years.

Today, Nigeria embraces democracy, but that has only made the problem of religious strife worse. Over 50,000 people are thought to have died in communal violence since President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999.

The worst of the violence began after the newly elected governor of the northern state of Zamfara announced his intention to impose *sharia*. Other states followed. Although the original proposals did not purport to cover Christians, *sharia* often was advanced as part of a larger campaign of hostility.

State governments discriminated against Christians by restricting broadcast access, church-building, education, government employment, and land use. Explains the Commission on International Religious Freedom:

> Calls for violence against non-Muslims has sometimes accompanied sharia implementation. In April 2004, press reports quoted the governor of Zamfara state, in northwestern Nigeria, as saying that he intends to implement the second phase of his plan to institute sharia by ordering the destruction of all Christian churches and non-Islamic places of worship, in accordance with what he believes is his "duty to subjugate infidels."

Ethnic clashes, largely between Christians and Muslims, killed an estimated 2,000 people in both 2000 and 2001. Hundreds died the following year, many in riots directed against the Miss World beauty contest held in Lagos. Islamic militants also target individual Christians.

Another danger was demonstrated in September 2004 when Al Sunna wal Jamma, inspired by the Taliban, attacked police stations in northeastern Nigeria. According to Berhane Habtemariam, writing in *Dehai*, "Political analysts saw the emergence of Al Sunna wal Jamma as a sign that violent, extremist groups may be gaining a significant foothold in religiously and ethnically divided Nigeria."

In early 2004, hundreds of Christians and Muslims were killed in attacks and counterattacks in Plateau. Some 30,000 Christians and 27,000 Muslims fled their homes following the worst of the sectarian violence.

Baroness Caroline Cox, a member of Britain's House of Lords, writes of Sudan that "the present National Islamic Front regime took power by military coup and immediately declared a militaristic *jihad* against all who oppose it; that includes many moderate Muslims as well as Christians and traditional believers." Full-scale civil war began in 1983, when Khartoum abandoned regional autonomy and imposed *sharia* on the entire nation. By some estimates, since 1989, two million people have died—many because of war-induced famine—and another four-to-five million have become refugees, constituting the world's largest population of internally displaced people.

Discrimination is embedded within the Sudanese government system: As is common for Islamic governments, Sudan prosecutes apostates. Christian converts face arrest and possible death. Attempts have also been made to convert Christians by force to Islam and impose *sharia* on Christians.

The Voice of America reports that "Many non-Muslims in Sudan say they are treated as second-class citizens and discriminated against in government jobs and contracts." Registration of religious groups is required. The government has destroyed churches and denied building permits to non-Muslims. All told, reports the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "The government of Sudan continues severely and systematically to commit violations of freedom of religion or belief, particularly against Christians, disfavored Muslims, and followers of traditional African religions."

Of even greater concern is the long-term military conflict, in which the fight is not strictly Muslim *versus* Christian. Christians and animists in the south, however, are the most common victims of a seemingly endless civil war involving the Muslim government.

Atrocities by government forces and government-backed militias have been common. The most publicized crisis today is in Darfur. Some 70,000 people are thought to have died, and another 1.5 million are homeless.

Columbia University's Mahmood Mamdani explains that "The major change in the political map of Darfur over the past decade was the growth of the Islamist movement." As a result, "Darfur became 'Islamist,' not 'Arab'." In 1990, the government organized local militias to battle the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Adds Mamdani, "Neither monolithic nor centrally controlled, many were purged when the Islamists split in 1999." Although the government may not have intended today's promiscuous killing, Khartoum set the fire.

Africa is a continent of tragedy. The causes of violence are many, but Christians are often the victims of Muslim depredations. Alas, the drive to politicize Islam in Africa, writes Sulayman Nyang, has "deep historic, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic roots." Moreover, events even in such secular Muslim societies as Indonesia and Turkey demonstrate how Islamic extremists can build upon both jihadist theology and political antagonism toward the United States to foment religious violence. c

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A Round Table Discussion

The Conservative Bookshelf

Melanie Anderson

The Genuine Article

What Every Barroom Needs

by Clyde Wilson

Some of the happiest memories of my collegiate days are fervent barroom debates among a small but redoubtable and congenial company of reactionaries.

The smell of spilled beer and sawdust still reminds me of those times. Outside, the 60's raged. Hairy "students" with girlish arms and shoulders and trust funds preached revolution and the merits of Mao and Che. In the back booths of Clarence's Bar and Grill and The Shack, however, our discussions were deeper and more serious, as well as decidedly unfashionable. What are the true principles of conservatism? Or what are the principles of true conservatism?

The argument often revolved around Russell Kirk's six canons or James Burnham's 29 theses. Or even around a silly collection of "conservative" writings by the then-not-yet-totally-discredited William F. Buckley, Jr. It was called *I Thought I Saw a Dream Walking* or some such title and was notable for the absence of almost every important American conservative thinker. Straussians and ultramontanists were well represented, but not Richard M. Weaver.

If only we had had Chilton Williamson's *Conservative Bookshelf* in those days! Our discussions would have been infinitely better guided and more fruitful. Mr. Williamson's selection of 50 works is as near perfection as is ever approached in this vale of tears (with one exception). The wise reading and understanding that lie behind his choices are awesome, and Mr. Williamson's summaries are succinct but perceptive and flawless. In three or four pages, he distills the burden of each classic and shows its place in a great tradition. This is no small achievement with often difficult writers, from Saint Augustine to John Lukacs.

The final entry, *Treason*, by Ann Coulter, does not belong among the classics, as the editor doubtless well knows, but is included as an illustration of the defects of what passes for "conservative" discourse these days.

Everybody will have one or two favorites overlooked, of course. Like it or not, Ludwig von Mises is a more influential economist than Hayek and Röpke. I might have included the

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whole of Faulkner's *Go Down, Moses*, of which "The Bear" is a part, rather than just "The Bear" alone. I would choose William Graham Sumner's *Folkways* or *The Conquest of the United States by Spain* instead of Henry Adams to represent "Progressive Era" conservatism. But I quibble. There are not many books that can be named "a lasting achievement." *The Conservative Bookshelf* is one.

The editor would doubtless be accused of dereliction if he had not included the *Federalist* among the classics of conservatism. Contrary to accepted opinion, this work does not contain the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. It is neither representative nor authoritative. It is a work of special pleading. The truly representative and authoritative wisdom of the Founding Fathers is to be found in the debates in the Philadelphia Convention, in the debates and documents of the ratifying conventions, and in the federal and state documents of the 1790's. John C. Calhoun's *Disquisition on Government* and *Discourse on the Constitution* would be better choices here. The *Federalist* is full of shallow speculation (Madison) and insincere argument (Hamilton), all in the service of aggressive centralization, which every classic of American conservatism, in one way or another, warns against. c

Paleos in Context

Good Company

by Samuel Francis

The significance of Chilton Williamson's new book, *The Conservative Bookshelf*, is that it is the first general account of the conservative tradition to place what is now called paleoconservatism in the context of that tradition. Once upon a time, the connection would have been obvious because all conservatives were paleoconservatives, or close to it. Today, however, it is not so obvious and has to be explained, even to readers who regard themselves as "conservatives" and who labor in the delusion that Bill Kristol, David Frum, Rich Lowry, and Ramesh Ponnuru are of the same cast.

Section VI of Chilton's book on the "present day" contains accounts of books by Pat Buchanan, Peter Brimelow, Tom Fleming, Clyde Wilson, and me, all of whom can fairly be lumped into the paleo persuasion, even if they don't much like the term (as I don't) or apply it to themselves, and even if we do not really deserve to be in the same book with Cicero, Burke, and Saint Augustine. He also includes Joe Scotchie's useful but too short book on paleoconservatism, *Revolt From the Heartland*. The fly in the ointment, of course, is the inclusion of *Treason*, by Ann Coulter. I have no problem generally with Miss Coulter, who is an articulate and sharp-witted (and -tongued) polemicist, and I even wrote a column defending her book against anti-McCarthy attacks by neocons (Arnold Beichman and Dorothy Rabinowitz), but I have to say that the book does not belong in *The Conservative Bookshelf*. I think Chilton knows this, and his account of *Treason* makes it pretty clear to the reader that he doesn't think it really belongs, either.

What did he leave out? Well, in my book (no pun intended), he left out probably the major work of conservative political and social theory of 19th-century Britain, Fitzjames Stephen's *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*. Today, you don't hear much about Stephen's book, published in 1873, but Russell Kirk has a chapter on it in *The Conservative Mind* and actually engaged in a polemic with Frank Meyer about it in *National Review*, back in the days when there was a conservative mind.

Stephen's book is a rebuttal of Mill's *On Liberty*, and it proceeds from the view that force—not "liberty"—is the fundamental fact of human society: that, without force (not just coercion, but any kind of constraint), human society cannot exist. We may jabber all we want about "freedom," "rights," "liberty," and the "progress of mankind," but all these good things exist only because, somewhere, somebody holds the gun or wields the sword. For those who know it, that's the real message of John Ford's great film, *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*.

Chilton included James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution*, which is entirely appropriate, though it is not really a conservative work but a brilliant piece of social and political analysis. I would have suggested also (maybe instead) Burnham's later book, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom*, still the best account of the "neo-Machiavellian" tradition of classical elite theory as formulated by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels, and Georges Sorel. The main insight of these thinkers is that all human societies are ruled by minorities (elites) and that "democracy," the "consent of the governed," and similar abstractions are largely mythical. That thesis is vital for an accurate understanding of what happens in any society and why it is happening, but it is also an important means of evaluating and judging whether a particular society is good or bad—depending on what its elite is, how it rules, and what kind of culture it creates. It is a mode of thinking that real conservatives, whatever they call themselves, need to know about and start understanding as they continue to sink or be pushed out of America's new ruling class.

It will be interesting to see what sort of reaction to Chilton's book comes from the neoconservatives, whom he generally does not bother to include (also rightly). Whatever tradition they come out of—Straussian, Social Democrat, Trotskyist, Wilsonian—there is nothing conservative about it or them and no reason they belong in a book about the real conservative tradition. c

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Cataloguing What's Been Lost

A Conservative Requiem

by Paul Gottfried

Chilton Williamson's study of the sources of American conservative thought presupposes certain assumptions about his subject that may not be universally shared but are defensible nonetheless. Williamson suggests that American conservatism is essentially paleoconservative, and both his choice of current conservative authors and his comments on Joe Scotchie's *Revolt From the Heartland* underline this association. Furthermore, Williamson's contemptuous references to the neoconservatives and his scathing comments on the marital infidelity of the libertarian Albert J. Nock indicate that there are positions often identified with the contemporary right that Williamson does not consider "conservative." He comes back repeatedly to the Christian roots of conservative thought, and, from the repeated citation of Catholic thinkers and the conspicuous absence of the Protestant Reformers, who heavily influenced American religious and political culture, his conservatism, it may be concluded, is largely (if not exclusively) a function of his Catholic beliefs. Williamson justifies this linkage by locating the heart of conservatism in the inseparably Catholic principle of "subsidiarity." To this, one may respond by pointing out that European Lutherans and Calvinists defended the same principle in early-modern times; also, Thomas Fleming's *The Morality of Everyday Life*, which Williamson discusses, documents the widespread nature of subsidiarity even in non-Christian societies.

Having pointed this out, allow me to dwell on the positive features of Williamson's discussion of conservative thinkers and their sources. His prose and expositions—unlike those, for instance, in *Commentary*—are marvelous to read. Even more important, Williamson sets up a plausible model of conservative thinking that, despite his courteous nods in the direction of "conservative" TV celebrities, underscores the gulf between the present alliance of country-club Republicans and neocon talking heads and those who understand the value of tradition and the destructive aspects of Progress. Were I doing a similar project, my list of thinkers and advocates would overlap his. Although I would have focused more on Continental authors, Williamson can properly claim that, like Russell Kirk, he is looking at a specifically Anglo-American conservative mind.

What is troublesome in his analysis, but is clearly not Williamson's fault, is the problem of taxonomy. Despite the earnest attempt in the Introduction to distinguish "conservative," "rightist," and generic Republican and to show in which ways they dovetail (or do not), one is still left, as Williamson concedes, with definitional and contextual loose ends. The reason is that, while we can find conservative impulses in 20th-century America, one is not describing in any way a conservative society. The American conservatism represented by Robert Taft was essentially bourgeois liberal (in the old-fashioned sense) and has now yielded, as Williamson correctly states, to "foreign adventurism, internationalist ambitions and global crusades." The fragile nature of conservative thinking has always been one of its characteristics, for a reason that sociologist Karl Mannheim explained in an essay on conservative "utopianism" in 1927. Conservative intellectuals, observed Mannheim, are invoking a past that is in the process of dissolving. They therefore practice "reflectiveness" by trying to reproduce, as a framework of values and sentiments, that which is no longer "a linear experience of historical time." Conservatism moves from the historically concrete to an exercise in imaginative and theoretical reconstruction. The Southern Agrarians, Russell Kirk, and the *Chronicles* circle all fall into Mannheim's category, which, in fact, encompasses all serious conservative thinking for the last hundred years. That such activity does not attract big-government think tanks should come as no surprise. c

Paul Gottfried is the author, most recently, of Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.

What's Right With the World

Art and Artist Together

by James O. Tate

The Conservative Bookshelf has so much going for it that I am hard pressed to nominate its best quality, though I aim to do so. Let me indicate something about the salient qualities of Chilton Williamson, Jr.'s latest production, before I identify what I see as his trump card.

In the first place, these 50 essays really are a conservative bookshelf, taking us from the Bible and the classics to today's most notable thinkers and writers. Mr. Williamson has surprised me with some of his choices (Phyllis Schlafly, for example), but he has justified every one of them. The sense of perspective—and what is conservatism if it is not perspective?—is

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everywhere bracing and everywhere felt. No book related to his subject better expresses the idea that conservatism is not an ideology or a political prescription but, rather, a vision or a way of seeing things.

Williamson has taken the opportunity, as well he should, to make his version of the conservative heritage one that is personally infused with his experience. When he writes about Edward Abbey, we can sense much of his own relation with wilderness and freedom. When he writes about Peter Brimelow and the issue of immigration, we also sense his own engagement with that issue and the penumbra of his own brilliant book about it, *The Immigration Mystique*—the best study of that subject ever penned. When he writes about Samuel Francis, Clyde Wilson, and Thomas Fleming, he deals with men he has himself known, and in so doing, he decisively clarifies the induced confusion about the meaning of conservatism.

He has also taken the opportunity to honor those he rightly calls "prophetic artists." The presence of T.S. Eliot, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Evelyn Waugh, and Flannery O'Connor is right, for the modern traditionalist must live in revolutionary times, and we need the vision of artists as much as we do the theories of political thinkers—and maybe we need them more.

Perhaps now I can address my favorite thing about Chilton Williamson's book, and that is his writing. *The Conservative Bookshelf* is not only readable, it is positively fun to read, and with that pleasure comes the sense that the style is the man himself. Those who know Chilton Williamson know that he has a zest for living, a talent for being in the world, and everything he does, he does excellently well, whether it is wrangling horses, stalking game, fly-fishing, or writing. His cogent sense of reality animates his writing, and his unified sensibility and flexible mind are effortlessly expressed in his articulation. I predict that his book not only will find many grateful readers but will be of special value, in these confusing times, to the young. ◦c

The Remnant's Library

Rascals and Prophets

by Thomas Fleming

Chilton Williamson has taken an important step toward giving postmodern conservatism a set of respectable literary credentials. If readers are expecting a conventional walk through the conservative "classics" or a set of reflections on the writers celebrated by Russell Kirk in *The Conservative Mind*, they will be disappointed. Rather than taking tea with Dr. Johnson or fencing with the legal minds of Henry Sumner Maine or Fitzjames Stephen, readers of *The Conservative Bookshelf* will find themselves rubbing shoulders with a rascally set of novelists and essayists—Ernest Hemingway, Edward Abbey, William Faulkner, Edmund Wilson, and Aldous Huxley—few of whom ever thought of themselves as conservatives.

Some readers will be reassured by the presence of such reactionary liberals as Ortega y Gasset and Albert Jay Nock or the one or two legitimate conservatives thrown in (to confuse the reader?)—Cicero, T.S. Eliot, and Clyde Wilson; for the most part, however, what this book represents is an act of subversive bricolage—a patching together of disparate elements as a means of defining a tradition that cannot really be defined. In Williamson's hands, Edward Abbey and Edmund Wilson are inducted as involuntary soldiers in the conservative cause—and very effective soldiers, too. His insight is impeccable. Even William F. Buckley, Jr. is represented by his last decent book, *God and Man at Yale*.

Everyone would write his own book, of course, though I cannot imagine anyone really keeping Ann Coulter on any bookshelf, conservative or otherwise. My own list would have begun with Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*, which, taken together, are the single most important contribution to conservative thought. And, if there is room for the Stoic emperor Marcus (whose philosophy was subversive of the Roman order), why not true-blue conservatives such as Sophocles, Livy, and Plutarch?

There is a chapter on Edmund Burke, as there should be, but the British tradition produced a number of powerful conservative writers and thinkers—Richard Hooker, Samuel Johnson, Walter Scott, and David Hume—beside whom Burke, for all his brilliance, is a fairly slender reed. I would not have represented T.S. Eliot by *The Waste Land*, a work of despair written before he found his moorings, and I think some room in a work of this kind might have been found for the best-selling reactionary writer of the 20th century, J.R.R. Tolkien. But this is not my book.

Publishers who commission this sort of book generally expect a piece of routine hackwork that represents conventional opinion. They must have been disconcerted to receive—and publish—an original contribution toward making sense of the helter-skelter traditions and movements, which, taken together, can compose a conservative tradition. *The Conservative Bookshelf*'s greatest strength is, as one would predict, in the depth of common sense and in the strength of the writing. Indeed, it is better written than many of the more recent conservative classics it has celebrated. A healthy sale during the Holiday Shopping Season would be a sign that there are still (in Nock's phrase) a saving remnant in America who esteem the practitioners of "Elijah's Job." ◦c

Thomas Fleming is the editor of Chronicles *and the author, most recently, of* The Morality of Everyday Life.

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
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Celtic Thunder

by Roger D. McGrath

"The Celts fear neither earthquakes nor the waves."

—Aristotle

Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America
by James Webb
New York: Broadway Books;
369 pp., $25.95

◆

Nearly six years ago, *Chronicles* published "Death Before Dishonor," an article I wrote about the westward march of the American pioneer. Much of the time, I was writing about the Scotch-Irish—or Scots-Irish, if you prefer. These hard-edged folks were in the vanguard of the movement across the continent—and God help those who stood in their way. James Webb's *Born Fighting* is devoted to the occasionally perverse, often irascible, and always independent and courageous Scots-Irish. If ever a people were born fighting, it was these sons of Ulster.

Webb writes well and often—I read his *Fields of Fire* when it first appeared in 1978 (most Marines I knew did)—but not until now, after six novels, has he produced his first work of nonfiction. Part history, part sociology, part personal, and all fast-paced well-written romp, *Born Fighting* will keep the reader up at night turning page after page. It is not a comprehensive history of the Scots-Irish or a thorough analysis of their culture, which has been done well by James Leyburn in *The Scotch-Irish: A Social History* (1962) and Grady McWhiney in *Cracker Culture: Celtic Ways in the Old South* (1988), among others, but a thematic focus on the instinctive warrior nature of the people. From fighting Romans to Anglo-Saxons to American Indians to Charlie, the Scots-Irish were in the forefront. Webb relishes the fact.



Melanie Anderson

Webb does not make the mistake that many others have by too narrowly restricting the bloodlines of the Scots-Irish. Since they were Protestant, so the reasoning goes, there were no Gaelic Irish among them. The Scots-Irish were purely the descendants of Lowland Scots who had been transplanted to Ireland, beginning in the early 1600's and then, after more than a hundred years in Ulster, shipped to the American colonies, especially during the 1720's, 30's, and 40's. There are two problems with this reasoning: First, the transplanted Scots—in Ireland for five or six or more generations—intermarried with the native Irish to some degree; and, second, in pre-Revolutionary War migrations to America from Ulster were significant numbers of Catholic Irish who lost their Catholicism on the frontiers of Pennsylvania or Virginia or North Carolina.

While such Gaelic surnames as McBride, McGee, McGrath, or Kennedy are found commonly in both Scotland and Ireland, others, such as McGregor and McNamara, are distinctly Scottish or Irish. Many of the surnames (including Murphy, Doyle, and Connolly—all ancestors of Webb) in the records of those we call Scots-Irish are distinctly Irish. Folks with such names were clearly not transplants from Scotland to Ireland. Then, too, although many Americans do not seem to know this today, the Irish colonized the Highlands of Scotland beginning in the fifth century and conquered and assimilated the other Celtic peoples they found there. That is why Gaelic became the language of the Highlands and surnames began with the patronymic prefix *Mac* (whether abbreviated *Mc*, *Ma*, or *M'*) and some with *O'*. Irish blood and Gaelic culture, although to a more limited degree, spread to the Lowlands also.

Nonetheless, because various forms of Protestantism, particularly Presbyterianism, became part of the cultural fabric of the Scots-Irish, they differed from their Irish Catholic cousins. As Webb notes, though, blood counts: "Once removed from Ireland, the common Celtic origins of these two groups brought many similarities, especially in their military traditions, their affinity for politics, and their literary prowess." I might have said "military prowess" and "literary traditions," but Webb has got it right.

Webb takes us all the way back to the building of Hadrian's Wall. In an effort to keep the wild Celts of Scotland from raiding Romanized Britain, the Romans erected the stone barrier across the narrow neck of the island. A pale remnant today of its former self, Hadrian's Wall was originally something akin to the Great Wall of China. Fifteen-feet

Roger D. McGrath is the author of Gunfighters, Highwaymen, and Vigilantes.

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high and ten-feet wide, the Roman barrier stretched 73 miles from the Irish Sea to the North Sea. Every mile, a guard tower sat atop the wall; every four or five miles, a fort and a gate could be found. The wall was as impregnable as second-century technology could make it.

Occasionally, the Romans ventured north of the wall to punish the wild Celts but usually found such thrusts costly and unproductive. Cassius Dio described the people the legions encountered:

> Their form of rule is democratic for the most part, and they are fond of plundering; consequently they choose their boldest men as rulers. They go into battle in chariots, and have small, swift horses; there are also foot-soldiers, very swift in running and very firm in standing their ground.

It sounds to me as if the Romans were fighting Daniel Boone, Andrew Jackson, and David Crockett.

Since so much of Scotland and Ireland was broken by rivers and mountains, imposing central control was always difficult, and the Celtic tie of kinship remained strong. Fighting alongside one's tribal or clan leader was an honor. "An offshoot of this ancient concept defines the unusually strong feelings about military service held by so many Americans of Scottish and Irish descent," writes Webb, "and helps explain why such a high percentage of American combat units in today's volunteer military are from Scots-Irish and Irish Catholic backgrounds."

Oddly, Webb suddenly changes his thrust to claim: "in the Celtic societies, if one stepped forward to serve, he was 'of the kin' so long as he accepted the values and mores of the extended family." That was accepted, however, only because they were all Celts! Webb has visited both Ireland and Scotland, and he should know that, if you are Gaelic, everybody looks like one of your relatives. The people are stunningly similar. Kinship meant just that. Values and mores were secondary. As John Prebble says about the Highlanders in *The Battle of Culloden*, "The ties of blood and name were strong among the people, and pride of race meant as much to a humbly in his sod and roundstone house as it did to a chieftain in his island keep." Edward Burt, an Englishman traveling in the Highlands in the 18th century, said, "They have a pride in their family—almost everyone is a genealogist." After the Battle of Culloden, the British army slaughtered the cattle of the Highlands and raped the women. Those women who were impregnated aborted the babies or killed them when born. They were not of the blood. The clans were not a "Proposition Nation."

After backing away somewhat from the importance of race, Webb, when describing Scotland in the late Middle Ages, writes: "Having been altered in their blood and traditions by intermarriage with Normans and English royalty, the high families of Scotland now embraced further schemes." It is good that Webb put blood back into the mix, because he follows with an inspired description of William Wallace, shunned by the mixed-blood Scottish nobles but supported by the common folk and Gaelic clans from the Highlands, destroying English armies. Eventually, Wallace met his doom. "The hybrid nobility had betrayed him," says Webb.

If the hybrid nobility betrayed Wallace and the common folk, so did the Catholic Church. By the 16th century, Her corruption and political machinations enabled John Knox to organize a Calvinist revolt in the Lowlands of Scotland. The Lowland Scots' interpretation of Calvin's doctrines only added to their already fierce sense of independence.

As a consequence, when thousands of Lowland Scots were planted in Ulster, they were separated from the native Irish, their Celtic cousins, by religion. Most Irish had remained Catholic as an expression of anti-English nationalism after Henry VIII's break with the Church of Rome. Similarly, many Highland clans remained Catholic until well into the 18th century.

The Ulster Scots found that the English considered them simply another version of the Irish—a people who did not conform to the Church of England, rebellious and troublesome. They were denied many of the civil rights that were denied the native Irish and began to understand that the English were using them to pacify Ulster for the benefit of England and Englishmen. They fought wars and skirmishes, suffered massacres and famines, and were still insulted and discounted by the ruling English hierarchy. When Parliament passed a number of acts, beginning in the early 1700's, that hit the Presbyterians in Ulster as hard as they did the Catholics, the great migrations to the American colonies began.

By this time, most of the Lowland Scots had been in Ireland for more than a hundred years, and some of the families were thoroughly intermarried with Irish. They thought of Ireland as their home; the Scottish connection was distant. Moreover, they hated the English like all other Irishmen. They came to America as Irishmen, and it was not, with rare exceptions, until generations later that they were referred to as Scotch-Irish, essentially an attempt by Protestant Americans to separate them from the Catholic Irish during the 1830's, 40's, and 50's.

Most of the Scots-Irish came to Pennsylvania, where they were guaranteed religious freedom. Puritan New England was not welcoming, referring to them as "these confounded Irish." Mobs actually stopped the landing of ships. Those who made it to shore immediately beat a path to remote frontier regions of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. Meanwhile, the provincial secretary for Pennsylvania was an Irish-born Quaker, James Logan. Thinking that frontier settlements of Scots-Irish would provide a barrier against Indian attacks on pacifist Quaker areas, Logan granted tracts of land to the immigrants. No sooner had the fierce fighters settled, however, than they were off to pioneer new regions, all the time claiming "squatter's rights." Five families of them, said Logan, "gives me more trouble than fifty of any other people." They are "troublesome settlers to the government and hard neighbors to the Indians."

Soon, the Scots-Irish were moving down the Shenandoah Valley into Virginia and then into North Carolina. A generation later, they reached Kentucky and Tennessee. By then, they had also pushed the frontier through western Pennsylvania and into Ohio. On the eve of the American Revolution, one Anglican bishop attributed much of the "rebellious spirit" in some of the colonies to the arrival from Ireland "of nearly three hundred thousand fanatical & hungry republicans in the course of a few years."

Smaller versions of Scottish and Irish clans formed in every mountain hollow, and leaders rose to assume positions similar to the chieftains of old. By his mid-teens, every able-bodied male was part of a local militia. Whether beating back Cherokee attacks on outlying settlements or annihilating a British army at King's Mountain, the Scots-Irish were in the forefront.

While many historians argue that the Scots-Irish began to lose their identity in the years following the American Revolution, Webb contends that not only did

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they retain their identity, but their culture subsumed those of others, including English, Welsh, and Germans who began settling and intermarrying with the Scots-Irish on the frontier.

With the establishment of the United States, those on the frontier found themselves enfranchised and wielding political power. The leaders they chose were most often populists and warriors. If any leader was like a clan chieftain of old, it was "Irish Andy" Jackson. Webb argues that Old Hickory "remains in a class by himself." Devoting an entire chapter to Jackson, Webb is clearly inspired by the man who inspired the frontiersmen, militiamen, mountain folk, Indian fighters, Irish immigrants, and workingmen of America.

By the 19th century, most of the Scots-Irish had left the Presbyterian Church and become Methodists or Baptists or members of some sect of their own invention. Many were swayed by fundamentalist preachers, sowing the seeds of what would become the Bible Belt. Nonetheless, Celtic genes exercised a powerful influence, and the preacher's words were

> countered on a daily basis by the heavy drinking that had come, along with the stills, from the glens of Ireland and Scotland, and by an equally long addiction to devilish music, sensual pleasures, constant physical challenge, and an inbred defiance of authority.

Webb follows the Scots-Irish into the Civil War and argues that Southern boys—a disproportionate number of whom were Scots-Irish—had been reared with a "warrior ethic" and fought because someone had invaded their land, because their chieftains had rallied the clan, because there was a fight to be fought. They fought least of all, probably not at all, for slavery. Although Webb only briefly mentions it, those regions of the South that were virtually 100-percent Scots-Irish—the western part of Virginia and the eastern parts of Kentucky and Tennessee—were Union in their sympathies. Webb attributes this to loyalty to local leaders who "went with the Union." I wish he would have opined why they sided with the North. It is clearly evident to me that the Scots-Irish hated the aristocratic planters and their privilege, reminiscent of English landlords in Scotland and Ireland.

Scots-Irishmen made up the bulk of the Confederate Army, says Webb, including most of its leaders—such men as Albert Sidney Johnston, Nathan Bedford Forrest, Jeb Stuart, and Stonewall Jackson. The Union Army was run like a business, a machine, argues Webb. The Confederate Army was a clan,

> a living thing emanating from the spirit of its soldiers—daring, frequently impatient, always outnumbered, often innovative, relying on the unexpected and counting on the boldness of its leaders and the personal loyalties of those who followed.

There are those who have said that the Southern boys lost the war "because they were too Celtic and their opponents too English." Not so, counters Webb. The South, lacking materiel and manpower, fought as well and for as long as she did only because she was "so wildly and recklessly Celtic."

Webb also discusses the aftermath of the war and Reconstruction, a "mess that Yankees made." His analysis is sharp, but it is really more about the South than about the Scots-Irish. His most interesting observation comes in noting the migrations of Scots-Irish out of the South, particularly to the West. The Celts have always been on the move westward. Driven by a folklore describing a paradisiacal land to the west, the Celts fought and trekked their way across Europe until they got to the Atlantic seacoast. They then built ships and sailed to the British Isles. Saint Brendan and other Irish monks sailed to Iceland and Greenland and may have reached North America. Now California claims the greatest number (although not percentage) of Celts in the United States. Where do they go from the Golden State?

While most scholars have argued that the Scots-Irish as an identifiable group were well on their way to the oblivion of assimilation by the time of the Civil War, Webb sees the characteristics and traits of the wild Celts everywhere in American life, especially in the military, in country music, and in fundamentalist Christianity. He sees them in his own family, generations of his family, be they Webbs or Hodges, Doyles, Smiths, McKnights, Murphys, Walkers, or Cochrans. He loves his people, and he loves their ways. He seems mostly proud that they always stood their ground and never backed down. c

The Peculiar Path

by Paul Gottfried

Demokratie-Sonderweg Bundesrepublik: Analyse der Herrschaftsordnung in Deutschland
by Josef Schüsslburner
Fulda: Lindenblatt Media Verlag; 798 pp., $39.80 EUR

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A Bavarian legal scholar who has been attached to the U.N. Secretariat and to the E.U. Commission in Brussels, Josef Schüsslburner has disagreements with the German Basic Law, enacted in 1949 as an interim constitution for the West German Federal Republic. The author describes this guiding document and the circumstances that helped shape it as "democracy's peculiar path for the Germans." It is a path that mandates an "order of control" (*Herrschaftsordnung*) that leaves little room for real constitutional freedom or for any meaningful practice of popular government.

While the Basic Law (Article 146) claims to be only provisional and, in fact, subject to replacement by a new, permanent constitution once Germany is reunified, its origins determined both its later development and the virtual impossibility of superseding it. The law came out of Germany's defeat and demoralization and has special features that her occupiers inflicted on their subjects. These include a federal court for interpreting the Basic Law (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the federal and provincial agencies known as the Verfassungsschutz, which were organized in 1949, at the command of the Allied Occupation, to document "extremist" threats to German democracy. Such institutions interpret the constitutionally guaranteed right to make fundamental changes in the Basic Law as an antidemocratic attack on German "militant democracy" (*wehrhafte Demokratie*). Although Articles 79 and 146 provide for the possibility of amending part or all of the Basic Law, the "state protectors" of Germany's democratic transformation and of the entrenched parliamentary blocs insist that any public advocacy of constitutional revision, particularly by conservative nationalists, should be suppressed. Courts have come down hard on those who express politically uncongenial opinions, and those groups that

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call for a constitution without snooping agencies or party bans can expect to be "investigated."

Schüsslburner has zeroed in on the glaring contradiction between the German government as it actually is and how it depicts itself. He is on target when he characterizes the Federal Republic, in the terminology of Carl Schmitt, as "a sovereign dictatorship," a form of permanent despotic control that affects the way people live. The Allied restrictions on a defeated Germany—imposed (supposedly) to save her and her neighbors from a re-eruption of German nationalist passions—and the Allied espousal of a plan for German "reeducation" shaped West Germany's constitutional horizons. The constitution points back to Allied directives—to what Schüsslburner styles a "governmental prototype," in the way that it monitors political opinion and empowers courts to ban undesirable parties and organizations. It was possible, however, to amend that dictatorial pattern once the occupiers were gone. Instead, judicial democracy became a permanent and accelerating German practice. And, since the ascent to power of the radical, antinationalist left—what, by now, has grown to become Germany's governing class—this rigidly controlling government, practicing forms of censorship reminiscent of East German communism, has gone largely unchallenged. (German parties of the right-center are even more weak-kneed than our Republicans and avoid identification with "extremism," which, in Germany, means the nationalist right.)

Like the Incorporation Doctrine in the United States, by which federal judges, through the 14th Amendment, can turn the Bill of Rights against the sovereign states that the amendments were meant to shield, German jurists and courts selectively invoke those parts of the Basic Law that can be turned against opponents of "militant democracy." At the same time, they ignore or slight those "Fundamental Rights," such as freedom of expression, that come at the beginning of the German constitution. This arbitrary judicial rule contradicts even those classical liberal traces that can be found in the Basic Law. From that law, it would appear that the state should not take sides in the competition for political office, providing that legal procedures are observed. Nor would it seem that the Basic Law empowered the Bundesverfassungsgericht to keep individuals from campaigning for office, unless they are doing something quite concrete, like stockpiling weapons or inciting violence, to "remove" or "damage" the regime. Unfortunately, this constitutionally expressed fear of "damaging" Germany's *freiheitliche demokratische Ordnung* and the referring of decisions regarding such threats in Article 21 to the federal constitutional court open the door to inventive interpretations of what constitutes such an assault.

German "democrats" have set out to give their allegedly benighted countrymen a "community of values" that bars opposition and criminalizes even those who argue that today's German republic is less concerned about intellectual and political freedom than German governments of the past. (Schüsslburner is correct to suggest that the German Second Empire, not to mention the Weimar Republic, was far more tolerant of opposing political views than the current version of "militant democracy.") Moreover, Germany's ideological dictators, assisted by the press, present themselves as "constitutional patriots." And they deny loyalty toward a specifically German nation, which they pelt with insults. These enforcers of universal values and constitutional procedures are not genuine legalists, however. They genuflect before the Basic Law only to the extent that it can be made to serve their purposes. Thus, the rights to express, publish, and disseminate opinions in Article 5; the stress on the indispensability of party formations for the "political self-development of the people" in Article 21; and the designation of the "people" in Article 20 as "the source of state power" are all filtered through more useful passages in the Basic Law. Politically incorrect publicists and party organizations are said to threaten the constitutional order, a problem that German censors consider to be addressed in Articles 18, 20-4, and 21-2. As Schüsslburner properly notes, however, the rights conferred on the German people, as well as on the state, to resist overt threats to the constitutional order do not consistently mean what those rights are now made to signify: disagreeing with an imposed ideological value consensus. The law, he explains, is dealing with attempts to overthrow the constitutional order by force, if evidence can be furnished that such a threat exists. And the Basic Law does provide for the peaceful alteration of the established order, in Articles 79 and 146. Although not exactly a fan of the Basic Law, Schüsslburner believes that the thought control and restriction of parliamentary choices now practiced in Germany go beyond any reasonable constitutional interpretation. He stresses the possibility of making such a document work, as long as the courts are not allowed to engage in "extreme interpretations."

Schüsslburner demonstrates how Germany's judicial governance has worked against "dangerous" opposition and disagreeable thought. (Were it not for the embarrassing discovery last year that the "investigated" National Democratic Party had been heavily infiltrated by the Verfassungsschutz, German judges would have succeeded by now in banning this party of the nationalist right.) It is also no wonder that the courts and major party blocs condemn "extremist" suggestions about reconstructing the German constitution. After all, the devotees of German ideological democracy are not likely to welcome a new basic law without those features that now help them to exercise their power. They also hope that Germany can be fully incorporated into a denationalized European Community; to that end, they quote arrangements for this transfer of authority in Articles 23 and 24. Why should Germany's political bosses support a new constitution that might reflect a German national consciousness while endangering their post-national agenda? They have even refused to acknowledge the right of their subjects to vote on the European Union's new constitution. Why allow people to make "undemocratic" decisions?

Note that Schüsslburner's arguments, which require a careful reading of the *Grundgesetz* and some previous exposure to German constitutional history, have not gone without criticism from the German right. *Junge Freiheit*, for example, has treated dismissively his contention that the antinational German government and its multicultural reign of terror can be traced back to the Basic Law—or, at least, to its contradictions. While Schüsslburner may push his interpretation too hard, by reading certain parts of that document more negatively than the text would warrant, his critical point is correct. It is also by no means original. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddhin and Caspar von Schrenk Notzing both wrote convincingly on the same subject, as the liberal-constitutional, anti-Communist phase of the Federal Republic was coming to an end. The association of the West German government with

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conservative Catholic Konrad Adenauer and the application of state bans to keep communists, as well as Nazis, out of public view were characteristic of a postwar German dispensation that was ending by the late 1960's. Hard though it might be to believe, the postwar German Social Democratic leader and opponent of Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, sounded like the current German right in his defense of German nationalism. Not until the 1960's could one view with justification the German Social Democrats at the federal level as a distinctly antinationalist party fixated on the sins of German history. By the 70's, this new direction became even more evident. Willi Brandt and his penitential politics and a radicalized generation of younger Germans, at war with their "Nazi" parents, would give the Federal Republic a different spin. The enemy for them was not generic totalitarianism, including the communists, but "fascism," which meant preeminently the German past.

Schüsslburner should have emphasized more than he does that, without the interruption of the Cold War, the Basic Law might have pushed Germany leftward faster. Like Aristotle, he correctly perceives that constitutions both correspond to and favor specific social characteristics. But this observation also did not elude the Allied High Command and the mostly antinationalist architects of the Basic Law. Their concerns are embodied in what was to be a provisional constitution but, at the same time, an intended prototype for any future German government. Thus, we stumble here over features—*e.g.*, a phased transition to international government, the required granting of asylum, the exclusion of preemptive war, and the solemnization of human rights—that make this law appear to foreshadow the present European left. Postwar Germany was turned into a laboratory for social experiments that eventually migrated elsewhere in the West. Curiously, those who approve of such aspects of the Basic Law never show that it was necessary to keep the Germans from falling back into Nazi habits. There is no reason to assume that this would have happened once the Third Reich had left Germany devastated and humiliated. And it is also not true, as Schüsslburner reminds us, that the Germans had no constitutional models of their own to consult. Adaptable constitutional frameworks abounded in Central Europe from the Holy Roman Empire onward, and some of their features, as we learn from this book, were incorporated into the work of the postwar constitutionmakers. There were also 19th-century liberal constitutions that had functioned in southwestern Germany since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The idea that Germany had no tradition of constitutional self-government—except for the Weimar failure—until the Allies came along is plainly untrue. What the Germans gave themselves in 1949, partly through advice they could not refuse, was not the best government they ever had. It was an imperfect constitution from the standpoint of national self-government but the only one that their former enemies would allow them to live under. In my view, this *Grundgesetz* was defensible, given the circumstances in which it was prepared and given the presumption that it could be altered. What happened thereafter, with shades of 1933, was that the Basic Law became window dressing for a legal revolution. Schüsslburner traces the fateful course by which this development occurred.

Paul Gottfried is the author, most recently, of Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt *(University of Missouri Press).*

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by Samuel Francis

Toward a Hard Right

What is the meaning of the election of 2004 for the American Hard Right? The question, of course, presupposes that there is such a thing as a "Hard Right" distinct from the Mossad's Station Pentagon, or the "moral values" evangelicals, or the Girly Boys' Jamboree. By "Hard Right," in this context, I mean neither what has by now evolved into the establishment conservatism of the neocons and their Christian Right allies nor the collection of conspiracy-mongers, captives of various ethnic and class resentments, and neck-twitchers of all descriptions whose bottomless buckets of e-mails seem magnetically attracted to my inbox. I mean, rather, a still amorphous but definitely existing formation of dissident conservatives and rightists (some savory and some not, depending on one's tastes) that finds itself alienated not only from the direction in which America as a nation and a civilization appears to be going but from the mainstream of American "conservatism," a body of opinion that now merely defends and reflects this direction. I will not name all the elements of this movement that I think belong in it (since the first response to doing so would be for most of those I named to denounce and reject association with the others), but most of the readers with whom I communicate, many of whom I regularly encounter at public conferences and speeches, will know exactly which individuals and which groups I am talking about. The Hard Right is not defined (at least not yet) by any coherently stated ideology or program or any formal organization (there are several, sort of), but those who are drawn to it know it when they see it, and those who don't are people for whom it probably doesn't really matter if they know it or not.

Regardless of the groups, publications, websites, and individuals who make up the Hard Right, there are three main issues that so far define it: immigration control, the war in Iraq (and, a bit more broadly, U.S. foreign policy), and what we shall call (perhaps a bit demurely) the Cultural Issue—namely, what kind of country is this going to be, and who's going to be in charge of it? The Cultural Issue is only in part (and only a rather thin part) about such matters as "homosexual marriage" or abortion or display of the Ten Commandments on the courthouse lawn, or similar moral-social (or constitutional) issues. Those issues all have conservative champions in the mainstream, and few in the Hard Right are much interested in them explicitly. The candidate who carried those issues more than any other in the last election was not President Bush, who did his best to avoid them but wound up with all the credit for them anyway, but the Constitution Party's Michael Peroutka, whose valiant efforts were barely noticeable in the final returns (a bit more than 100,000 votes). One reason he did not fare better, perhaps, is that President Bush and the Republicans actually did stroke those issues enough to be able to draw away whatever support he might have gained from them.

The Moral Issue, in that sense, is not the same at all as the Cultural Issue, of which immigration should properly be considered a part. The Cultural Issue concerns matters on which religious and ethical beliefs in themselves are silent: For example, Should we display the Confederate Flag or similar symbols? Or, What should your children learn at school about George Washington or Christopher Columbus, as opposed to Red Cloud and Nat Turner? Ultimately, of course, the Cultural Issue comes down not just to procedural questions about what public schools should teach and on what public funds should be spent but to the bottom line: Was the Confederacy right, or at least defensible? Were whites right to take the country from the Indians? Were white Southerners right to keep slavery as long as they did? Throughout most of American history, the answers were clear enough to all Americans who mattered. Today, thanks in large part to the managed collapse of the traditional cultural envelope, they are not, and the answers that are emerging (again, through managed construction) are what help create the Hard Right.

To return, then, to the question raised, What was the effect of the 2004 election on the American Hard Right? My original inclination, both before and after it became clear that George W. Bush had won, was that its impact was disastrous. Now, that may not be the case.

The reason a Bush victory seemed disastrous (for the Hard Right specifically, as opposed to all the other reasons it is disastrous) is that it effectively prevents the conservative consciousness-raising that is needed if Americans who now think of themselves as "conservatives" (and believe, as conservatives do, that everything's OK) are ever going to grow up and recognize that they need to be Hard Right (adherents of which know that things aren't OK). What happened in 2004 is what has happened in every election year since George Wallace ran against Richard Nixon in 1968. The Democrats are just sooooo bad! Humphrey or McGovern or Clinton or Gore or Kerry or (fill in the blank) is sooooo dangerous, we've just got to vote for Nixon or Ford or Bush or Bush or whoever it might be to keep him out. With all his flaws, the Republican is always the lesser of the two evils.

Not surprisingly, of course, the logical consequence of this "strategy" of the Lesser of Two Evils is that the lesser evil becomes increasingly evil. Not only does it offer a blank check to the Republican incumbent to do whatever he wishes after he once again gulls the conservative cattle into the proper voting corrals, but it does nothing to develop conservative strength within the party itself as a base from which it could ever recover its position. The natural result of the perpetual Lesser of Two Evils strategy is the permanent marginalization of conservative forces within the GOP. Today, to say they have been "marginalized" is problematic. It is not clear that they even exist.

Suppose, however, that conservatives had decided to vote against Bush this time and allowed Kerry to win? Would this have been any better? Probably not.

The reason is that conservatives in-

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side the GOP would not have used the opportunity to take over and construct a serious conservative (let alone a Hard Right) party but would have done exactly what they did when Bill Clinton won the White House in 1992. For the next eight years, we had to listen to every Clinton panty-raid story and murder theory the professional conservatives could come up with. We enjoyed only a brief whiff of this same brew during the Swift Boat controversies last summer, but we would have spent the next four years listening to how Kerry stole the election and the most lurid gossip about his sex life, financial deals, military records, and legal and political scandals. As under Clinton, there would have been no substantive discussion of public issues—mass immigration, foreign policy, or culture—and whatever leftist agendas a President Kerry might have inflicted on these fronts during his tenure would have been dumbly and unconsciously swallowed by the "respectable" and mainstream right. A Kerry victory last year would have done nothing to develop the Hard Right as a mature political and cultural movement. It would have benefited only Mr. Kerry and his allies and his adversaries.

What I am calling the Hard Right is not, properly speaking, a political movement at all in the narrow sense of politics—that is, in the sense of entering elections, running campaigns, and winning votes. It is not even close to being able to do that. Previous efforts of hard-right movements to enter the political lists have always turned out to be disastrous for the simple reason that the culture into which they are venturing is not at all prepared to receive or understand them. They immediately are pegged as "extremist" or "fringe" or not serious because they come across as purely ideological or single-issue movements—and so they are. What they invariably need to do, and never have the patience or skill to do, is engage in what Antonio Gramsci called "prefigurement," the preparation of the public culture for the reception of the new materials and ideas. Running for office is one way to do that, but there are usually cheaper and more effective ways to do so. Most hard-right movements wind up as dead-end "third parties" in the elephants' graveyard where thousands of such efforts lie buried because they run for office and then never do anything else until the next election. For the same reason that Sun Tzu said the greatest skill lies in winning the battle before the fighting, the election should be won well before the campaigning starts.

The Hard Right, in other words, is, by definition, a cultural movement rather than a political one, and its proper purpose ought to be to prepare the American political culture for the reception of its issues and ideas. There is a good deal of evidence that a breakthrough of some kind is about to happen concerning immigration, at least in reaction to Bush's amnesty plan for illegal aliens, and that, in turn, clearly connects to the Cultural Issue. The war, as should be obvious enough to most *Chronicles* readers, will soon make itself into an issue, whether the administration wants it or not. There is little doubt, then, that all the issues that now define the Hard Right are alive and kicking. What is important is for the Hard Right to be the force that defines their discussion.

As its issues do enter the discussion forums of the mainstream, maintaining control of them will not be easy. On immigration, for example, after decades of ignoring and denying its significance, mainstream-conservative organizations are now trying to raise money off it. They often have the mailing lists and resources and illusion of impact that can take the issue out of the control of those Hard Right (largely small-scale-populist) efforts that have long been reporting on and developing the immigration issue in different ways. Of course, the larger conservative organizations will drop the issue once it ceases to make them money or will settle for partial remedies where only radical (Hard Right) measures will work. The same thing happened to Wallace himself to an extent, as Nixon began to grasp that his fierce opposition to busing, forced desegregation, judicial tyranny, and crime were paying off. A further reason there can be no effective third party in this country is that the mainstream parties will simply steal its issues if they ever threaten to acquire significant political followings.

What is more important for the Hard Right to do now is not to start licking its chops over all the votes it will gain and elections it will win but to forget campaign politics and start what the European New Left used to call the "long march through the institutions," yet another concept from Comrade Gramsci. Hard Rightists need not only to develop their own identity as a movement and their own institutions but to shape those of others—to force their enemies to respond to them, to force them as much as possible to live with the political consequences of their own policies, and to establish a "dialogue" that will carry Hard Right ideas and values into the mainstream. All of that, of course, appears much easier said than done, but the second Bush administration seems to be shaping up as a far-more-favorable environment for the emergence of a Hard Right than even the first one was. With no reelection concerns, with majorities in both chambers of Congress, the administration can offer no more excuses to its conservative base, and the base can offer no further excuses to itself as to why it should remain conservative rather than Hard Right.

What is not clear about the future of the Hard Right is not whether it will exist or will become a more clearly defined political movement but whether it can attract enough citizens who share its discontents and aspirations to make it an effective force. What the election of 2004 seems to tell us more than anything else is that most Americans who now see themselves on the political (and cultural) right are perfectly happy with President Bush and what he is doing. They like his cheery grin and friendly arm-waving; they like his cute wife and daughters and their toasty religious and family-values rhetoric. They like his "Standin' up for America" bluster. The Bushes tell them everything's OK, and that's what conservatives always want to hear. Let them stay where they are. They are not what the Hard Right needs, and their involvement in it would only retard its emergence as a new cultural and political force. c

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by Scott P. Richert

If We Make It Through December

From oracles to astrology to double predestination, men throughout history have sought hope in a glimpse of their future. As the Greeks well understood, however, foreknowledge is usually at the root of tragedy, and even Saint Augustine warned against consulting astrologers not because astrology is mere superstition but because of the possibility that the astrologers' forecasts might be right. We cannot properly live our lives day to day when we know how they are destined to end.

The same is true of the lives of cities and of nations. Knowing that our time on earth must someday draw to a close is essential to being human; knowing—or wanting to know—the day and the hour and the circumstances is likely to lead us only to despair.

I have written here before that Rockford is dying, and I don't intend to take back those words. Some clarification, however, might be in order. The city of Rockford may survive as long as the United States does; indeed, it may well exist long after this unwieldy continental empire has crumbled. It won't, however, be the city that we know today—a solidly middle-class, Middle American, European-derived community built on manufacturing. The growth of Rockford's population over the past decade was entirely the result of Hispanic immigration; the white population is declining. Today, healthcare and public education "contribute" more to Rockford's economy than manufacturing does. And as I write this just a week before Christmas, Rockford is set to lose another 1,000 manufacturing jobs before the year ends.

Got laid off down at the factory
And their timing's not the greatest
in the world.
Heaven knows I've been working
hard.
Wanted Christmas to be right for
Daddy's girl.
I don't mean to hate December.
It's meant to be the happy time of
year.
But my little girl don't understand
Why her daddy can't afford no
Christmas cheer.

The narrator of Merle Haggard's plaintive song has "Got plans to be in a warmer town come summertime," and on this, the coldest day of winter so far, some of those 1,000 workers are undoubtedly trying to figure out where they should go. Knowing their fate for most of the year, as the 400 workers at Atwood Mobile and the 100 at Amerock and the 300 at Textron have, has helped very little. Few comparable jobs are being created within commuting distance of Rockford, and President Bush's campaign promises aside, most of these workers will not have the time or resources to be able to take advantage of retraining so that they can get positions in, say, the healthcare industry. They are going to be too busy working two or three part-time jobs just to pay their mortgages and heating bills.

These factory closings and layoffs are coming just days after President Bush's joint press conference with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at the White House on December 15. Responding to Berlusconi's concern about the weakness of the dollar (the euro currently hovers around $1.33; the British pound has gone as high as $2.00), the President lectured the assembled reporters on deficits, skipping over the budget deficit with barely a mention, dwelling on the Social Security deficit ("I campaigned on the issue"), and dismissing the trade deficit. You can almost see the smirk on his face as you read the transcript: "There's a trade deficit. That's easy to resolve; people can buy more United States products if they're worried about the trade deficit."

The President didn't say whether the people he had in mind were Berlusconi's fellow Italians or his fellow Americans, but it really doesn't matter: What he meant was that, while others might be concerned about the trade deficit, he and his administration don't view it as a problem. That the trade deficit continues to balloon even as the dollar has sunk to historic lows, however, is a serious indication of the hollowness of the American economy. And it portends further trouble for American agriculture and for manufacturing centers such as Rockford.

If the dollar recovers, as President Bush claims he wants it to ("The policy of my government is a strong dollar policy"), the effect will be to make American products more expensive, decreasing American exports. If American manufacturers cannot compete in the "global marketplace" today, how will they survive when exchange rates return to something closer to normal?

The problem that President Bush does not want to acknowledge, but which is obvious to those who have observed the decline in American manufacturing, is that we are rapidly approaching the point where concerned Americans or beneficent Italians simply could not wipe out our trade deficit if they tried. Many small manufacturers in Rockford would gladly buy American-made steel, and they would probably even be willing to pay a small premium for it (despite their ever-falling profits), but the United States doesn't produce enough steel to meet domestic needs. Some union workers still take "Buy American" campaigns seriously, but in most areas of the country, it is next to impossible to outfit a family entirely in American-made clothes, regardless of the price you're willing to pay. Forget about locally grown or organic produce; can you even feed your family a balanced diet without purchasing imported goods? (In his final press conference, outgoing Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson expressed amazement that terrorists hadn't taken advantage of our reliance on foreign foodstuffs: "For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.")

If we make it through December, we'll be fine. America and Rockford and most of the newly unemployed Rockfordians will make it through December, but, Merle notwithstanding, the coldest time of winter here is usually January. What happens then? c

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Letter From Iraq

by Scott Taylor

Five Days in Hell, Part Two

◆

As dusk approached, we were offered a final meal of flat bread, roast chicken, and tomatoes. The maniacal little leader came to watch us eat, all the while aiming his gun at us. "Eat, eat. Why do you have no appetite? Are you afraid, American pig?" he said and then laughed at his own joke. Although I was certainly not hungry, I did my best to choke down a few difficult mouthfuls. Inside, I had to stifle a trembling fear from overcoming my composure. My fellow prisoner began to sob, and I reached over to take his hand.

"How long do you think the pain will last?" he asked. It was something I had been giving careful consideration. "About three seconds." As the sun started to set on the horizon, Mubashir drove up and entered into a heated argument with the newcomer. Reassured at the sound of his voice, I had risked a glance out of the window—just in time to see the ceremonial dagger being returned to the trunk of the car. We had been spared once again.

During some candid conversations, I finally learned the identity of my captors. As we talked about the various ethnic factions and politics at play in northern Iraq, I had mentioned the group Ansar al-Islam. Mubashir had looked surprised at my comment and said, "Don't you know? We are Ansar al-Islam." My heart sank when I heard this because I knew that this group of fundamentalist extremists had links to Al Qaeda. "Yes," confided Mubashir, "Osama is our brother in Afghanistan, and al-Zarqawi is our brother in Jordan."

This group had never before released a foreigner, and this revelation explained why they had never mentioned ransoming us off as hostages. The Ansar al-Islam fought for their religious beliefs—not for money. Although I expressed my fears to Mubashir, he once again stressed the fact that his brother's wish would be granted—provided we were telling the truth.

We spent Friday morning awaiting word that we could enter Mosul and be granted an audience with the new *emir*. We got the word around 2 P.M. that the *emir* would see us. We climbed into one car—the UNICEF driver in the trunk; Zeynep and I, along with Mubashir and two guards, in the front. Our hands were not tied, and we wore no blindfolds—everything seemed to be going well. However, once inside Mosul, it became apparent that something had gone wrong with the plan.

We had stopped at several homes and picked up different guides at various locations. Eventually, we were taken to a large house in a northern suburb and led into an empty room. The UNICEF driver was released from the trunk and taken into a small anteroom beneath a staircase. Mubashir had complained of being ill, and he now seemed disinterested in our fate. There were about a dozen young men inside this house, and they were extremely hostile toward us. Blankets were placed across all the windows despite the soaring temperature.

Zeynep whispered that these new men were not Turkmen but Arabs, as she no longer understood their conversation. Mubashir made some sort of statement to them on our behalf and then bade us farewell. He and his men were heading back into Tal Afar to join the fight.

Within minutes of his departure, the Arabs burst into the room and roughly blindfolded me. As I tried to protest, I was kicked in the ribs, knocking the wind out of me. "Shut up, American spy!"

For the next hour, I was interrogated—beginning again with their presumption that I was either a CIA or Mossad spy. I gave all the possible details of my identity, and, when asked how I could confirm these "lies," I told them to research my writings on the internet. In particular, they could not believe that I had written features for *Al Jazeera*'s website. Although questioning was intense, I was relieved when it ended without any physical force being used. My relief was premature.

I had barely removed the blindfold and taken a sip of water when five men rushed back into the room. I could see the batons and ropes, but I had no time to react before I was pulled to my feet. When I attempted to resist, my feet were knocked out from under me, and I was savagely kicked. They blindfolded me and gagged me with a headscarf. My hands were tied behind my back, and I was rolled over with my feet up in the air—tied to a pole. Two men held the pole up, while two others began beating my feet with straps and batons.

At first, I could not see the blows coming. In his pent-up fury, one of my attackers struck my face several times with his fist, knocking my blindfold aside. I mentally promised myself not to give them the satisfaction of hearing me scream until after the 20th blow. I bit down hard on the cloth and focused on counting rather than the pain. I kept my promise, but on the 21st strike I screamed out, "F--k!" The cloth muffled the sound somewhat. With each successive blow I uttered the same expletive. They deliberately hit the same spot on my thigh repeatedly. For the first four or five blows, the pain would increase incrementally, and then the final strike would force an involuntary convulsion. I could feel the pain explode in my head, and my body jack-knifed upward reflexively.

In these instances, I found myself blurting out "Jeeesus Christ!" through my gritted teeth. I lost all track of time. I could have been tortured for 5 minutes or 25. I do remember that, despite the excruciating pain in my legs, I kept fearing that the next blow would be to my genitals. With my legs splayed apart and upended, I felt incredibly vulnerable. When the beating finally stopped, I felt a tremendous sense of relief that they had not used the batons on my crotch.

After my feet were cut loose, I was roughly pulled upright, and the interrogator handed me a pen and paper. "You will write down all the websites you think might help to confirm that you are in fact a Canadian journalist," he said. I made some remark that I would have gladly done so without the beating, but my attempt at black humor was wasted.

I had been badly beaten, and, as I walked out of the anteroom back into the main parlor, most of the Arab "pupils" had gathered to see my reaction. I tried my best not to let them see any weakness by pressing the pen hard against the paper so that they could not see my hands shaking. Taking the list of websites from me, the interrogator told me, "If this checks out, you'll live; if you lied, you die."

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A few minutes later, I was ushered into an adjacent room and told to lie face-down on the floor, and a gun barrel was placed against the back of my neck. It was Zeynep's turn to be beaten, and, as she cried out in pain, the guard behind me kept repeating, "You can spare her the pain—simply confess that you are a spy." As I kept uttering denials, he spat on my head and said, "Only a dog would let a woman suffer like that!" I thought to myself, *And what kind of animal would torture a woman?*

For several hours after the beating, I was kept alone in that room. My legs were aching and would occasionally seize up on me. I tried to stand, but the guards insisted that I remain seated on a mat. When the interrogator finally reentered my holding cell he said, "You failed the test on the internet. Prepare yourself to die—tonight." As the door banged shut behind him, I once again had an all-consuming sense of dread. The next time the door opened, it was an armed guard and one of the "pupils" carrying a platter of food. Once again, I was being encouraged to eat my final meal.

Though I did not know it at the time, Zeynep and the UNICEF driver had been set free, while both of them were told that I had been beheaded.

After I had picked at my food, the dishes were cleared away, and a heavyset young Arab entered the room. He was grinning from ear to ear, and I recognized him as one of my torturers. "I am the lucky one who has been chosen to kill you, American dog," he said.

It was at this time I decided to play my final card. Zeynep had always told me that I should tell our captors I wished to convert to Islam. Even if I wasn't sincere, she thought it might buy me time (if not freedom). "I want you to teach me an Islamic prayer before you kill me," I said. "A man about to die should have a god to pray to—shouldn't he?" Other guards and pupils had overheard this, and they seemed excited at the prospect of converting a *Kaffir* and then executing him.

As they started to explain the conversion process and necessary prayers, one of the clerics returned to the house. He put an end to the commotion by informing me my religious conversion was no longer necessary as I was "free to go." Thinking this may be yet another test of my resolve to convert, I explained that, in that case, it was even more important, "as a man needs a god to thank for sparing him his life."

I was advised that the procedure would have to be performed at a later date, as a car was waiting to take me to a safe house in preparation for my release. Once again, I dared to start believing that I might actually survive this ordeal.

My eyes had been taped shut with electrical tape, and my sunglasses placed on top. I was led gently to a car outside. The night air felt cool and refreshing, and I tried to keep my euphoria in check—reminding myself that it was not over yet.

However, by the time we had driven several kilometers and my escorts led me inside a new house, I felt certain that I had been saved. The glasses were taken off, and the tape removed. I found myself in a clean home sitting on a bed looking at three smiling Arabs. My guards from the other house were in the doorway, and one of them waved his hand in a fluttering motion, smiled, and said, "Free. Bye, bye." The door shut behind them and all of a sudden the three Arabs stopped smiling. The big man standing in the center of the room strode toward me, pulling a pair of handcuffs from behind his back. The nightmare started all over.

They cuffed my hands behind my back and instructed me to sleep. Two of them slept in the same room as me—armed with pistols—while the homeowner had taken the precaution of padlocking us in. It proved impossible to sleep with my arms pinned back like that, and, after two hours, I felt stabbing pain in my shoulders.

The following morning, it became clear that instead of taking me to a safe house *en route* to freedom, I had been transferred to yet another fundamentalist faction. At about 10 A.M., I was "prepped" for my new interrogation by having my feet and hands chained to the bed and my eyes once again taped firmly shut. I estimated that at least three additional terrorists entered the room and began talking with my guards. Anticipating yet another beating, I fought to control my fear. One man simply stated in excellent English, "We know that you are a Mossad spy." As I started to protest, he interrupted me, "Don't waste your breath. You have 24 hours to decide whether to tell the truth and die with a clear conscience or go to your death as a liar. That is your choice. Think it over." With that, the newcomers promptly left the house.

I spent that entire day chained to the bed and, for the most part, blindfolded. As a gesture of compassion, they would occasionally free my eyes so that I could watch the television. All the programming was on the anniversary of the World Trade Center attacks. It was September 11, and I was tied to a bed in an Al Qaeda cell house in Iraq. I felt my fate was truly sealed.

That evening, I was once again asked what I would prefer as my final meal. After arguing, again, that my appetite wasn't exactly stimulated by my imminent death, I asked for a roast chicken. When the food arrived, they kept one of my hands tied to the bed and a pistol to the back of my head. It seemed they were taking no chances in letting me escape execution.

It was only 9 P.M.—just 11 hours after they first came, not the promised 24—when the three other terrorists returned. I did not feel cheated out of the time, as I was actually dreading the thought of another night of agony in the handcuffs. I had made my peace with God, and, if necessary, I was prepared to die. Another 13 hours of mental anguish was not necessary.

As soon as everyone was settled around my bed, the interrogator said that I did not have to fear any torture, as this round of questioning would be far more straightforward. "It is either life or knife—with each answer that you give us," he said. "So please relax." For over one hour, I carefully answered all their questions—careful to avoid the obvious traps. For instance, when asked, "Have you ever visited the State of Israel?" I answered, "No, I have never been to the occupied State of Palestine."

I have no idea whether my answers were convincing—in fact, I suspect that the decision to release me had already been made at some high level—but, during one of my lengthy replies, the interrogator suddenly said, "Stop. Get your things. You will live. You are free."

Once the handcuffs were removed, I was handed my shoes and jacket, and it seemed as though *they* were the ones anxious to be rid of *me*. With my eyes still taped shut, I was driven to a highway where one of the guards flagged down a passing taxi. Another man ripped the tape off my eyes, pushed 10,000 dinars (six dollars) into my shirt pocket, and shoved me headfirst into the back of the cab.

I was free.

Canadian journalist Scott Taylor is the author, most recently, of Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War Against Iraq. *Part One of this piece appeared in the January 2005 issue of* Chronicles.

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Letter From the Upper Midwest

by Sean Scallon

Diversity Bites Back

◆

After September 11, the word *blowback* was frequently heard. It is a CIA term describing operations that come back to haunt the agency (*e.g.*, Afghanistan). Unlimited immigration has its own form of blowback: people like Chai Vang, who, on the afternoon of November 21, 2004, shot eight deer hunters in the northwoods of the Indianhead region of Wisconsin just outside the town of Birchwood, killing six of them, including a female hunter.

Interestingly, one of the worst incidents of mass murder in Wisconsin history has its origins with the CIA itself. During the Vietnam War, CIA agents recruited and organized Hmong tribesmen like Mr. Vang (although he himself immigrated to the United States in 1980 at a young age) to fight both the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which snaked through the mountainous highlands of Laos where the Hmong live. They also fought the Pathet Lao, a communist rebel group. In 1975, the Pathet Lao triumphed against the Royal Laotian government forces and turned against the Hmong with genocidal fury, reportedly dropping chemical bombs on Hmong villages. The Hmong fled in terror to refugee camps in Thailand. Having no desire to integrate the Hmong, who are despised by the lowland Southeast Asian ethnic groups, and also having no desire to become another Burma, with ethnic armies on her jungle borders dealing opium, the Thais decided (with some justification) that the Hmong were an American problem and demanded that the United States allow them in.

Many Lutheran and Catholic organizations in the Upper Midwest agreed with the Thais. The plight of the Hmong became their cause in the late 1970's and early 80's, and they helped thousands of Hmong to emigrate to America. These refugees soon began to sponsor family members who, in turn, sponsored other relatives. Today, there are more Hmong in the United States than in Southeast Asia. Although most Hmong live in California, many decided to immigrate to the Upper Midwest, refusing to let the harsher climate stop them from taking advantage of better welfare services and numerous job opportunities. They also served as a diversifying factor for those multiculturalists who think that having the descendants of Germans and Scandinavians living side by side is not enough.

The Hmong did not have a written form of their language until a few decades ago. They were no more suited to assimilate into modern American life, with all of its complexities, than any headhunter tribe in the jungles of Borneo would be. Pat Buchanan was attacked back in 1992 when he honestly answered the question: *Who would assimilate better into Virginia, a million Zulus or a million Britons?* Had someone bothered to ask this when the immigration of the Hmong was proposed, perhaps the struggles that many Hmong adults go through—the conflicts between the primitive tribal and honor-bound world of the past and the postmodern world of today—would not be as soul-wrenching or, in some cases, as deadly.

Mr. Vang, like many Hmong, lived on the east side of St. Paul, Minnesota, with his family of six. Apparently, he had some run-ins with the Twin Cities police for domestic violence. Domestic disputes in which Hmong men kill their family members are not uncommon. And, as in many immigrant communities past and present, crime is also not uncommon among the Hmong. As Samuel Francis pointed out in a recent syndicated column,

> Ten years ago, immigration expert Roy Beck wrote a path-breaking article in the *Atlantic Monthly* about the Hmong immigrants in Wausau, Wisc.—a discussion he repeated in his later book, *The Case Against Immigration*.
>
> [Beck said that] "The number of Southeast Asians burgeoned, and the city's ability to welcome, nurture, accommodate and assimilate the larger numbers shrank. Most immigrants were unable to enter the mainstream of the economy. Residents resented the social costs of caring for many more newcomers than anybody had been led to believe would arrive. . . . Inter-ethnic violence and other tensions proliferated in the schools and in the parks and streets of a town that formerly had been virtually free of social tensions and violence."

Prearranged marriages, adolescent prostitution, honor killings, and ritual slaughter of animals in the backyard are just some of the points of conflict between the world the Hmong once knew and the world they now inhabit. Of course, not all Hmong are like Mr. Vang. Among the young, assimilation is slowly taking place, causing conflict between generations in the Hmong community. And most Upper Midwesterners were coming to terms with the Hmong presence in their communities before this incident.

In fact, hunting and fishing are shared values between whites and the Hmong. The wooded landscape, with thousands of lakes and streams and forested hills, reminds the Hmong of home. The Hmong, however, are not used to such concepts as private property, bag limits, and "No Trespassing" signs, because they could hunt and fish wherever they wanted to, and as much as they wanted to, back in the old country. So clashes take place between white hunters who follow the rules and Hmong who do not understand them. Such was the case with Mr. Vang and the unfortunate deer-hunting victims.

People cannot believe that a man could snap like that and kill so many. Yet snap is exactly what he did. Confronted when he was found in a tree stand on private property and asked to leave, Mr. Vang, according to Sawyer County sheriff's reports taken from the surviving victims, climbed down from the stand, took the scope off of his ASK Chinese-made semiautomatic rifle, walked about 40 yards back, turned around, and opened fire. One of the injured men radioed back to his buddies at a deer camp, asking them to come to his assistance. When they did, Mr. Vang (who claimed that the hunters taunted him with racial slurs and

Elizabeth Wolf

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that one of their party fired at him first) picked them off at distances of 40 to 70 yards away, betraying the fact that he had some military training. (He was in the U.S. Army.) People who argue that this incident shows that the Hmong have no respect for human life do not realize that Mr. Vang comes from a place where revenge killing and genocide against the Hmong people by the communist Pathet Lao were almost everyday occurrences. Regard for the lives of strangers is probably not on the top of the list of Hmong values, but ensuring the survival of oneself and one's family is.

St. Paul Mayor Randy Kelly has spent taxpayer dollars to travel to Hmong camps in Thailand to ask more Hmong to come to his city. Now, it is clear that more Hmong immigration will have costs that are not merely fiscal (more spending on social services and schools during tight times). Of course, the human cost was ignored when it involved Hmong killing one another in gang and domestic violence. Now that the violence has spilled over, people are finally asking why they should tolerate it. They should go to their church leaders who celebrate "diversity," their business leaders looking for cheap labor and docile employees, and their politicians seeking more tax revenue. They are the ones who have conducted social-engineering experiments on the Hmong as though they were lab rats. Get the answers from them.

Sean Scallon is a reporter who lives in Arkansaw, Wisconsin.

Letter From Spain

by Michael McMahon

Saints and Pilgrims

◆

Marie's walk was an act of prayer for her brother, who had leukemia. Alessandro had recently endured a divorce and was walking to find peace. Klaus was taking time out to decide what to do with his life after losing his job. Sharon and Chris were on the Spanish leg of a three-month tour of Europe. Pierrot and Helene, in their late 60's, were making the pilgrimage to Compostela for the fourth time, because they loved it. And me? I was on the Camino de Santiago because I had been asked.

In the summer of 2003, the idea of walking the ancient pilgrims' way to the shrine of St. James the Great had presented itself to me three times in as many weeks—too often, I felt, to be accounted for by mere coincidence. The first providential prod came at a campsite in the French Pyrenees, when, in return for a small act of kindness, a stranger had given me a book about the Camino. I had long known that people still traveled the thousand-year-old network of footpaths to the tomb of the Apostle in northwestern Spain, and that knowledge had pleased my old-fashioned devotional temperament. I read and enjoyed the book, and it occurred to me that maybe one day I might make the pilgrimage, too.

Back in England a few days later, I met in the street an ex-colleague whom I hadn't seen for a decade. "What have you been up to for the last ten years?" I asked him. "Quite a lot," he replied. "But one of the most interesting things I have done has been in the last ten weeks: I cycled to Compostela and back." The hairs on the back of my neck stood up.

The following week, I was staying at the Chateau de Plassac, north of Bordeaux. After dinner on my last night there, my host and I took our brandy glasses and cigars on a moonlit stumble around the estate. He pointed out many interesting details of the house and grounds, told me a little of its history, and concluded the tour at a small late-medieval tower with an arch under it. "And this," he said, "is the Tour des Pelerins."

"What pilgrims, Audoin?" I asked. "Why, the pilgrims of St. Jacques de Compostelle, of course!" he replied. "You are standing on the *chemin* at this very moment!" I resolved then and there to make the pilgrimage.

Eleven months later, I was sitting down to a predawn breakfast in the refuge in St. Jean Pied de Port, on the French side of the Pyrenees, listening to a little speech given to the gathered pilgrims by the laughter-creased, croaky-voiced, rolling-gaited "mère des pelerins."

"It would be madness to attempt the mountain route into Spain," announced Jeannine. "You must follow the main road. On the high path, there is snow, ice, and fog; you will get lost."

Well, she was right on all counts—but in my case, not in that order. I got lost before I even got out of town and ended up committed to the mountain route by mistake. There was indeed snow and ice; and the fog got so thick that, after a while, I couldn't see the signs that marked the path—or very much else, for that matter. My guidebook told me that the critical point of the journey (which should in no circumstances be undertaken in adverse weather conditions) was the cairn marking where the camino left the track and headed off over the grass. Miss it, I read, and you have had it.

Had I missed it already? If I hadn't, how would I be able to spot it in the fog? These two questions were quickly subsumed in a third: If Providence had put me on the pilgrimage in the first place, was It really likely to abandon me on the first day? A little gust of cold wind brought the answer. The fog swirled for

Michael McMahon

Michael McMahon (left) with Luigi, a pilgrim from Rome.

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a moment, and I found myself in a 20-yard pocket of visibility. At the other side of it, a dozen or so people were standing at the foot of a fingerpost set by a pile of stones, listening to instructions addressed to them by a man who was obviously a guide. They were all wearing winter mountain clothing, including gloves, heavy waterproofs, and balaclavas. In my straw hat and lightweight walking trousers, I had been feeling cold all morning; now, I also felt foolish. As I walked over to the waymarker, the group set off along a path that appeared through the mist. The sign said "Camino de Santiago."

I followed that sign and signs like it for 500 miles over the next three-and-a-half weeks. All sorts of things went wrong, of course, and I had to put up with a fair amount of pain. But somehow, the suffering didn't seem to matter. Pilgrims quickly learn to accept it, and, once accepted, it becomes insignificant. Yes, there were times when my blisters were so bad that each step felt like putting a bare foot on red-hot shards of glass, and when the tips of my toes felt as if matches were being struck on them. My back and (more) my neck ached under the weight of my rucksack pretty constantly, and my shirt was always wet through with sweat. And yet, all these discomforts were not merely diminished but displaced by the pilgrim's most immediate reward: an irrepressible sense of Joy.

There are many human explanations for the happiness that pilgrims experience. Grace, as the Angelic Doctor says, works through Nature. Walking balances the activity of the brain and the body, establishing a rhythm that generates a sense of peace. Stepping aside from the cares and routines of everyday life liberates the spirit and allows a sensation of detachment. Discovering that one can cover great distances carrying a heavy pack inspires self-confidence and promotes a sense of achievement. Even when added together, however, these pleasures do not amount to Joy, which (as C.S. Lewis found to his Surprise) is a thoroughly transcendent experience. To the Christian, to know Joy is to know one is in the presence of God. I had set off with the idea that I was in some way walking to Him but quickly realized that He was with me on the road.

Many of the pilgrims I met told me that they felt the same. Maurice, a retired schoolmaster from near Dublin, told me that the word that summed up for him the sense of God's guiding and protecting



Michael McMahon

Pilgrims on the Camino in Navarre.

presence on the camino was *held*—and when he extended his joined and cupped hands to express the idea, his three companions nodded, saying they knew exactly what he meant. Stuart and Pamela, from Melbourne, told me in Santiago that they had thought through what had been remarkable about their walk and had concluded that it was that they had spent a month of their lives living in the present—and in the Presence. Luigi, from Rome, told me that he was inexpressibly grateful to God for the love that He had shown him on every day of his pilgrimage. The most dramatic expression of it had been after a problem with his bankcard had left him without cash for over a week. Fellow pilgrims, *hospitaleros*, and complete strangers had overwhelmed him with their generosity, buying him meals, paying for his accommodation, and giving him cash.

I received many kindnesses myself. When my knee became so swollen that I could hardly walk, a pilgrim gave me his fancy telescopic walking stick ("Keep it! It's the spirit of the camino!") and another gave me a roadside physio session without which I wouldn't have been able to carry on. When I limped into the monastery of San Juan de Ortega, a French woman saw my difficulties and sent her husband off to fetch her medical kit. "Take your boots off!" she said, announcing herself to be a chiropodist. She lanced and dressed my blisters and then disappeared with a smile and a wave. An old man hobbled after me in Villafrancea, took me by the arm and led me back to a turning that I had missed half a mile earlier. When I got to Melide, I was so tired that I couldn't see a sign for accommodation for looking, and I asked a stranger if he knew of anywhere I might stay. It turned out that he was a German pilgrim, and he told me that he had found a wonderful—and wonderfully cheap—little hotel in a back street on the other side of town. "But it is too difficult to explain how to find it," he said. So he took me there. In San Miguel del Camino, I rested on a bench outside the house of a man who had put out a box of biscuits under a sign saying "Help yourself, pilgrim!" Beside it was a little pile of handwritten cards. I have one before me now: "May the Apostle grant you all your wishes." It is signed "Agapito" and dated "27-05-04."

Buoyed up by so much good will and encouragement, I finally reached Santiago on June 3, as the cathedral bells were clanging, clattering, and clanking for six o'clock Mass. I showed my credential at the pilgrims' bureau and was issued a signed and sealed certificate announcing "*Dnum. Michaelem McMahon hoc sacratissimum Templum pietatis causa devote visitasse.*" I entered the cathedral by the Puerta Santa, which was open, for I had made my pilgrimage during a Jacobean Holy Year. When I queued to pray before the casket that is said to contain the Saint's mortal remains, I was not troubled by the thought that it might not: Either way, I had walked my way close to a man who, 2,000 years ago, had walked with Our Savior. And, when I climbed the stairs to give the great silvered and gilded statue of the Apostle the customary embrace, I heard myself address it and him in a single, spontaneous word that formed itself without the intervention of thought: "Thanks."

Michael McMahon writes from Norfolk, England.

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by David A. Hartman

Diagnosing the Diminishing Dollar



Holding a green piece of paper decorated with patriotic symbols as a proxy for economic value is an act of faith. To do so with the currency of your own country is a necessary act of faith, since daily life requires it in order to make economic transactions. But to hold sizable amounts of the currency, or the currency-denominated assets, of a *foreign* country is carrying faith beyond any warrant provided by human experience. History clearly reveals that the eventual debasement of currency is as predictable as night following day. Why, then, are our foreign-trade partners so eager to hold huge hoards of U.S. greenbacks?

A survey of the current economic landscape abounds with evidence of the debasement of the dollar. Gold, the hedge of last resort for financial liquidity, has returned to its former price of $450 per ounce. Oil prices that hovered around $20 per barrel in the 1990's have more than doubled, while housing prices are growing at double-digit rates.

The typical American homeowner is attempting to profit from this debasement by borrowing as much as mortgage lenders will lend to buy the largest home that he can(not) afford. Household debt as a percentage of Gross National Product has continually set records for the past two decades. When interest levels return to normal and join soaring energy costs, these households will have a painful financial hangover from their current libations.

The federal deficit (now approaching $400 billion per year) is the principal source of the dollars that fuel the inflation of the price of commodities and other real assets. Financed primarily by foreigners and foreign central banks, with the balance bought by the Federal Reserve Banks, the deficit roughly correlates to the international current-account deficit generated by the negative balance of trade in goods.

The excessive growth of the money supply since the mid-90's has driven after-tax and risk-adjusted interest rates to negative real returns on fixed-rate investments. Stock-market returns, augmented by foreign earnings restated in depreciated dollars, and outsourcing of goods and services to cheaper foreign suppliers—plus the valuation of earnings at unrealistically low interest rates—barely support otherwise unjustifiable common-stock prices. Both stocks and bonds provide unattractive real returns to U.S. investors, discouraging savings and encouraging excessive investment in cheap imports and an overpriced residential-housing market paid for with unsustainably cheap mortgage debt.

The Bush administration has been playing a game of chicken with our foreign competitors by devaluing the dollar as much as possible in an attempt to close the trade deficit. The European Union and, to some extent, Japan have allowed the relative appreciation of their currencies, but the remainder of the Asian countries have kept their currencies pegged to the dollar. The United States has been their most profitable market, providing the lowered costs that go along with access to the world's largest homogenous market—the only principal market that offers them relief from border-adjusted value-added taxes. U.S. manufacturers' exports are likewise priced out of foreign markets by those countries' value-added taxes, with no compensating relief offered by the U.S. Tax Code.

As the dollar depreciates, the rising prices of raw materials are soon followed by cost-of-living increases in wages and salaries, and that is on top of the cost-push of lower operating rates. So the devaluation of the dollar has had the effect of a dog chasing its tail. Compared with a basket of seven major currencies, the dollar has declined an average of 15 percent—and all to no avail; an equal decline is predicted during 2005. As the *Wall Street Journal* recently observed:

> [T]he Bush Treasury, and perhaps Mr. Bush himself, seem to have fallen for the notion that a country can devalue its way to prosperity. . . . Britain tried this in the 1970's, and had to call in Margaret Thatcher to save the country from sinking to Third World status. The Carter administration also tried talking down the dollar and ended up inspiring a global run on U.S. assets.

BusinessWeek asks, in the same vein:

> Will trade imbalances topple the greenback? . . . [F]or more than a decade the global economy has become more dependent on foreign capital to finance its (U.S.) demand. . . . Foreign money now finances three-fourths of U.S. net investment.

Neither of these astute observers, however, diagnoses the real source of the problem and, thus, cannot offer a remedy.

The declining dollar is the product of three deficits: The federal deficit, the difference between excessive federal spending and ill-advised tax cuts; the personal-savings deficit, characterized by "consume today, and worry about tomorrow later"; and the manufacturing trade deficit, which clearly indicates the desperate need to level the taxation playing field for our disappearing manufacturing sector. Ideological internationalists without concern for their nation, multinational corporations who profit from the hollowing out of the U.S. economy, and economists who do not understand the power of price mechanisms have used the media to mislead the public regarding the source of the problem and its obvious solution: border-adjusted (consumption-based) tax reform.

A country that manipulates her own currency to demean it as a store of value for the wealth of her citizens and as a respected medium of exchange; that borrows to encourage consumption at the expense of savings for investment (to be billed to future generations); and that provides foreign competitors with tax advantages that are insurmountable for her national industries' survival is not being governed in the interests of her citizens. c

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by Srdja Trifkovic

Rumsfeld Stays

Having provided advice to a number of influential Balkan figures in my time, I know the sense of frustration when sound counsel is overruled in favor of proposals based on error or mendacity. I have been proved right, but only when it was too late: Crown Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic would have been better off had he discarded his notions of reuniting Yugoslavia in the early 1990's. The leaders of the Republika Srpska should have severed their link to Milosevic well before he stabbed them in the back in 1995. Instead of ratifying the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute in 2001, President Vojislav Kostunica should have signed a bilateral treaty with Washington on the nonextradition of U.S. citizens to the ICC.

It is somewhat consoling that the effect of those mistakes was minor in the global scheme of things. What happens in the Balkans is very important *vis-à-vis* the "War on Terror" and as a reflection of the postmodern Western mind-set, but individual decisions by the local actors are of limited significance. When the president of the United States accepts advice on matters of war and peace that is based on error or guile, however, the consequences are serious both for America and the rest of the world. If he continues receiving advice from the same source regardless of that source's past failures, the matter is alarming, indeed.

Alarm bells should have rung on December 3, when Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld won a strong endorsement from President George W. Bush and remained at the Pentagon. This was a mistake for four reasons: It vindicated the false rationale for the war in Iraq; it perpetuated a flawed exit strategy (or, more precisely, the failure to develop one); it reiterated the strategy of global dominance; and it implied trust in Mr. Rumsfeld's two top advisors, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith, who are not deserving of it.

That the war in Iraq was fought for reasons different from those stated is by now certain. If there is one person more culpable than any other for the lies and the subsequent mess, it is Donald Rumsfeld. As I pointed out in this space in October 2002, he and his team had long sought to construct an Iraqi pseudoreality in pursuit of a war "that, if successful, will do little to advance American interests: We would be saddled with yet another Muslim protectorate, unstable and resentful." That pseudoreality rested on two key claims: the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) and his links to the September 11 attacks.

Mr. Rumsfeld and Dr. Wolfowitz had advocated war against Iraq on the grounds of her alleged possession of WMD's for many years. They were among the founding members of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), established in 1997 and dedicated to "American global leadership." The PNAC started advocating the overthrow of Saddam almost immediately. In January 1998, in an open letter to President Clinton, the PNAC said that the only acceptable strategy was one that would eliminate the possibility that Iraq would be able to use, or threaten to use, WMD's: "In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy."

This theme was to be a mainstay of the group's public speaking and private policy advocacy for years. Testifying to the House National Security Committee in September 1998, Wolfowitz asserted that Saddam was reconstituting his "prohibited weapons capabilities" and demanded "a serious policy" that would "free Iraq's neighbors from Saddam's murderous threats." There was no proof, then or later, that Iraq had any such capability; in 2002, however, that objection was discounted by Rumsfeld in a phrase worthy of Hegel: "the absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence."

When no WMD's were found following the occupation of Iraq, Rumsfeld refused to admit that he was wrong. "I have reason, every reason, to believe that the intelligence that we were operating off was correct," he declared, "and that we will, in fact, find weapons or evidence of weapons programs that are conclusive." After almost two years of diligent search, this has not happened, and it most likely never will. On the basis of this blunder alone, Rumsfeld should have done the honorable thing and resigned, or the President should have replaced him.

As for the alleged terrorist link, the record is even more damning for the secretary and his aides. We now know that, within hours of the attacks on September 11, they were busy trying to insert the war against Iraq into the package of antiterrorist options. According to the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *that same afternoon*, Mr. Rumsfeld told Gen. Richard Myers that "his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Laden." Some months later, he blended two themes into one by declaring that, "within a week, or a month, Saddam could give his WMD to al-Qa'ida." Secretary of State Colin Powell told the commission that, within days of September 11, Dr. Wolfowitz had argued that Iraq should be attacked but had no rational basis for the demand:

> Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. "Paul [Wolfowitz] was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with," Powell told us. "And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem."

"Using" is an apt word: In the end, the commission concluded that there was "no credible evidence" of a terrorist link. It noted that Bin Laden had long opposed the secular regime in Baghdad and that his subsequent attempts to obtain help from Iraq were rebuffed by Saddam. Its conclusion, that there was no proof "that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States," reflected the

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consensus of the intelligence community. Its findings were openly supported by CIA and FBI officials who had been under intense political pressure before the war to establish such a link, notably by Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon. If Mr. Rumsfeld and his aides were not able to prove the commission's well-publicized assessment wrong, they should have been fired for effectively obstructing the War on Terror.

The Pentagon trio got their war in March 2003, ostensibly won it, and then mishandled its aftermath. The prisoner-abuse scandal last spring—for which Rumsfeld managed to avoid responsibility—had only aggravated a very bad security situation. Over the past year, the insurgency has grown from 15 to 20 attacks each day to over 150, and it now includes almost daily car bombings of U.S. convoys and mortar and rocket attacks in the center of Baghdad. The battle for Fallujah was hardly over when Mosul became a battleground. As American casualties exceed 1,200 dead and 10,000 wounded, there is still no clear exit strategy, and U.S. troop strength is actually increasing. Even a general election, scheduled for January, will resolve little if the Sunni minority boycotts it—or if the Shia majority wins too convincingly.

It is unclear under what conditions Mr. Rumsfeld would be ready to proclaim the mission a success and recommend the withdrawal of U.S. forces. He and his team appear unwilling to accept that, in the long run, Washington will not be able to dictate the composition and policies of the post-occupation government in Baghdad. They are equally loath to contemplate Iraq's *de facto* partition—which should be treated as a feasible option—or the most likely alternative, her domination by a religious Shia government that would be friendly to Iran. They can hardly hope for the emergence of a secular, Western-friendly political force, a Ba'ath with a human face: Rumsfeld's appointee Paul Bremmer was too thorough in eradicating the Ba'ath itself, down to the level of parking-lot guards and preschool teachers, turning ethno-religious factionalism into the only game in town. Having succeeded in imposing a monopoly on the Iraqi policy, Rumsfeld should have been held accountable for its shortcomings. "Staying the course" promises more of the same, with an array of Islamic terrorist groups being the only beneficiaries.

The fundamental problem with Donald Rumsfeld has less to do with the particulars of his Iraqi policy—mendacious as it was before the war and inept in its aftermath—than with his strategic vision. He is still an advocate of NATO expansion against a Russia that has long ceased to be an enemy but may be forced to become one if the alliance grabs her Ukrainian backyard. He still favors the antimissile defense system, a costly proposal whose assumptions are both politically and technically flawed. The 1999 Rumsfeld Report stated that the system was needed because

> a number of countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their regions and . . . they want to place restraints on the U.S. capability to project power or influence into their regions.

Five years later, the secretary of defense still does not see that it is impossible to maintain forever the ability to counter and defeat any regional power that seeks to assert its limited interests—*e.g.*, China in the Straits of Taiwan. His ambition demands global hegemony as the unquestionable basis of U.S. foreign policy. That the task is inherently self-defeating should be obvious: In the past three years, the already massive U.S. military budget has grown by a third to a mind-boggling $500 billion, equaling the combined military spending of the rest of the world. A strategic doctrine that demands the capacity to project power everywhere and all the time cannot be sustained either economically or physically, because the threat is limitless and open-ended by definition. A man who subscribes to such a doctrine should not head the Pentagon.

Last, but by no means least, Donald Rumsfeld should have been replaced because he has displayed poor judgment, and may have even compromised U.S. national security, by surrounding himself with men of questionable integrity. In 2001, he made Richard Perle chairman of the Defense Policy Board, a position Perle had to resign in March 2003 when it was revealed that a venture-capital firm in which he was managing partner would profit from the Iraq war. (And yes, Perle was an enthusiastic advocate of that war.) The attitude of Rumsfeld's henchmen was evident in Paul Wolfowitz's now famous *Vanity Fair* admission last year that, in seeking justification for war against Iraq, "for bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." This surprisingly frank statement reflects a manipulative Straussian mind-set that knows no restraint and no moral bounds.

The FBI is continuing its probe of accusations that Lawrence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst, supplied the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) with classified Department of Defense documents that were passed on to Israel. On December 1, 2004, the feds searched the lobby group's offices for the second time in three months and served subpoenas on four senior AIPAC staff. Mr. Franklin, a career specialist involved in Iran policy, works under Douglas Feith at the Office of Policy. It was Dr. Feith, Richard Perle's protégé, who gave Larry Franklin his job, just as it was Perle who gave Feith a job after he was suspected of leaking secrets to Israel during Ronald Reagan's second term. As Thomas Fleming pointed out in these pages last November, Feith was one of eight authors of a 1996 memorandum that urged the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu to move toward reestablishing the principle of preemption and in which the authors referred to a foreign country as their own ("We in Israel . . .").

"I recommend that you allow the secretary of defense and deputy secretary of defense to return to the private sector," U.S. Rep. Dave Obey, the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, wrote to President Bush in September 2003. The 18-term congressman said that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz

> have made repeated and serious miscalculations, miscalculations that have been extremely costly to the American people in terms of lives lost, degradation of our military and intelligence capability to defend against terrorists in countries outside Iraq, isolation from our traditional allies and unexpected demands on our budget that are crowding our other priorities.

It is to be hoped that, as Mr. Bush begins his second term, at least some of Representative Obey's Republican colleagues will come to see the wisdom of that call. c

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

President Bush Can End "Gay Marriage" If He Wants To

by William J. Quirk

In June 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court ignited our most recent culture war when it discovered a constitutional right to sodomize (*Lawrence and Garner* v. *Texas*). The Massachusetts Supreme Court then threw kerosene on the fire by finding that its constitution mandated "gay marriage" (*Goodridge* v. *Department of Public Health*). Americans from San Francisco to New York saw glowing same-sex couples exchanging vows in open violation of state laws, and Americans didn't like it. The fire, on Election Day, consumed the Democrats and the homosexuals. The homosexuals immediately understood they had gone too far: "There is hurt, there is bewilderment, there is trauma," said Matt Foreman, the executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. "Let's not pretend that it doesn't feel like we are all walking targets, more than ever, because it does feel that way." Oliver Stone worried that his movie starring a bisexual Alexander the Great might get caught up in the flames. "I'd be naive not to be concerned. I didn't know there would be a parallel situation going on." Neither did John Kerry.

Has the imperial judiciary also gone too far? Has the long exercise of untrammeled power made the Supreme Court careless? Has the country lost her patience with the use of the judicial process to enact a moral agenda? The Bush administration campaigned against the Court, promising to rein in "activist judges." If the Court has been casually provoking the country, perhaps it should be chastised. Let's see if the Bush administration has the power to deal with it.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in the *Lawrence* decision, which struck down a Texas antisodomy law, found that "liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." Homosexuals are "free as adults to engage in the conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Since the Supreme Court conceded Texas was not enforcing her law, experienced Court watchers did not understand why the Court had taken up such an incendiary issue. The *New York Times*' Linda Greenhouse suggested, in the University of Virginia's Henry J. Abraham Lecture (April 2, 2004), that perceptions can change overnight "on the basis of personal experience and direct observation." To adhere to its precedent—the Court had upheld Georgia's antisodomy law in 1986—"would have been to negate the way a majority of the court now sees the world, and the way a majority of the justices wanted the Court to appear in the world's eyes." It was a matter of image.

In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the Massachusetts state constitution, dating to the Pilgrims, required the Commonwealth to provide "gay marriage": "The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational reason." (No *rational* reason?) The Massachusetts court gave the state legislature six months to pass an appropriate law, but the legislature failed, authorizing only "civil unions": "It is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second class status," said the Massachusetts Supreme Court on February 4, 2004 (Advisory Opinion on Senate No. 2175). The court concluded:

> That there may remain personal residual prejudice against same-sex couples is a proposition all too familiar to other disadvantaged groups. That such prejudice exists is not a reason to insist on less than the constitution requires.

The ruling set off a flurry of "gay weddings" across the country.

Former President Clinton, speaking after the November 2004 election, told Hamilton College students that "the gay marriage issue was an overwhelming factor in the defeat of John Kerry." *Newsweek* reports that Kerry refused Clinton's advice to make a strong anti-"gay-marriage" speech. Kerry and the Democrats constructed a values wall to separate themselves from the voters. Some exit polls support Clinton's remark, finding that the most important issue to voters (22 percent) was "moral values," which ran ahead of taxes, education, Iraq, terrorism, the economy, and healthcare. "Moral values" looked a lot like a proxy for "gay marriage" and partial-birth abortion—80 percent of those choosing it as their most important issue voted for President Bush.

On Election Day, 11 states voted on amendments to their state constitutions to ban "gay marriage." All passed with large majorities. The margins ranged from a high of 86 percent in red-state Mississippi to lows in blue-states Michigan and Oregon of 59 percent and 57 percent, respectively. Ohio, which teetered all night between red and blue, passed the "gay marriage" ban 62 to 38 percent, which almost certainly enabled Bush to carry the state. Homosexual-rights advocates told the *New York Times* that they expected to lose, with the possible exception of Oregon, but were "stunned" by the "depressingly large" margins of loss. Now, homosexuals are reconsidering their strategy of using the courts to secure rights. Said one, "The consequences—the risks—of losing are great. And we're unprepared for the consequences of winning."

The new strategy of homosexual-rights advocates is to attempt to persuade people of their position. They are willing to try a little democracy—which is, of course, exactly what they should do. The homosexuals learned a lesson that the Supreme Court has refused to acknowledge for 50 years: Court intervention in culture-war issues does not settle anything. The Court sets fires; it does not put them out. Abortion, affirmative action, prayer, and the role of religion are more contentious matters today than when the Court took control of them. And, of course, the litigation never ends. Only the political process, with its debate and compromise, provides a democratically sustainable solution.

Has the imperial judiciary walked away from this fire unsinged? Maybe not. An A.P. poll taken after the election shows that six out of ten Americans no longer believe that judges should have life ten-

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ure. One cost of injecting the courts into political issues is that the American public is increasingly inclined to view judges as political players who, therefore, do not deserve life tenure. The solution, however, is not to make judges more politically accountable for the fires they start but simply to take away their box of matches. The Bush administration has a remarkable opportunity to do just that.

First, the administration should forget the plans it has announced. Appointing conservative judges is hard, slow, and—if history is any guide—disappointing. Republican Presidents since Richard M. Nixon have been promising to do that, and we now have "gay marriage," which, we can safely say, is not what the voters who elected those presidents had in mind. It is fine to appoint conservative judges, but, once appointed, they take on the bias of the institution. Justice Stephen Breyer recently told a Harvard audience: "In my experience, most judges approach and decide most cases, including constitutional cases, quite similarly." Judges, particularly lower-court judges, believe they should follow past decisions, and they should—they are not legislators—but the problem is that now we have 50 years of awful Supreme Court decisions. For example, in late November 2004, a federal appeals court held that, since the U.S. military discriminates against homosexuals, Yale Law School could bar military recruiters from its campus without fear of losing federal funds (*Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights* v. *Rumsfeld*). Conservative judges can help some, but only very gradually.



Elizabeth Wolf

The Bush administration should also forget its plan to push for a constitutional amendment to ban "gay marriage." Such an amendment is wrong in theory, because the states should decide the issue; and is a waste of time unless the administration has 66 votes in the Senate—which it does not have and is not going to get.

The administration's announced plans, in short, will not do much to get the courts out of the culture wars; the problem, however, is easily solved. The House showed exactly how to do it last term. H.R. 3313, which passed last July by a vote of 233-192, would remove the "gay marriage" issue from the Supreme Court's docket. Each state's high court would then have the last word. In effect, the federal courts could no longer start this fire.

Congress, under Article III of the Constitution, controls the Supreme Court's jurisdiction—a feature that the Framers included to provide a democratic check on the Court. A simple statute passed by a simple majority of Congress and signed by the President can assure that each state can decide for itself without fear of being overridden by a judicially imposed uniform national rule. The same democratic check on the Court can be used for any of the culture-war issues. Let the states deal with them. Congress, if the states abuse their discretion, can always restore federal jurisdiction.

The Constitution, in Abraham Lincoln's phrase, is the frame of government under which we live. But who interprets the Constitution? The Constitution does not expressly assign that duty to any branch. The Supreme Court, for the last 50 years, has claimed to be the exclusive and final interpreter. The imperial judiciary rests on that assertion.

The Constitution, to the contrary, grants Congress almost total control over the Court—what cases it may hear and when. Congress itself, of course, is bound by the Constitution and can only pass a law it believes to be constitutional. The executive also, of course, cannot enforce a court order that it believes to be unconstitutional. Three branches, not one, can and should interpret the Constitution.

The right plan only needs 51 votes in the Senate, and the Bush administration has 55. The administration just has to use its 55-vote majority to get through the Senate a couple of laws like H.R. 3313. Last year's Senate did not take up H.R. 3313, but the Bush administration now has the necessary votes to pass a similar bill. By a simple majority vote, our judicial dictators could disappear like evil spirits at the break of day.

The imperial judiciary has only existed this long because it has suited the convenience of Congress. The culture-war issues are all political poison, and, if they can be dealt off to the life-tenured Supreme Court, all the better. Similarly, the Senate, for decades, has been the graveyard for all efforts to overrule the Court by constitutional amendment—*e.g.*, amendments concerning flag-burning, public prayer, campaign finance, and term limits. Now, however, the Bush administration has a workable majority in the Senate, which is all it needs for the right plan.

The House is clearly on board with efforts to instill in the Court some respect for majority values. Last term, the House—to the shock of the legal establishment—twice exercised its constitutional authority over the Supreme Court docket. The first instance was H.R. 3313. The second, H.R. 2028, passed by a larger margin. The Court, on June 22, signaled that it would delete "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance as soon as an appropriate case could get to it. The House, just 90 days later, passed H.R. 2028—which would have removed cases involving the Pledge of Allegiance from the Court's docket—by a vote of 247 to 173. For an imperial Court, that is, shall we say, a bit disrespectful. The Court will try hard to see that it does not happen again.

Last year's Senate did not take up either H.R. 3313 or H.R. 2028, but the Bush administration now has no excuse not to end the imperial judiciary. President Bush owes his election to people who do not think that the Supreme Court should impose "gay marriage" on the country and who believe the Court has been out of line for a long time. He promised them he would rein in "activist judges." Now he has precisely the right instrument, at precisely the right place, at exactly the right moment in history. That alignment may not come along again for quite some time—if ever.

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by George McCartney

Puritan Pervert



Kinsey

Produced by American Zoetrope
Written and directed by Bill Condon
Distributed by Fox Searchlight Pictures

Pervert. Although the word has been drummed out of polite conversation in recent years, *pervert* comes inevitably to mind when discussing Alfred C. Kinsey, the sex statistician and subject of Bill Condon's new film, *Kinsey*. *Pervert* perfectly applies to the man who spent his life trying to erase this word from our vocabulary. Etymologically, it comes from the Latin *per* (thoroughly) and *vert* (turn). To be perverted, then, means to turn or be turned thoroughly away from the normal. This was Kinsey, a man who turned away from the normal in sexual relations and succeeded in turning his wife, his colleagues, and, eventually, a significant portion of America with him. He did so by claiming to demonstrate that there was no basis for classifying any sexual activity as abnormal, including but hardly limited to wife-sharing, hetero and homo group sex, voyeurism, sadomasochism, pedophilia, and—one of his own favorite pastimes—masturbating by means of urethral insertion, preferably using a toothbrush, bristle-end first.

Initially, Kinsey's turning was not something he freely chose. It was forced upon him by his unusually contentious upbringing. Whatever else he was, Kinsey was an exceptionally strong-willed individual, so it is not surprising that, as a boy, he would clash with his father, a blinkered, 19th-century puritan whose entire life seems to have been a search-and-destroy mission waged against pleasure of all kinds, especially sexual. It was inevitable that Kinsey should rebel against his father's warped moralism. Unfortunately, as can happen with strong personalities, his rebellion went too far. From a perverted, humorless Christianity, he vaulted into a perverted, humorless behaviorism.

In Condon's biopic, we first meet the future sex statistician as a young boy. It is 1908, and he is listening to his father, Alfred Seguine (John Lithgow), harangue his Methodist congregation on the evils of the modern technologies that facilitate lust: cars, movies, and . . . zippers. Zippers? Yes, they afford "speedy access to moral oblivion," fulminates Kinsey Senior. He fairly seethes with what we have been strenuously taught to recognize as an imperfectly repressed libido. His stifled urges have curdled into a miserable, raging prudery. Not long after this scene, we see Alfred C. 30 years later. He stands before an amphitheater, his face flushed red as he hectors 100 or so hormonally addled college students. It is not zipper speed that has him exercised, however. He is inveighing against the "scandalous delay in [American] sexual activity." The tone of impassioned righteousness that resonates through the oratory of both father and son says it all. Junior may think he has thrown off Papa's orthodoxy, but he has merely swapped it for another zealotry that is just as bullying in its own way and frequently a good deal more harmful. Later in the film, Alfred C.'s own son rebels against his father's penchant for discussing genitalia with his daughters at mealtime. Having heard quite enough about labia and vulvas, the young man declares such talk is not normal at dinner. As he stalks from the room, he angrily informs his father, "My friends' parents think you're a menace." Unfortunately, we never hear from this perceptive young man again.

This juxtaposition of puritanisms is the best part of Condon's otherwise dishonest film. Elsewhere, he pretends to give us Kinsey, warts and all; in fact, he has carefully sanitized his subject preparatory to canonizing him. The real Kinsey was not at all like the film's. Playing Kinsey, Liam Neeson has been directed to make the statistician seem a tormented but large-souled man dedicated to a scientifically disinterested inquiry into the facts of sexual activity in America. Not so, his sympathetic biographers reveal. In *Alfred C. Kinsey: A Life*, James H. Jones judges Kinsey to have been a clever manipulator who masterfully disguised his real intentions from both authorities and associates. "The man I came to know," Jones writes, "bore no resemblance to the canonical Kinsey." He was "a crypto-reformer who spent his every waking hour attempting to change the sexual mores of the United States." In *Sex: The Measure of All Things: A Life of Alfred C. Kinsey*, Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy reports that Kinsey confided to one of his colleagues that "the most basic force behind his research was deeply personal." So much for disinterested inquiry.

Entomologist-turned-sexologist, Kinsey made a point of referring to his own species under the rubric of "the human animal." After a career studying the habits of gall wasps and cataloging nearly 500,000 specimens, he tired of the critter and changed course. He became determined to apply his scientific methods to Americans—you and me and our children. As warrant for doing so, he reasoned that "human beings are just larger, more complicated gall wasps" and assembled a staff at Indiana University to take the "sex histories" of thousands of men and women. The ever-progressive Rockefeller Foundation found his early results so promising that they decided to support his efforts lavishly. In 1948, Kinsey published his research in *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, followed five years later by *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*. The Kinsey Reports, as they came to be known, claimed their statistics demonstrated that 90 percent of American males and over 60 percent of females engaged, with varying degrees of frequency, in some kind of abnormal or illicit sex, officially defined. It followed, he told his supporters at Indiana and the Rockefeller Foundation but not the public at large, that, to cleanse society of sexual aberration, you would have to arrest just about everyone in the nation. "When it's everybody's sin, it's nobody's sin," he sardonically quipped.

Seeming to authorize erotic indulgence, Kinsey's books became best-sell-

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ers, an almost unprecedented phenomenon for putatively scholarly works. *Time* put Kinsey on its cover, noting that this mild-mannered Methodist from New Jersey was an "almost monotonously normal human being," a dedicated family man and hardworking scientist whose painstaking research promised to liberate average Americans from the puritan prison of sexual ignorance. Following *Time*'s lead, the rest of the media joined in hailing him a new savior. The young Hugh Hefner (who, like Kinsey, came from an overbearing Methodist background) wrote an ecstatic article on Kinsey's research for his college newspaper and, shortly after graduating, felt himself licensed to launch *Playboy*, enriching himself enormously by spreading the gospel of Kinsey-style sexual liberation to the immeasurable pleasure of adolescent men around the world.

And gospel it was. Kinsey had a reformer's zeal, and, like most reformers, his motives were profoundly self-interested. He was seeking a new dispensation in order to accommodate his own peculiar proclivities. This is what stood behind his insistence that judgmental words, such as *normal*, *abnormal*, and *perversion*, have no relevance when discussing sex. To prove this, he deep-fried his evidence. For instance, he claimed his statistics demonstrated that homosexuals make up 10 percent of the population and, further, that 37 percent of all men had at least one homosexual experience ending in orgasm. To this day, these statistics are accepted as fact by many who are unaware that, of the 5,300 men Kinsey interviewed, 1,400 were doing time in prison, and many of them were sex offenders. What's more, when interviewing homosexuals in less-restricted walks of life, he encouraged them to recruit their homosexual friends to participate in his project. Then, there is the matter of self-selecting volunteers. Even today, in the age of sexual bravado, most people are chary of revealing their intimate lives to strangers. Who, then, was agreeing to submit to these interviews in the buttoned-up 40's? It was, after all, a time when news of an irregular sex life could cost a person his job. Kinsey's interviewees were perforce a special group. Most were more than ordinarily preoccupied with sex and, therefore, more given to experiment. All this never appeared in the report and is barely mentioned in the film, and then only by one of Kinsey's academic competitors, a pompous, jealous prig.

The reason Kinsey dwelt on homosexuality was that he was a bisexual whose switch-hitting predilections seem to have been more homo than hetero. There is also a good deal of evidence that he may have preferred voyeurism and onanism even more. His devotion to various wanking techniques included autoerotic asphyxia. For a real treat, he would hang himself from the rafters by a rope tied round his scrotum until he passed out. Then, there is the research that he recorded on film in his attic of his male staff sharing their wives, including his own. No wonder he so fiercely insisted that there are no normative boundaries to sexual expression.

Sadly, Kinsey felt compelled to study child sexuality, too. To conduct this research, he contacted several pedophiles and took their sex histories. His two principle sources were Rex King, a sexual omnivore if we are to believe his story, and former Nazi Fritz von Balluseck, whose career met an untimely end in 1956 when he was tried for the rape and murder of a ten-year-old girl. King, who claimed to have had relations with over 9,000 partners of both sexes, human and animal, was especially interested in boys and had molested children as young as two months. Kinsey not only took these gentlemen's histories but maintained contact with them afterward, warmly thanking them for their help and inviting them to send more information on their exploits when they could. It never occurred to him to report them to authorities. To King, he wrote: "I rejoice at everything you send, for I am then assured that that much more of your material is saved for scientific publication." How can this be read but as an encouragement to molest more children in the cause of science? As for Von Balluseck, the judge who tried him in Germany wrote the following regarding the miscreant's diaries:

> With cynicism and passion, he recorded his crimes against 100 children in the smallest detail. He sent the detail of his experiences regularly to the U.S. sex researcher, Kinsey. The latter was very interested and kept up a regular and lively correspondence with Von Balluseck.

Condon muffles these disquieting facts. He includes a brief scene in which a visibly dismayed Kinsey interviews King, making it seem a one-time contact. Needless to say, the former Nazi is kept entirely out of camera range.

Condon and his enthusiastic cast have labored to make Kinsey seem a humane man of science. He was not. He spoke of human beings as animals encoded with but one purpose: to reach orgasm as frequently as possible. Love, friendship, children, and family simply do not enter the picture. His was the male dream in its most insane form: sexual gratification with neither context nor responsibility. Kinsey seems never to have considered that the sex drive of the "human animal" is designed to foster procreation. This is why his fraudulent research has been so instrumental in visiting sexual chaos on America. Whenever sex is promoted from a means to an end in itself, havoc is likely to ensue. The wild increase in pornography, prostitution, disease, broken homes, abortions, and throwaway children can all be traced to the kind of demand Kinsey and others of his ilk have imposed upon the unwitting: Desire, however wayward, must be satisfied before all other considerations. A puritan to the end, Kinsey was grimly determined to transform his perversions into moral duties.

It might be worth mentioning something else that Condon left out of his film. While Kinsey and his crew of graduate students were stalking the perfect orgasm, America was at war with two totalitarian regimes that threatened to harness human energy to less pleasurable pursuits. Kinsey and his staff seem to have been content to leave this matter to the unenlightened.

The Kinsey Institute still flourishes on the campus of Indiana University, disseminating views that continue to be taken seriously by government officials and civic groups, including the North American Man/Boy Love Association. By the way, the Institute's website currently features news of Condon's film. They obviously think that it is a swell way to promote themselves. c

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by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

Night Vision

"I hear thunder," Ivalene said in a puzzled voice, looking up to the blue sky stretched tight across the great canyon.

"How could there be thunder?" Will Ford demanded. "There isn't a cloud in sight. They must be blasting somewhere close by to here."

"So how could they be blasting, smartass?" she retorted. "Blasting isn't allowed in, like, national parks—you know?"

The low rumble sounded again almost under their feet, and Will Ford, looking at his boots, saw the head of the thunder cloud eight hundred feet down, flashing like a lightbulb between the walls of the side canyon. "Well I'll be danged," he said. "Look at that, would you? A guy comes all the way out here to the Grand Canyon for a little R and R, and it sounds just exactly like Baghdad on a slow day."

"How could *anyone* possibly compare the two?" Ivalene retorted. "Thunder is the voice of Gaia, Will—the goddess of nature, goodness, and peace."

Will Ford was about to answer her when he thought better of it. Brains, after all, weren't the reason he kept Ivalene around to begin with. Even so, it wasn't always easy having a tree-hugger for a girlfriend. "Maybe you better get dinner started now, before that thing moves on up here and soaks us," he suggested.

He had the fire already lit, and an armload of dead pine branches piled beside it; nothing left for him to do but prepare the thick beefsteak he'd bought from a butcher shop in Circleville, Utah, on the trip south from Salt Lake City. The rest of the meal was the girl's responsibility. Will poured a couple of fingers of single-malt whiskey into a plastic cup and went on to the Jeep, where he pulled a nylon bag from the back and sat up on the front seat to open it.

The bag lay heavily on his lap, a hard, concentrated weight. He unzipped it and drew out a piece of complicated-looking equipment painted black except for the glassy eye pieces. It was night-vision gear, but unlike the standard issue model—unlike, in fact, any night vision Will had seen in his Army career. He had bought it for seven dollars and fifty cents, American money, in a pawn shop in the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad. The pawnbroker, a bearded, turbaned man with a gold tooth and an eye that kept drifting up under its drooping lid, said the customer who had left it with him claimed it to be brand-new, state-of-the-art equipment, still in the experimental stage in the U.S.A. Having smuggled his purchase into the barracks in a duffel bag and hidden it among his other gear, Will had tested the system just once. The result had been profoundly disturbing—so much so that he had laid the thing away and not tried it again until, stateside at last, he had made further experiments at home in Salt Lake City.

Now he sat regarding the apparatus with an unease amounting to dread. Ashamed, Will replaced the night vision in its bag and wandered over to the cliff edge for a look at the thunderstorm. Though he'd been half expecting to find it crouched just below the canyon rim, waiting to leap up over and pounce upon the camp, the storm had vanished without a trace, except for a wet shine on the boulders far below and the acid smell of baked rock cooling.

"Storm's gone away," he reported cheerfully to Ivalene on his return to camp. "How's dinner coming along, Baby?"

"It's doing fine. I'll be ready for you to do your steak thing in just a few minutes now."

"Good. There's time for another whiskey, then. Sure you won't have a drink—just a *little* one—with me, to stay warm? It's getting downright chilly out here."

"I don't need chemicals in my body to keep me warm. And every outdoorsperson knows that alcohol does the opposite, by thinning the blood and reducing the flow to the extremities."

Will Ford thought: *Next she's going to tell me that contraceptive foams are chemicals and that sex, by withdrawing the flow of blood from the head to the loins, makes you stupid.*

The evening sun hung red above the western land line, burning along the undersides of the clouds and flooding the upper half of the canyon maze with a crimson brilliance that lay squarely upon the blue, purple, and black shadows below, without mixing with them. Will sat at a safe distance from the cliff edge to watch the sunset, while he finished his second drink. He was not a man to enjoy, or even to notice, scenery. The Grand Canyon, however, was unignorable: something beyond scenery, like the background of a movie transformed by camera tricks and special effects. Without waiting for sunset to be over, he tossed the empty cup over the cliff, before he could think what Ivalene would have had to say about that, and walked briskly on toward the fire. "If anyone had ever told me I was going to fall for a guy who ate dead cow," Ivalene marveled as she watched him lift the great marbled steak from its waxed-paper wrapper and place it, sizzling, across the carboned grill laid above the flames, "I'd have told them I was more likely to get involved with a lumberjack than that."

Will nodded to show he'd heard, but he did not answer her. The words "fall for" set off an alarm bell in his mind. They weren't the kind he was comfortable hearing any woman, let alone Ivalene, use.

It was dark on the North Rim when they finished supper. Ivalene cleaned up and gave the steak bone to Will with instructions to bury it at a distance from camp. He threw it into the canyon instead and made a detour round the lighted tent where Ivalene was inside taking care of girl things, on his way to the Jeep and the bottle of whiskey he'd left on the front seat, together with the nylon bag.

In the dim car light, the night-vision equipment looked especially sinister. Will Ford felt an impulse to hurl the contraption over the cliff after the steak bone and the cup, but he resisted it. There was a mystery here, he understood—rather, the key to a mystery—that he could not ignore or run away from. In Iraq, he had been decorated twice for bravery in action. Here, on the North Rim of the Grand Canyon, there was no one to

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snipe at him or try to blow him up with a bomb. Yet he was scared now, he had to admit—frightened beyond anything he'd ever known by these ugly black goggles attached by wires to the compact black box.

His experience in Iraq had been upsetting enough, but he'd reassured himself at the time by reflecting that this was a backward and uncivilized country, populated by people who were hardly better, if at all, than savages. The Salt Lake City one, by comparison, had been unnerving. This was a godly city, the capital of a god-fearing people who had taken a barren desert, similar to the Mesopotamian one, and, in a few decades, caused it to blossom as the rose. How could it be that the pawn broker's goggles, when operated in Utah, produced a vision essentially the same as when he'd first tried them in Iraq? On the streets of Baghdad, the first-seen, familiar, and expected things had always been a scrim obscuring and hiding the shadowy, lurking, and often unseen reality behind it. In Baghdad, you came to expect the unexpected, suspect the hitherto unsuspected. That was normal for Baghdad, because Baghdad was Baghdad. But this was Salt Lake City, with its wide, immaculately clean streets, its tall modern buildings shining in the white desert sun, its prosperous, well-dressed, and well-behaved people going about their honest business in the shadow of the Mormon temple in Temple Square. In Salt Lake City, what you saw was always what you saw. Only the night vision saw anything different, anything other, anything to drive a sane man mad with terror.

"Are you coming to bed, Sweetie Pie, or what?" Ivalene called from the tent.

Will Ford looked at the equipment lying in his lap, and at the nylon bag on the seat beside him. "I'm coming!" he cried, gratefully, as he stuffed the night vision back into the bag, like a snake charmer returning a cobra to its basket. A full moon had risen, he saw as he crossed the open clearing where the fire had collapsed in a pile of glimmering red coals, at the opposite end of the canyon from where the sun had gone down, inverting light and dark like a photographic negative.

"Take your boots off and stick them up under the rain fly," Ivalene ordered in a floating, detached voice as soon as he put his head and shoulders through the tent door. She lay naked in the half-zippered bag, and her eyes looked glassy. The inside of the tent was heavy with smoke and the familiar cloying odor, acrid and sweet at the same time.

Afterward, Will drank more of the whiskey, while Ivalene smoked another joint. He had a toke when she offered it and passed her his bottle in return. To his surprise, she accepted it and took a long pull. Will made a point of being approving.

"There's no chemicals in that stuff," he promised her. "Just a couple acres of corn, is all."

"I like it," Ivalene said positively. She reached for the bottle between them, sucked hard on it again, and patted her bare stomach afterward.

"You need to be careful with that stuff," Will told her, "on top of what you've had to smoke tonight, and not being used to whiskey and all."

"I feel fine," Ivalene insisted. "Just look at the full moon through the tent wall." She rose to her knees, grabbed his hand suddenly, and pulled on it, as if to lift him up. "Come on, Will! Let's both of us take a moonbath!"

"What in Hell is a moonbath?"

"It's when you get naked and run around outside and let the moonlight pour all over you and wash you clean—like standing under a waterfall!"

Now he'd heard everything, Will thought. He'd never known these earth muffins were so crazy.

"You go take a moonbath," he suggested, "and I'll just lay here and drink a little more whiskey and try and imagine being clean all over."

He cursed under his breath as her pale form clambered heavily on all fours over his legs on its way out of the tent. Then he must have slept, because the next thing he remembered was hearing a scream. It was a woman's scream, and Will Ford, waking all over at once despite the whiskey he'd had to drink and thinking for an instant that he was back in Iraq, reached instinctively beside himself for his rifle. Then, recalling where he was and with whom, he shucked off the sleeping bag and sprang naked through the tent door into the bright cold night beyond.

The cry, his combat-trained senses told him, had come from the direction of the cliff edge. Unconscious of the forest rubble under his bare feet, Will Ford sprinted to the stony verge and peered over it into the void below, transformed by the climbing moon to a rigid chaos of white and black, dark and light, shadow and lunar glare. Twice he shouted her name, and twice his voice returned him raggedly from every direction, multiplied like a staggered chorus of badly trained singers. In desperation, he looked wildly about himself. The night was nearly as bright as day, yet he could see nothing—rather, he was unable to make out anything. Then he remembered the night vision, tightly confined in its bag on the seat of the Jeep.

The moon showed him the way across the camp and back, as it had done so many nights in the Iraqi desert. Standing on a flat boulder, perilously close to the lip of the precipice, Will Ford settled the headset in place, adjusted the goggles tightly to his eye sockets, and moved the switch that activated the system to the ON position.

He saw nothing at first—nothing but the barren rock shelf below, a jumble of boulders and the sparsely scattered trees. Then, somewhere in that cold and universal immobility, something moved. Ford concentrated on the thing and saw that it moved again. It was one of the little black trees, a juniper or piñon pine, but, even as he watched, it was becoming less of a tree and more of something else: a creature mobile as well as alive, legged rather than rooted, more human than arboreal, upright like a man, but otherwise like no man he had ever seen before. Will Ford felt sick with terror. It was happening as it had happened before, in Baghdad and Salt Lake City. Dreadful forms were emerging from the shadows wherever he looked. Gigantic serpents glided behind eroded gnomons, horned demons like those scratched in the desert varnish by ancient Indians slipped from one tree to the next, every rock was an incubus, and boulders the size of houses revealed themselves as pale dragons crouched behind black open maws as wide as dragline buckets.

Will Ford tore frantically at the goggles and headset. They came away easily in his hands, and, two-handedly, he hurled them with all his strength at the huge bats, scaly pterodactyls, and winged gargoyles flying upward from the abyss to darken the moonlit sky with their myriad rubbery black wings. He had not intended to follow them and was shocked to find himself actually doing so, working his arms frantically as if to discover and utilize vestigial wings of his own. But only his voice seemed to work now as he plummeted like a small struggling rock toward a ledge of shattering sandstone a thousand feet below, taking up in the bass register where Ivalene's had broken from the treble clef five minutes ago. c

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

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